Two Concepts of Basic Equality

It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another's equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each individual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in themselves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else)

Cardiac myosin activation with omecamtiv mecarbil in systolic heart failure

BACKGROUND The selective cardiac myosin activator omecamtiv mecarbil has been shown to improve cardiac function in patients with heart failure with a reduced ejection fraction. Its effect on cardiovascular outcomes is unknown. METHODS We randomly assigned 8256 patients (inpatients and outpatients) with symptomatic chronic heart failure and an ejection fraction of 35% or less to receive omecamtiv mecarbil (using pharmacokinetic-guided doses of 25 mg, 37.5 mg, or 50 mg twice daily) or placebo, in addition to standard heart-failure therapy. The primary outcome was a composite of a first heart-failure event (hospitalization or urgent visit for heart failure) or death from cardiovascular causes. RESULTS During a median of 21.8 months, a primary-outcome event occurred in 1523 of 4120 patients (37.0%) in the omecamtiv mecarbil group and in 1607 of 4112 patients (39.1%) in the placebo group (hazard ratio, 0.92; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.86 to 0.99; P = 0.03). A total of 808 patients (19.6%) and 798 patients (19.4%), respectively, died from cardiovascular causes (hazard ratio, 1.01; 95% CI, 0.92 to 1.11). There was no significant difference between groups in the change from baseline on the Kansas City Cardiomyopathy Questionnaire total symptom score. At week 24, the change from baseline for the median N-terminal pro-B-type natriuretic peptide level was 10% lower in the omecamtiv mecarbil group than in the placebo group; the median cardiac troponin I level was 4 ng per liter higher. The frequency of cardiac ischemic and ventricular arrhythmia events was similar in the two groups. CONCLUSIONS Among patients with heart failure and a reduced ejection, those who received omecamtiv mecarbil had a lower incidence of a composite of a heart-failure event or death from cardiovascular causes than those who received placebo. (Funded by Amgen and others; GALACTIC-HF ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT02929329; EudraCT number, 2016 -002299-28.)