Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems

Abstract. In this paper, we develop methods for constructing votebuying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe votebuying/coercion attacks on three proposed end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Prêt-à-voter, and ThreeBallot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.

Privacy-preserving Queries over Relational Databases

Abstract—We explore how Private Information Retrieval (PIR) can help users keep their sensitive information from being leaked in an SQL query. We show how to retrieve data from a relational database with PIR by hiding sensitive constants contained in the predicates of a query. Experimental results and microbenchmarking tests show our approach incurs reasonable storage overhead for the added privacy benefit and performs between 3 and 343 times faster than previous work. I