The exact tree-level calculation of the dark photon production in high-energy electron scattering at the CERN SPS

Dark photon ($A'$) that couples to the standard model fermions via the kinetic mixing with photons and serves as a mediator of dark matter production could be observed in the high-energy electron scattering $e^- + Z ~\rightarrow e^- + Z + A'$ off nuclei followed by the $A' \to invisible$ decay. We have performed the exact, tree-level calculations of the $A'$ production cross sections and implemented them in the program for the full simulation of such events in the experiment NA64 at the CERN SPS. Using simulations results, we study the missing energy signature for the bremsstrahlung $A' \rightarrow$ invisible decay that permits the determination of the $\gamma-A'$ mixing strength in a wide, from sub-MeV to sub-GeV, $A'$ mass range. We refine and expand our earlier studies of this signature for discovering $A'$ by including corrections to the previously used calculations based on the improved Weizsaker-Williams approximation, which turn out to be significant. We compare our cross sections values with the results from other calculations and find a good agreement between them. The possibility of future measurements with high-energy electron beams and the sensitivity to $A'$ are briefly discussed.Comment: 11 pages, 6 figures, revised version, improved cross-section integrator is used, comparison with bremsstrahlung spectrum is added, final conclusions remain unchange

Missing energy signature from invisible decays of dark photons at the CERN SPS

The dark photon ($A'$) production through the mixing with the bremsstrahlung photon from the electron scattering off nuclei can be accompanied by the dominant invisible $A'$ decay into dark-sector particles. In this work we discuss the missing energy signature of this process in the experiment NA64 aiming at the search for $A'\to invisible$ decays with a high-energy electron beam at the CERN SPS. We show the distinctive distributions of variables that can be used to distinguish the $A'\to invisible$ signal from background. The results of the detailed simulation of the detector response for the events with and without $A'$ emission are presented. The efficiency of the signal event selection is estimated. It is used to evaluate the sensitivity of the experiment and show that it allows to probe the still unexplored area of the mixing strength $10^{-6}\lesssim \epsilon \lesssim 10^{-2}$ and masses up to $M_{A'} \lesssim 1$ GeV. The results obtained are compared with the results from other calculations. In the case of the signal observation, a possibility of extraction of the parameters $M_{A'}$ and $\epsilon$ by using the missing energy spectrum shape is discussed. We consider as an example the $A'$ with the mass 16.7 MeV and mixing $\epsilon \lesssim 10^{-3}$, which can explain an excess of events recently observed in nuclear transitions of an excited state of $^8$Be. We show that if such $A'$ exists its invisible decay can be observed in NA64 within a month of running, while data accumulated during a few months would allow also to determine the $\epsilon$ and $M_{A'}$ parameters.Comment: 12 pages, 15 figures. Revised versio

Applicability of QKD: TerraQuantum view on the NSA's scepticism

Quantum communication offers unique features that have no classical analog, in particular, it enables provably secure quantum key distribution (QKD). Despite the benefits of quantum communication are well understood within the scientific community, the practical implementations sometimes meet with scepticism or even resistance. In a recent publication [1], NSA claims that QKD is inferior to "quantum-resistant" cryptography and does not recommend it for use. Here we show that such a sceptical approach to evaluation of quantum security is not well justified. We hope that our arguments will be helpful to clarify the issue

Fully Geant4 compatible package for the simulation of Dark Matter in fixed target experiments

We present the package for the simulation of DM (Dark Matter) particles in fixed target experiments. The most convenient way of this simulation (and the only possible way in the case of beam-dump) is to simulate it in the framework of the program for tracing particles in the experimental setup. One of the most popular such programs is Geant4. Specifically, the package includes the processes of DM particles production via electron and muon bremsstrahlung off nuclei, resonant in-flight positron annihilation on atomic electrons and gamma to ALP (axion-like particles) conversion on nuclei. Four types of DM mediator particles are considered: vector, scalar, pseudoscalar and axial vector. In particular, for bremsstrahlung the total cross sections are calculated at exact tree level (ETL). The code handles both the case of invisible DM mediator decay and of visible decay into $e^+e^-$ (or into $\gamma \gamma$ in the case of ALP). The software consists of a collection of different classes, inheriting from the Geant4 framework classes, thus the expected use of this package is to include it in a Geant4-based code for the simulation of particles propagation and interaction in the detector. As an example of its usage, we discuss the results obtained from the simulation of a typical active beam-dump experiment, considering $5 \times 10^{12}$ 100 GeV electrons impinging on a lead/plastic scintillator active thick target, showing the expected sensitivity for the four types of DM mediator particles mentioned above.Comment: 10 pages, 4 figure

Search for invisible decays of sub-GeV dark photons in missing-energy events at the CERN SPS

We report on a direct search for sub-GeV dark photons (A') which might be produced in the reaction e^- Z \to e^- Z A' via kinetic mixing with photons by 100 GeV electrons incident on an active target in the NA64 experiment at the CERN SPS. The A's would decay invisibly into dark matter particles resulting in events with large missing energy. No evidence for such decays was found with 2.75\cdot 10^{9} electrons on target. We set new limits on the \gamma-A' mixing strength and exclude the invisible A' with a mass < 100 MeV as an explanation of the muon g_\mu-2 anomaly.Comment: 6 pages, 3 figures; Typos corrected, references adde

Experimental demonstration of scalable quantum key distribution over a thousand kilometers

Secure communication over long distances is one of the major problems of modern informatics. Classical transmissions are recognized to be vulnerable to quantum computer attacks. Remarkably, the same quantum mechanics that engenders quantum computers offers guaranteed protection against such attacks via quantum key distribution (QKD). Yet, long-distance transmission is problematic since the essential signal decay in optical channels occurs at a distance of about a hundred kilometers. We propose to resolve this problem by a QKD protocol, further referred to as the Terra Quantum QKD protocol (TQ-QKD protocol). In our protocol, we use semiclassical pulses containing enough photons for random bit encoding and exploiting erbium amplifiers to retranslate photon pulses and, at the same time, ensuring that at the chosen pulse intensity only a few photons could go outside the channel even at distances of about a hundred meters. As a result, an eavesdropper will not be able to efficiently utilize the lost part of the signal. The central component of the TQ-QKD protocol is the end-to-end loss control of the fiber-optic communication line since optical losses can in principle be used by the eavesdropper to obtain the transmitted information. However, our control precision is such that if the degree of the leak is below the detectable level, then the leaking states are quantum since they contain only a few photons. Therefore, available to the eavesdropper parts of the bit encoding states representing `0' and `1' are nearly indistinguishable. Our work presents the experimental demonstration of the TQ-QKD protocol allowing quantum key distribution over 1079 kilometers. Further refining the quality of the scheme's components will expand the attainable transmission distances. This paves the way for creating a secure global QKD network in the upcoming years.Comment: 23 pages (main text: 15 pages, supplement: 8 pages), 21 figures (main text: 7 figures, supplement: 14 figures