36,448 research outputs found
The Debt Limit and the Constitution: How the Fourteenth Amendment Forbids Fiscal Obstructionism
The statutory debt limit restricts the funds that can be borrowed to meet the government\u27s financial obligations. On the other hand, the Fourteenth Amendment\u27s Public Debt Clause mandates that all the government\u27s financial obligations be met. This Note argues that the Public Debt Clause is violated when government actions create substantial doubt about the validity of the public debt, a standard that encompasses government actions that fall short of defaulting on or directly repudiating the public debt. The Note proposes a test to determine when substantial doubt is created. This substantial doubt test analyzes the political and economic environment at the time of the government\u27s actions and the subjective apprehension exhibited by debt holders. Applying this test, this Note concludes that Congress\u27s actions during the 1995–96 and 2011 debt-limit debates violated the Public Debt Clause, though Congress\u27s conduct during the debate over the debt limit in 2002 did not. And under a departmentalist understanding of executive power, a conclusion of this nature would be the basis for the president to ignore the debt limit when congressional actions create unconstitutional doubt about the validity of the public debt
Commitments in Groups and Commitments of Groups
I argue that a group can have normative commitments, and that the commitment of a group is not
merely a sum or aggregate of the commitments of individual group members. I begin with a set of simple
cases which illustrate two structurally different ways that group commitments can go wrong. These two
kinds of potential failure correspond to two different levels of commitment: one at the individual level,
owed to the other group members, and one at the group level, which the group as a single body owes
either to itself or to some third party. I distinguish the content of a commitment (what must be done for
the commitment to be fulfilled) from the holder of that commitment: the party to whom the content is
owed. I then discuss examples which support the two-level view of group commitment and show that,
even when individual-level and group-level commitments have the same content, they are understood to
have different holders. Finally I return to my original cases and argue that a two-level structure of group
commitment allows us to make sense of the problems that occur in them
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