22 research outputs found

    Assessing children’s implicit attitudes using the Affect Misattribution Procedure

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    In the current research we examined whether the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005) could be successfully adapted as an implicit measure of children’s attitudes. We tested this possibility in three studies with 5 to 10 year old children. In Study 1 we found evidence that children misattribute affect elicited by attitudinally positive (e.g., cute animals) and negative (e.g., aggressive animals) primes to neutral stimuli (inkblots). In Study 2, we found that, as expected, children’s responses following flower and insect primes were moderated by gender. Girls (but not boys) were more likely to judge inkblots as pleasant when they followed flower primes. Children in Study 3 showed predicted affect misattribution following happy as compared to sad face primes. In addition, children’s responses on this child-friendly AMP predicted their self-reported empathy; the greater children’s spontaneous misattribution of affect following happy and sad primes, the more children reported feeling the joy and pain of others. These studies provide evidence that the AMP can be adapted as an implicit measure of children’s attitudes and the results of Study 3 offer novel insight into individual differences in children’s affective responses to the emotional expressions of other

    Prevention of intention invention in the affect misattribution procedure

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    The affect misattribution procedure (AMP) is one of the most promising indirect measures, showing high reliability and large effect sizes. However, the AMP has recently been criticized for being susceptible to explicit influences, in that priming effects tend to be larger and more reliable among participants who report that they intentionally responded to the primes instead of the targets. Consistent with interpretations of these effects in terms of retrospective confabulation, two experiments obtained reliable priming effects when (a) participants lacked meta-cognitive knowledge about their responses to the primes and (b) participants’ attention was directed away from response-eliciting features of the primes. Under either of these conditions, priming effects were unrelated to self-reported intentionality, although self-reported intentionality was positively related to priming effects under control conditions. The findings highlight the contribution of meta-cognitive inferences to retrospective self-reports of intentionality and suggest an effective procedure to rule out explicit influences in the AMP
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