Does the Plaintiff Matter?: An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions

With the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLR) the U.S. Congress introduced sweeping substantive and procedural reforms for securities class actions. A central provision of the Act is the lead plaintiff provision, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the investor with the largest financial interest in a securities fraud class action should be appointed the lead plaintiff for the suit. The lead plaintiff provision was adopted to encourage a class member with a large financial stake to become the class representative. Congress expected that such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a securities fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that may arise when class counsel\u27s interests diverge from those of the shareholder class. Now, more than ten years after the enactment of the lead plaintiff provision, the claim that the lead plaintiff, and particularly the lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, is a more effective monitor of class counsel in securities fraud class actions continues to be intuitively appealing, but remains unproven. In this study, Professors Cox and Thomas inquire anecdotally and empirically whether the lead plaintiff provision has performed as projected. The anecdotal evidence they uncover is mixed: in some instances demonstrating the virtues of the lead plaintiff provision, while in others showing that the provision has encountered difficulties, including hesitance among institutional lead plaintiffs to take on the burden of serving as lead plaintiff (though recently more institutional investors are taking on the role of lead plaintiff) and allegations of pay-to-play schemes between plaintiffs\u27 law firms and potential lead plaintiffs. Professors Cox and Thomas then conduct a series of statistical analyses of the lead plaintiff provision\u27s costs and benefits. Surprisingly, their results indicate that the ratio of settlement amounts to estimated provable losses in securities class actions---the most important indicator of whether investors have been compensated for their damages---has been lower since the passage of the PSLRA and that settlement size has not increased since the passage of PSLRA. However, they also find that the presence of an institutional investor increases the dollar amount of settlements in those cases in which they appear, suggesting that the current trend for institutional investors to be lead plaintiffs in securities class actions will positively affect average settlement size in such actions in the future. Their analysis also sheds new light on the relative impacts other types of lead plaintiffs, such as individuals versus an aggregation of individuals, have on the outcome of settlements. They conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of their findings

SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry

This Article examines the overlap between SEC securities enforcement actions and private securities fraud class actions. We begin with an overview of data concerning all SEC enforcement actions from 1997 to 2002. We find that the volume of SEC enforcement proceedings is relatively modest. We next examine the scope of the recently enacted Fair Fund provision that authorizes the SEC to designate civil penalties it recovers from defendants to benefit defrauded private investors. We conclude that this provision offers only limited potential relief for private investors. We complete this Part of the Article with an analysis of the serious resource limitations faced by the SEC. The second portion of the Article contains an empirical analysis of the determinants of SEC enforcement actions and the overlap of private fraud suits and SEC enforcement proceedings. Using bivariate analysis, we find that (1) private suits with parallel SEC actions settle for significantly more than private suits without such proceedings; (2) SEC enforcement actions target significantly smaller companies than private actions alone; (3) private cases with parallel SEC actions take substantially less time to settle than other private cases; and (4) private cases with parallel SEC actions have significantly longer class periods than other private actions. Finally, we create a model for estimating damages to compare settlement ratios in cases with parallel SEC actions to those in private actions. We find that one-fourth of all the private class action settlements occurring in suits that yield less than 10 percent of provable losses are settled for less than 2 percent of provable losses, but that there are no private actions with parallel SEC suits with such small settlements. In the final Part of the Article, we conduct a multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of when SEC enforcement actions are filed. We find that the most highly significant determinant of SEC actions is financial distress. Estimated losses do not appear to be a statistically significant factor in the SEC\u27s decision to file these suits

Polarimetric Multi-View Inverse Rendering

A polarization camera has great potential for 3D reconstruction since the angle of polarization (AoP) of reflected light is related to an object's surface normal. In this paper, we propose a novel 3D reconstruction method called Polarimetric Multi-View Inverse Rendering (Polarimetric MVIR) that effectively exploits geometric, photometric, and polarimetric cues extracted from input multi-view color polarization images. We first estimate camera poses and an initial 3D model by geometric reconstruction with a standard structure-from-motion and multi-view stereo pipeline. We then refine the initial model by optimizing photometric and polarimetric rendering errors using multi-view RGB and AoP images, where we propose a novel polarimetric rendering cost function that enables us to effectively constrain each estimated surface vertex's normal while considering four possible ambiguous azimuth angles revealed from the AoP measurement. Experimental results using both synthetic and real data demonstrate that our Polarimetric MVIR can reconstruct a detailed 3D shape without assuming a specific polarized reflection depending on the material.Comment: Paper accepted in ECCV 202

Rational Pessimism, Rational Exuberance, and Asset Pricing Models

The paper estimates and examines the empirical plausibility of asset pricing models that attempt to explain features of financial markets such as the size of the equity premium and the volatility of the stock market. In one model, the long-run risks (LRR) model of Bansal and Yaron, low-frequency movements, and time-varying uncertainty in aggregate consumption growth are the key channels for understanding asset prices. In another, as typified by Campbell and Cochrane, habit formation, which generates time-varying risk aversion and consequently time variation in risk premia, is the key channel. These models are fitted to data using simulation estimators. Both models are found to fit the data equally well at conventional significance levels, and they can track quite closely a new measure of realized annual volatility. Further, scrutiny using a rich array of diagnostics suggests that the LRR model is preferred. Copyright 2007 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.