Strategy Learning in 3x3 Games by Neural Networks

This paper presents a neural network based methodology for examining the learning of game-playing rules in never-before seen games. A network is trained to pick Nash equilibria in a set of games and then released to play a larger set of new games. While faultlessly selecting Nash equilibria in never-before seen games is too complex a task for the network, Nash equilibria are chosen approximately 60% of the times. Furthermore, despite training the network to select Nash equilibria, what emerges are endogenously obtained bounded-rational rules which are closer to payoff dominance, and the best response to payoff dominance

Hierarchical-power-flow-based energy management for alternative/direct current hybrid microgrids

Modern microgrids are systems comprising both Alternative Current (AC) and Direct Current (DC) subgrids, integrated with Distributed Generations (DGs), storage systems, and Electric Vehicles (EVs) parking facilities. Achieving stable and reliable load flow control amidst varying load, generation, and charging/discharging strategies requires a hierarchical control scheme. This paper proposes an hourly power flow (PF) analysis within an Energy Management System (EMS) for AC/DC Hybrid Microgrids interconnected via an Interlinking Converter (IC) in both grid-connected and islanded modes. The framework operates within a two-level hierarchically controlled platform. Tertiary control at the top level optimizes DGs' reference power for generation and consumption, minimizing power purchase costs and load shedding in grid-connected and islanded modes, respectively. DG converters employ current control mode to share their power references as the primary controller. While no secondary controller is adopted in this scheme, the Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in islanded mode utilizes P/Q droop control to maintain voltage and frequency in the AC subsystem. Power sharing between AC and DC subgrids through IC is determined by the difference between AC grid frequency and DC link voltage. Integration of controlled converters’ buses into PF equations enables solving the unified system using the traditional Newton-Raphson (NR) method. A segment of a real distribution grid planned for installation in Italy under the HYPERRIDE project serves as a case study. Comparison with MATLAB/Simulink results confirms the effectiveness, precision, and convergence speed of the proposed model and control schemes, demonstrating efficient load distribution and voltage/frequency restoration in islanded mode

Inattentive Consumers in Markets for Services

In an experiment on markets for services, we find that consumers are likely to stick to default tariffs and achieve suboptimal outcomes. We find that inattention to the task of choosing a better tariff is likely to be a substantial problem in addition to any task and tariff complexity effect. The institutional setup on which we primarily model our experiment is the UK electricity and gas markets, and our conclusion is that the new measures by the UK regulator Ofgem to improve consumer outcomes are likely to be of limited impact

Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether insiders determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, while it increases as the game is transformed into an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect

The impact of relative position and returns on sacrifice and reciprocity: an experimental study using individual decisions

We present a comprehensive experimental design that makes it possible to characterize other-regarding preferences and their relationship to the decision maker’s relative position. Participants are faced with a large number of decisions involving variations in the trade-offs between own and other’s payoffs, as well as in other potentially important factors like the decision maker’s relative position. We find that: (1) choices are responsive to the cost of helping and hurting others; (2) The weight a decision maker places on others’ monetary payoffs depends on whether the decision maker is in an advantageous or disadvantageous relative position; and (3) We find no evidence of reciprocity of the type linked to menu-dependence. The results of a mixture-model estimation show considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ motivations and confirm the absence of reciprocal motives. Pure selfish behavior is the most frequently observed behavior. Among the subjects exhibiting social preferences, social-welfare maximization is the most frequent, followed by inequality-aversion and by competitiveness

On reminder effects, drop-outs and dominance: evidence from an online experiment on charitable giving

We present the results of an experiment that (a) shows the usefulness of screening out drop-outs and (b) tests whether different methods of payment and reminder intervals affect charitable giving. Following a lab session, participants could make online donations to charity for a total duration of three months. Our procedure justifying the exclusion of drop-outs consists in requiring participants to collect payments in person flexibly and as known in advance and as highlighted to them later. Our interpretation is that participants who failed to collect their positive payments under these circumstances are likely not to satisfy dominance. If we restrict the sample to subjects who did not drop out, but not otherwise, reminders significantly increase the overall amount of charitable giving. We also find that weekly reminders are no more effective than monthly reminders in increasing charitable giving, and that, in our three months duration experiment, standing orders do not increase giving relative to one-off donations

What happens if you single out? An experiment

We present an experiment investigating the effects of singling out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. We find that (a) trustworthiness falls if there is a singled out subject; (b) non-singled out subjects discriminate against the singled out subject when they are not responsible of the distinct status of this person; (c) under a negative frame, the singled out subject returns significantly less; (d) under a positive frame, the singled out subject behaves bimodally, either selecting very low or very high return rates. Overall, singling out induces a negligible effect on trust but is potentially disruptive for trustworthiness

Sorting Via Screening Versus Signaling: A Theoretic and Experimental Comparison

Similar to Kübler et al. (2008, GEB 64, p. 219-236), we compare sorting in games with asymmetric incomplete information theoretically and experimentally. Rather than distinguishing two very different sequential games, we use the same game format and capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies on the same verbal instructions. Although the equilibrium outcomes coincide, greater efficiency losses off the equilibrium play due to sorting under signaling, compared to screening, is predicted and confirmed experimentally