Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem

The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility

SPLENIC HOMOTRANSPLANTATION.

During the past 12 months, five clinical whole-organ splenic homotransplantations have been carried out with the objective of providing active immunologic tissue for the recipient patients. In one case with hypogammaglobulinemia, it was hoped that the transplanted tissue would alleviate a state of immunologic deficiency. In the other four, all of whom had terminal malignancies, the purpose was to superimpose a state of altered immunologic reactivity upon the host in the hope of thereby suppressing the inexorable growth of the neoplasms. As will be described, these procedures can now be judged in each instance to have been without benefit. Nevertheless, full documentation of the cases seems justified not only because of the many implications of transplantation of immunologically competent tissue, but also because of the potentially important observations made during the care of these patients. In addition, a full account will be presented of the supporting canine studies of splenic homotransplantation, inasmuch as many of the principles of clinical therapy and investigation derived from prior observations in the dog. The fact that it is possible to obtain viable splenic homografts in the dog for as long as two-thirds of a year without the production of runt disease or other harmful effects may have application in future research on bone marrow, other lymphoid, or hepatic homografts

Noncooperatively Optimized Tolerance: Decentralized Strategic Optimization in Complex Systems

We introduce noncooperatively optimized tolerance (NOT), a generalization of highly optimized tolerance (HOT) that involves strategic (game theoretic) interactions between parties in a complex system. We illustrate our model in the forest fire (percolation) framework. As the number of players increases, our model retains features of HOT, such as robustness, high yield combined with high density, and self-dissimilar landscapes, but also develops features of self-organized criticality (SOC) when the number of players is large enough. For example, the forest landscape becomes increasingly homogeneous and protection from adverse events (lightning strikes) becomes less closely correlated with the spatial distribution of these events. While HOT is a special case of our model, the resemblance to SOC is only partial; for example, the distribution of cascades, while becoming increasingly heavy-tailed as the number of players increases, also deviates more significantly from a power law in this regime. Surprisingly, the system retains considerable robustness even as it becomes fractured, due in part to emergent cooperation between neighboring players. At the same time, increasing homogeneity promotes resilience against changes in the lightning distribution, giving rise to intermediate regimes where the system is robust to a particular distribution of adverse events, yet not very fragile to changes