Spillback Effects of Expansion When Product-Types and Firm-Types Differ

Contrary to perspectives that credit firms with only limited abilities to undertake significant change successfully, recent research has demonstrated that firms often improve their performance after undertaking major expansion to their operations. In this paper, we build on a study by Mitchell and Singh (1993) to test for differences in expansion effects, depending on whether the new goods substitute for old products and whether the firm is a generalist or specialist participant in the industry. The analysis helps us understand when a business can undertake major change successfully. The results have implications for ecological and other definitions of the core of a business and highlight the necessity for firms to undertake changes even at considerable risk to their existing operations.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68398/2/10.1177_014920639502100105.pd

Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment

We study a model in which a CEO can entrench himself by hiding information from the board that would allow the board to conclude that he should be replaced. Assuming that even diligent monitoring by the board cannot fully overcome the information asymmetry visà- vis the CEO, we ask if there is a role for CEO compensation to mitigate the inefficiency. Our analysis points to a novel argument for high-powered, non-linear CEO compensation such as bonus pay or stock options. By shifting the CEO’s compensation into states where the firm’s value is highest, a high-powered compensation scheme makes it as unattractive as possible for the CEO to entrench himself when he expects that the firm’s future value under his management and strategy is low. This, in turn, minimizes the severance pay needed to induce the CEO not to entrench himself, thereby minimizing the CEO’s informational rents. Amongst other things, our model suggests how deregulation and technological changes in the 1980s and 1990s might have contributed to the rise in CEO pay and turnover over the same period

Ownership structure, investment behaviour and firm performance in Japanese manufacturing industries

Abstract Using data spanning the 1996-98 fiscal years of 247 of Japan's largest manufacturers, we empirically evaluate the extent to which a firm's investment behaviour and financial performance are influenced by its ownership structure. To do so, we examine six distinct categories of Japanese shareholders: foreign investors, investment funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies, affiliated companies and insiders. Our findings strongly indicate that the relationship between the equity stakes of a particular category of investor and a firm's financial performance and investment behaviour is considerably more complex than is depicted in simple principal-agent representations. Such a result emphasizes the importance of making finely grained and contextually relevant distinctions when modelling and evaluating corporate governance relations

Institutional Labor Economics, the New Personnel Economics, and Internal Labor Markets: A Reconsideration

The author illustrates the utility of institutional labor economics and makes a case for a reconsideration of it. Two recent developments motivate this effort: the rise of New Personnel Economics (NPE) as a significant subfield of labor economics and the substantial shifts in work organization that have taken place since the 1990s. Understanding how and why firms have reorganized work opens the door for a renewed interest in institutional approaches. The author explains that the rules of institutional labor markets (ILMs) emerge from the competition between organizational interest groups—unions, personnel professionals, and the government—and competing views of firms’ objectives—resulting in the rise of ILMs, the slow diffusion of High Performance Work Systems, strategies used to obtain a high level of commitment from workers, the use of contingent employees, and the spread of new promotion rules in response to equal employment opportunity pressures. As such, the role of power and influence in establishing work rules is of central concern, though more conventional NPE considerations also remain important

Spatial theory and human behavior

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45971/1/10110_2005_Article_BF01952731.pd

Rational Expectations: Retrospect and Prospect

The transcript of a panel discussion marking the fiftieth anniversary of John Muth's "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements" (Econometrica 1961). The panel consists of Michael Lovell, Robert Lucas, Dale Mortensen, Robert Shiller, and Neil Wallace. The discussion is moderated by Kevin Hoover and Warren Young. The panel touches on a wide variety of issues related to the rational-expectations hypothesis, including: its history, starting with Muth's work at Carnegie Tech; its methodological role; applications to policy; its relationship to behavioral economics; its role in the recent financial crisis; and its likely future

Managerial Power, Stock-Based Compensation, and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence

We study theoretically and empirically the relation among CEO power, CEO pay and firm performance. Our theoretical model follows the rent extraction view of CEO compensation put forward by the managerial power theory. We test our theoretical findings using the sample of S&P1500 firms. The predicted relation between power and pay is largely supported. However, the relation between power and firm performance has mixed support, suggesting that, while the managerial power theory has relevance in explaining the relation between power and pay, the scope of power needs to be broadened for better understanding of how managerial power affects firm performance