No. 29: The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe

All the signs point to the existence of a growing exodus of skilled Zimbabweans from the country. Although the precise dimensions and impacts of this “brain drain” have yet to be determined, the Zimbabwean government has recently sought to stem the tide with various policy measures. The education and health sectors appear to be the hardest hit although professionals in other sectors have also been leaving in numbers. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) has undertaken a multi-country study of the brain drain within and from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SAMP’s primary contribution is to examine the skills base of a country and, on the basis of nationally-representative surveys, determine the future emigration potential of skilled people who remain. In other words, SAMP provides critical policy-relevant information on the likely course of the brain drain in the future and the effectiveness of policy measures that might be deployed to slow or reverse the brain drain. The Zimbabwean survey was conducted in 2001. A representative sample of 900 skilled Zimbabweans was interviewed to obtain information on personal and household economic circumstances; attitudes towards current and future economic, social and political circumstances; likelihood of emigration in the future; and attitudes towards measures designed to keep them in the country. The majority of the respondents (844) were African. Thus, the survey results are focused primarily on the emigration potential of black Zimbabweans. The white sample was too small to say anything of significance about white intentions. The respondents were drawn from a wide variety of professions and sectors and therefore represent a broad cross-section of skilled Zimbabweans. The first significant finding is that 57% of the sampled population have given a “great deal” of thought to emigrating from Zimbabwe (with another 29% having given the matter some thought). Only 13% have given it no consideration. A comparison with South Africa is germane since that country is widely believed to be undergoing a crippling brain drain. In South Africa, only 31% of the skilled population have given a great deal of thought to emigrating, with 31% having not thought about it at all. In terms of gender breakdown, more women than men have given a great deal of thought to emigrating (62% versus 54%), which is the opposite of the South African scenario. In age terms, it is Zimbabweans in the 25-35 age group who have given most thought to emigrating. Nevertheless, levels of dissatisfaction are so high that the majority in each age group have given at least some thought to leaving. As SAMP has demonstrated elsewhere, thinking about leaving and actually doing so are not the same thing. The survey therefore sought to establish the extent to which skilled Zimbabweans have made a mental commitment to leaving within a certain time frame. Respondents were therefore asked about the likelihood of their leaving within the next six months, two years, and five years. Over a quarter (27%) said it was likely or very likely that they would leave in six months. Fifty five percent were committed to emigrating within the next two years. And 67% said they were committed to emigrating within the next five years. These are sobering statistics, unmatched in any other country in the region in which SAMP has done similar research. They suggest that the pool of future emigrants in Zimbabwe remains massive. The firmest indication of migration potential, however, is whether a person has acted on their desires by applying for emigration documentation. Many emigrants do not, of course, apply until they are already overseas. However, the survey found that nearly 20% of the resident skilled population had either applied for or were in the process of applying for a work permit in another country. Another question addressed by the survey concerns the “permanence” of intended or likely emigration. This is an important issue. Are people so disillusioned that they wish to leave forever or would they return if conditions improved for them at home? The survey found that 51% expressed a strong desire to leave permanently (for longer than 2 years), compared with only 25% who have a strong wish to only leave temporarily. Again, 43% said they would prefer to stay in their most likely emigration destination for more than 5 years. This is not therefore a population that sees emigration as temporary exile. Why are so many Zimbabweans thinking seriously about leaving? The reasons for this extraordinary state of affairs can be analysed at two levels. First, it is possible to point to economic and political events over the last decade as the primary cause of emigration and high future potential. These events are too well-known to be repeated here. Instead, this survey sought to obtain the opinions of skilled Zimbabweans themselves, to statistically measure levels and forms of dissatisfaction and disillusionment and relate these to high emigration potential. The survey discovered extremely high levels of dissatisfaction with the cost of living, taxation, availability of goods, and salaries. But the dissatisfaction goes deeper than economic circumstances to include housing, medical services, education and a viable future for children. South Africans actually show similar levels of economic dissatisfaction but they are far more optimistic about the future than Zimbabweans. Asked about the future, there was deep pessimism amongst skilled Zimbabweans, with the vast majority convinced that their personal economic circumstances would only get worse. They were also convinced that social and public services would decline further. The respondents were also asked about their perceptions of political conditions in the country. Here, too, there was considerable negativity and pessimism. Ratings of government performance were extremely low. Various measures have been mooted in Zimbabwe with a view to keeping skilled people in the country, including compulsory national service and bonding. A coercive approach to the brain drain has not worked particularly well elsewhere and often have the opposite effect to that intended. The survey showed that such measures would only add to the burden of discontent and for around 70% of respondents would make absolutely no difference to their emigration intentions. Zimbabwe faces an immense challenge in stemming the exodus to other countries within Africa and oversees. The basic conclusion of this study is that coercive measures will not work and that the best way to curb the high rates of skilled labour migration lies in addressing the economic fundamentals of the country which will ultimately improve living standards. Regretably, most skilled Zimbabweans are very pessimistic that this will happen in the foreseeable future

The Spatial Impress of Capital with the Colonial State in Swaziland, with Particular Reference to the Period 1903-1914

Swaziland is in many ways a unique country on the African scene. The last African state to receive political independence from colonial Britain (in September, 1968), it has since been politically and socially dominated by the considerable personage of the world’s longest reigning Monarch, His Majesty King Sobhuza II. The King, with absolute sway in the traditional sphere, is also proving a considerable binding force for a Nation being atomised by the forces of westernization. The Nation, a single tribe, is a relatively small one of approximately 520,000 population in a country of just over 6400 square miles. Process is, of course, no respector of scale and as has been pointed out on a number of occasions, Swaziland duplicates many of the phenomena and dynamics of Independent Africa at large. For the student its size becomes a distinct advantage since it represents a compact laboratory which encapsulates much of the African past and present. Swaziland has been my periodic home for the last twelve years. I was fortunate to be there during the ‘heady’ days of independence in 1968 and to experience at first hand the dissolution of many of the pernicious racial barriers which had been allowed to penetrate from neighbouring South Africa during the colonial period. In the years since one has been made aware of the signs of increasing prosperity and material welfare and a ‘booming economy.’ In recent years, as knowledge of the country has increased and a more perceptive eye hopefully gained, it has become increasingly obvious that the greater prosperity is the preserve of a privileged few, that the economy is controlled by forces of multi-national capital way beyond Swazi reach and that deep internal and social contradictions are developing in the country. In addition, regional inequalities in health and wealth have if anything intensified and what was once called the colonial legacy—its distinctive human landscape—is still very much present. In African studies as a whole there has been a growing awareness over the last decade that much of Africa is de facto still colonial; at least still tending to serve the purposes of the former European colonial power. A desire to uncover the nature and implications of these purposes in Swaziland has led to a growing interest in the Swazi past. This interest has been fuelled by the geographer’s appraisal that the human landscape bears the visible imprint of these purposes as they were worked out during the colonial period. It is within this interest area that the objectives of this thesis were framed. Research for this thesis was undertaken during leave of absence from Wilfrid Laurier University from August 1977 to January 1978. The time was evenly divided between Britain, where research was primarily archival, and Swaziland, where archival research was coloured by first hand experience and by conversation with both black and white within the country

Covid-19 and urban food security in Ghana during the third wave

While the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on household food security have been documented, the intensity and forms of food insecurity in urban households in the Global South have not been adequately explored. This is despite the emerging consensus that impacts of the pandemic were more severe in urban than rural Africa. This paper addresses this knowledge gap by examining the relationship between pandemic precarity and food insecurity in Ghana’s urban areas during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. This study is based on the World Bank (WB) and Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) COVID-19 High-Frequency Phone Survey. Using a sub-sample of 1423 urban households, the paper evaluates household experiences of the pandemic. Our findings show that household demographic characteristics are not a major predictor of food insecurity. Economic factors, especially the impact of the pandemic on wage income and total household income, were far more important, with those most affected being most food insecure

Food insecurity and dietary deprivation: Migrant households in Nairobi, Kenya

The current study focuses on food consumption and dietary diversity among internal migrant households in Kenya using data from a city-wide household survey of Nairobi conducted in 2018. The paper examined whether migrant households are more likely to experience inferior diets, low dietary diversity, and increased dietary deprivation than their local counterparts. Second, it assesses whether some migrant households experience greater dietary deprivation than others. Third, it analyses whether rural-urban links play a role in boosting dietary diversity among migrant households. Length of stay in the city, the strength of rural-urban links, and food transfers do not show a significant relationship with greater dietary diversity. Better predictors of whether a household is able to escape dietary deprivation include education, employment, and household income. Food price increases also decrease dietary diversity as migrant households adjust their purchasing and consumption patterns

Wild and indigenous foods (wif) and urban food security in northern Namibia

Rapid urbanisation and food system transformation in Africa have been accompanied by growing food insecurity, reduced dietary diversity, and an epidemic of non-communicable disease. While the contribution of wild and indigenous foods (WIF) to the quality of rural household diets has been the subject of longstanding attention, research on their consumption and role among urban households is more recent. This paper provides a case study of the consumption of WIF in the urban corridor of northern Namibia with close ties to the surrounding rural agricultural areas. The research methodology involved a representative household food security sur vey of 851 urban households using tablets and ODK Collect. The key methods for data analysis included descriptive statistics and ordinal logistic regression. The main findings of the analysis included the fact that WIFs are consumed by most households, but with markedly different frequencies. Frequent consumers of WIF are most likely to be female-centred households, in the lowest income quintiles, and with the highest lived poverty. Frequent consumption is not related to food security, but is higher in households with low dietary diversity. Infrequent or occasional consumers tend to be higher-income households with low lived poverty and higher levels of food security. We conclude that frequent consumers use WIF to diversify their diets and that occasional consumers eat WIF more for reasons of cultural preference and taste than necessity. Recommendations for future research include the nature of the supply chains that bring WIF to urban consumers, intra-household consumption of WIF, and in-depth interviews about the reasons for household consumption of WIF and preferences for certain types of wild food

No. 29: The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe

All the signs point to the existence of a growing exodus of skilled Zimbabweans from the country. Although the precise dimensions and impacts of this “brain drain” have yet to be determined, the Zimbabwean government has recently sought to stem the tide with various policy measures. The education and health sectors appear to be the hardest hit although professionals in other sectors have also been leaving in numbers. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) has undertaken a multi-country study of the brain drain within and from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SAMP’s primary contribution is to examine the skills base of a country and, on the basis of nationally-representative surveys, determine the future emigration potential of skilled people who remain. In other words, SAMP provides critical policy-relevant information on the likely course of the brain drain in the future and the effectiveness of policy measures that might be deployed to slow or reverse the brain drain. The Zimbabwean survey was conducted in 2001. A representative sample of 900 skilled Zimbabweans was interviewed to obtain information on personal and household economic circumstances; attitudes towards current and future economic, social and political circumstances; likelihood of emigration in the future; and attitudes towards measures designed to keep them in the country. The majority of the respondents (844) were African. Thus, the survey results are focused primarily on the emigration potential of black Zimbabweans. The white sample was too small to say anything of significance about white intentions. The respondents were drawn from a wide variety of professions and sectors and therefore represent a broad cross-section of skilled Zimbabweans. The first significant finding is that 57% of the sampled population have given a “great deal” of thought to emigrating from Zimbabwe (with another 29% having given the matter some thought). Only 13% have given it no consideration. A comparison with South Africa is germane since that country is widely believed to be undergoing a crippling brain drain. In South Africa, only 31% of the skilled population have given a great deal of thought to emigrating, with 31% having not thought about it at all. In terms of gender breakdown, more women than men have given a great deal of thought to emigrating (62% versus 54%), which is the opposite of the South African scenario. In age terms, it is Zimbabweans in the 25-35 age group who have given most thought to emigrating. Nevertheless, levels of dissatisfaction are so high that the majority in each age group have given at least some thought to leaving. As SAMP has demonstrated elsewhere, thinking about leaving and actually doing so are not the same thing. The survey therefore sought to establish the extent to which skilled Zimbabweans have made a mental commitment to leaving within a certain time frame. Respondents were therefore asked about the likelihood of their leaving within the next six months, two years, and five years. Over a quarter (27%) said it was likely or very likely that they would leave in six months. Fifty five percent were committed to emigrating within the next two years. And 67% said they were committed to emigrating within the next five years. These are sobering statistics, unmatched in any other country in the region in which SAMP has done similar research. They suggest that the pool of future emigrants in Zimbabwe remains massive. The firmest indication of migration potential, however, is whether a person has acted on their desires by applying for emigration documentation. Many emigrants do not, of course, apply until they are already overseas. However, the survey found that nearly 20% of the resident skilled population had either applied for or were in the process of applying for a work permit in another country. Another question addressed by the survey concerns the “permanence” of intended or likely emigration. This is an important issue. Are people so disillusioned that they wish to leave forever or would they return if conditions improved for them at home? The survey found that 51% expressed a strong desire to leave permanently (for longer than 2 years), compared with only 25% who have a strong wish to only leave temporarily. Again, 43% said they would prefer to stay in their most likely emigration destination for more than 5 years. This is not therefore a population that sees emigration as temporary exile. Why are so many Zimbabweans thinking seriously about leaving? The reasons for this extraordinary state of affairs can be analysed at two levels. First, it is possible to point to economic and political events over the last decade as the primary cause of emigration and high future potential. These events are too well-known to be repeated here. Instead, this survey sought to obtain the opinions of skilled Zimbabweans themselves, to statistically measure levels and forms of dissatisfaction and disillusionment and relate these to high emigration potential. The survey discovered extremely high levels of dissatisfaction with the cost of living, taxation, availability of goods, and salaries. But the dissatisfaction goes deeper than economic circumstances to include housing, medical services, education and a viable future for children. South Africans actually show similar levels of economic dissatisfaction but they are far more optimistic about the future than Zimbabweans. Asked about the future, there was deep pessimism amongst skilled Zimbabweans, with the vast majority convinced that their personal economic circumstances would only get worse. They were also convinced that social and public services would decline further. The respondents were also asked about their perceptions of political conditions in the country. Here, too, there was considerable negativity and pessimism. Ratings of government performance were extremely low. Various measures have been mooted in Zimbabwe with a view to keeping skilled people in the country, including compulsory national service and bonding. A coercive approach to the brain drain has not worked particularly well elsewhere and often have the opposite effect to that intended. The survey showed that such measures would only add to the burden of discontent and for around 70% of respondents would make absolutely no difference to their emigration intentions. Zimbabwe faces an immense challenge in stemming the exodus to other countries within Africa and oversees. The basic conclusion of this study is that coercive measures will not work and that the best way to curb the high rates of skilled labour migration lies in addressing the economic fundamentals of the country which will ultimately improve living standards. Regretably, most skilled Zimbabweans are very pessimistic that this will happen in the foreseeable future

Opportunity and Survival in the Urban Informal Food Sector of Namibia

Literature on participation in the informal food sector in cities of the Global South is conventionally characterized by a survivalist or opportunistic perspective. The main difference is that opportunists, in contrast to survivalists, are motivated by entrepreneurial choice rather than necessity and see opportunities for economic and social advancement in the sector. Recent studies in Brazil and India conclude that research on informal sector participation requires a “both/and” rather than “either/or” approach. The main problem this paper addresses is whether the “both/and” model is also applicable in the African context. This is the first study to investigate the issue in the informal food sector of an African city; in this case, the capital city of Namibia, Windhoek. The paper evaluates five potential ways of distinguishing between survivalist and opportunistic food vendors and concludes that entrepreneurial motivation (EM) provides the most useful set of metrics. Selected EM responses are then used to construct four regression models—two survivalist and two opportunistic—in order to determine which individual and business characteristics are most strongly and consistently associated with survivalism and opportunism. Few vendors are both survivalist and opportunistic in orientation. There is a possibility of survivalists becoming more opportunistic over time but the models do not confirm this hypothesis. Apart from differences in EM, there are many similarities between the two groups and both would therefore benefit from a more enabling policy environment. The primary distinguishing business characteristic is the enterprise type with street food vendors most likely to be opportunistic. Ironically, it is street vendors who are seen as unsightly, unhealthy, and uncontrollable, and face the most difficult operating environment