Quod non est in actis non est in mundo: legal words, unspeakability and the same-sex marriage issue

This article centres on the legal recognition of same-sex marriage with a view to exploring the issue of unspeakability; that is, the condition whereby some questions cannot be articulated because of a lack of words. More specifically, the article will explore what happens to those social practices that are not given legal speakability and thereby legal recognition/protection. To this end, I first focus on how words are produced in the sphere of everyday life and their dependence on the existence of a widespread normality. I then discuss how the law sees to the preservation and the reproduction of normality by providing a set of categories which are made available to law-abiders to settle disputes when they arise. In doing so, I elucidate the twofold role played by law as both a selective and a creative device. To cast some light on the particular way law operates, I discuss an important decision by the Italian Constitutional Court in 2010, which provides a telling example of how legal officials are able to seal off the set of legal categories and to leave some issues in the sphere of the unspeakable. I then unearth a paradox: while unspeakability reveals a condition of powerlessness, the acquisition of speakability could bring about even harsher exclusionary effects. I conclude by arguing that the entry into the sphere of official law is always a Janus-faced achievement, but can play as an effective instrument of critique

Social theory and the analysis of transactions

Este artículo analiza una seria objeción a las teorías sociales que apoyan los mecanismos apagados y las fuerzas escondidas que, a su vez, influyen en los actores sociales: ellas destacan la necesidad teórica de confirmar sus presuposiciones tanto si ellas son demostradas como si son desmentidas por los fenómenos en los que ellas mismas se centran. En primer lugar, el autor examina cómo Latour ha puesto en evidencia decididamente este problema. Se trata, pues, de uno de los objetivos polémicos principales de Latour, la teoría social de Bourdieu, para demostrar que, en realidad, Bourdieu compartió las preocupaciones de Latour. Este artículo lleva a cabo este objetivo deteniéndose en la relación entre la noción de rule-following de Wittgenstein y la de habitus de Bourdieu. En la base de este análisis, el autor profundiza el concepto de transactions, que atañe a las interpretaciones discursivas de los actores y al contexto semiótico en los que se insertan. Este análisis finaliza con las consecuencias teóricopolíticas de este tipo de metodología.This article discusses a serious objection to social theories that claim opaque mechanisms and hidden forces operate over social actors’ head: they bespeak the theorists’ need to confirm their presuppositions whether they are proven or disproven by the phenomena they focus on. The author first explores the way in which Latour has convincingly unearthed this problem. He then analyzes one of Latour’s primary polemical targets, Bourdieu’s social theory, to show that in reality Bourdieu shared Latour’s concerns. The article does so by exploring the nexus between Wittgenstein’s notion of rule-following and notion of Bourdieu’s habitus. Based on this analysis, the author elaborates on the concept of “transactions”, which draws attention to both the actors’ discursive performances and the semiotic context where they take place. The article concludes by illustrating the theoretical-political consequences of this methodological commitment

Whither the state? On Santi Romano’s The legal order

This essay foregrounds the relevance of Italian jurist Santi Romano’s theorizing to today’s political and legal debates on the relation between state and non-state laws. As Romano’s classic book L’ordinamento giuridico (1917–1918) has finally been translated into English, the Anglophone readership can take stock of one of the most enlightening contributions to institutional thinking in the last centuries. Romano put forward a theory of legal institutionalism that has legal pluralism as a basic corollary and contended that the legal order is naturally equipped to temper and overcome conflicts between bodies of law. The present contribution argues that this approach unravels the riddles of recent multiculturalist paradigms and provides invaluable insights on the way the state could and should manage the conflicts between competing normative orders that lay claims to legislative and jurisdictional autonomy

Moral exemplars in education: a liberal account

This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy of fostering virtue development with the specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. I argue that, for what matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account of moral exemplarity. Specifically, I challenge two key assumptions of Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017), namely that moral exemplars are exceptionally virtuous agents and that imitating their behavior is the main strategy for acquiring the virtues. I will introduce and discuss the notions of enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators and show that we have good reasons to consider them moral exemplars although they fail to satisfy (either of) the key assumptions

Epistemic Paternalism, Personal Sovereignty, and One’s Own Good

A recent paper by Bullock (2018) raises a dilemma for proponents of epistemic paternalism. If epistemic paternalists contend that epistemic improvements contribute to one’s wellbeing, then their view conflates with general paternalism. Instead, if they appeal to the notion of a distinctive epistemic value, their view is unjustified, in that concerns about epistemic value fail to outweigh concerns about personal sovereignty. In this chapter, I address Bullock’s challenge in a way that safeguards the legitimacy of epistemic paternalism, albeit restricting its scope to a limited range of cognitive projects. After shedding light on a problem with how Bullock singles out cases to which the dilemma applies, I argue that there is at least one reasonable way of interpreting the notion of ‘personal autonomy’ which legitimates and justifies undertaking epistemically paternalistic interferences for one’s epistemic good

What to make of the exception? A three-stage route to Schmitt’s institutionalism

This article traces a developmental trajectory in Schmitt’s conception of law that brings out alternative conceptualizations of the exception. “Transcendence”, “immanence” and “integration” signify three different models to represent the relation between what I call “nomic force” (the particular phenomenon of bringing order) and “materiality” (the matter-offactness of a particular entity or phenomenon). I contend that while Political Theology feeds off a transcendent model, where a sovereign decider makes materiality speakable, The Concept of the Political shows important differences as Schmitt’s argument implies a novel conception of materiality, much indebted to an immanent model. Finally, in the years in which Schmitt embraces an institutional theory of law, between 1928 and 1934, he elaborated on a theory of law pivoted on integration. The chief claim of this article is that Schmitt’s conceptualization of exception and decision is conditional upon the relation between nomic power and materiality that underlies his reflection in these three phases

Tax-benefits policies jointly run by the social partners. Labour market implications of the bipartite sectoral funds.

This paper focuses on the employment effects of tax-benefit policies implemented by Bipartite Sectoral Funds (BSFs), institutions established by workers’ unions and employers’ organisations, and conducts a preliminary theoretical analysis of their implications for employment based on a model of wage bargaining which includes the basic elements of a tax-benefit policy and allows for the internalization of benefits. The intuition is that the peculiar institutional profile of BSFs may favour the internalization of social benefits by the unions. If this actually occurs, it can be expected that the costs of the benefits will be shared between the employers and the workers. However the exact institutional profile of the funds crucially affects the degree of internalization. It is argued that this may actually occur provided that the exchange between wage and benefits is actually feasible in the context of current industrial relations, the workers attach a sufficiently high value to the benefits, and BSFs are autonomous from government interference

For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach

This paper attempts to provide a remedy to a surprising lacuna in the current discussion in the epistemology of expertise, namely the lack of a theory accounting for the epistemic authority of collective agents. After introducing a service conception of epistemic authority based on Alvin Goldman’s account of a cognitive expert, I argue that this service conception is well suited to account for the epistemic authority of collective bodies on a non-summativist perspective, and I show in detail how the defining requirements of an expert can apply to epistemic groups