How payment for research participation can be coercive

The idea that payment for research participation can be coercive appears widespread among research ethics committee members, researchers, and regulatory bodies. Yet analysis of the concept of coercion by philosophers and bioethicists has mostly concluded that payment does not coerce, because coercion necessarily involves threats, not offers. In this article we aim to resolve this disagreement by distinguishing between two distinct but overlapping concepts of coercion. Consent- undermining coercion marks out certain actions as impermissible and certain agreements as unenforceable. By contrast, coercion as subjection indicates a way in which someone’s interests can be partially set back in virtue of being subject to another’s foreign will. While offers of payment do not normally constitute consent-undermining coercion, they do sometimes constitute coercion as subjection. We offer an analysis of coercion as subjection and propose three possible practical responses to worries about the coerciveness of payment

Bridging consent: from toll bridges to lift bridges?

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The ability to share human biological samples, associated data and results across disease-specific and population-based human research biobanks is becoming increasingly important for research into disease development and translation. Although informed consent often does not anticipate such cross-domain sharing, it is important to examine its plausibility. The purpose of this study was to explore the feasibility of bridging consent between disease-specific and population-based research. Comparative analyses of 1) current ethical and legal frameworks governing consent and 2) informed consent models found in disease-specific and population-based research were conducted.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>Ethical and legal frameworks governing consent dissuade cross-domain data sharing. Paradoxically, analysis of consent models for disease-specific and population-based research reveals such a high degree of similarity that bridging consent could be possible if additional information regarding bridging was incorporated into consent forms. We submit that bridging of consent could be supported if current trends endorsing a new interpretation of consent are adopted. To illustrate this we sketch potential bridging consent scenarios.</p> <p>Summary</p> <p>A bridging consent, respectful of the spirit of initial consent, is feasible and would require only small changes to the content of consents currently being used. Under a bridging consent approach, the initial data and samples collection can serve an identified research project as well as contribute to the creation of a resource for a range of other projects.</p

A developing country response to Lavery et al. "In global health research, is it legitimate to stop clinical trials early on account of their opportunity costs?"

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>A recent paper presents an argument and mechanism for the possible stopping of clinical trials early based on opportunity costs.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>Although we agree that the costs and opportunity costs of clinical trials need to be reduced wherever possible, we raise concerns about the motivation and mechanism for stopping clinical trials early raised by Lavery <it>et al</it>.</p> <p>Summary</p> <p>We argue that there are already enough acceptable criteria and actors in the clinical trials arena to justify early stoppage of clinical trials, and argue that factors other than efficacy need to be carefully considered, especially in developing country contexts.</p

Responsible research for the construction of maximally humanlike automata: the paradox of unattainable informed consent

Since the Nuremberg Code and the first Declaration of Helsinki, globally there has been increasing adoption and adherence to procedures for ensuring that human subjects in research are as well informed as possible of the study’s reasons and risks and voluntarily consent to serving as subject. To do otherwise is essentially viewed as violation of the human research subject’s legal and moral rights. However, with the recent philosophical concerns about responsible robotics, the limits and ambiguities of research-subjects ethical codes become apparent on the matter of constructing automata that maximally resemble human beings (as defined hereunder). In this case, the automata themselves, as products of research and development, are in the very process of their construction subjects of research and development. However, such research faces a paradox: The subjects cannot give their informed consent to this research for their own development, although their consent would be needed for the research. According to ethical codes, this research would be unethical. The article then explores whether the background concepts giving rise to this paradox could be reframed in order to allow such research to proceed ethically

Protecting Vulnerable Research Subjects in Critical Care Trials: Enhancing the Informed Consent Process and Recommendations for Safeguards

Although critically ill patients represent a vulnerable group of individuals, guidelines in research ethics assert that ethically acceptable research may proceed with such vulnerable subjects if additional safeguards are in place to minimize the risk of harm and exploitation. Such safeguards include the proper obtainment of informed consent that avoids the presence of the therapeutic misconception and the assessment of decisional capacity in critically ill patients recruited for research. Also discussed in this review are additional safeguards for such vulnerable subjects, as well as the issues involved with proxy consent. Heightened awareness to principles of ethics and provision of additional safeguards to enhance protections of vulnerable subjects would help to maintain the public trust in the research endeavor