28 research outputs found
On the Security of Y-00 under Fast Correlation and Other Attacks on the Key
The potential weakness of the Y-00 direct encryption protocol when the
encryption box ENC in Y-00 is not chosen properly is demonstrated in a fast
correlation attack by S. Donnet et al in Phys. Lett. A 35, 6 (2006) 406-410. In
this paper, we show how this weakness can be eliminated with a proper design of
ENC. In particular, we present a Y-00 configuration that is more secure than
AES under known-plaintext attack. It is also shown that under any
ciphertext-only attack, full information-theoretic security on the Y-00 seed
key is obtained for any ENC when proper deliberate signal randomization is
employed
Quantum-noise--randomized data-encryption for WDM fiber-optic networks
We demonstrate high-rate randomized data-encryption through optical fibers
using the inherent quantum-measurement noise of coherent states of light.
Specifically, we demonstrate 650Mbps data encryption through a 10Gbps
data-bearing, in-line amplified 200km-long line. In our protocol, legitimate
users (who share a short secret-key) communicate using an M-ry signal set while
an attacker (who does not share the secret key) is forced to contend with the
fundamental and irreducible quantum-measurement noise of coherent states.
Implementations of our protocol using both polarization-encoded signal sets as
well as polarization-insensitive phase-keyed signal sets are experimentally and
theoretically evaluated. Different from the performance criteria for the
cryptographic objective of key generation (quantum key-generation), one
possible set of performance criteria for the cryptographic objective of data
encryption is established and carefully considered.Comment: Version 2: Some errors have been corrected and arguments refined. To
appear in Physical Review A. Version 3: Minor corrections to version
Barbosa et al. Reply to ``Comment on 'Secure Communication using mesoscopic coherent states', Barbosa et al, Phys Rev Lett 90, 227901", Yuan and Shields, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 048901(2005)
Yuan and Shields claim that our data-encryption protocol is entirely
equivalent to a classical stream cipher utilizing no quantum phenomena. Their
claim is, indeed, false. Yuan and Shields also claim that schemes similar to
the one presented in Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 227901 are not suitable for key
generation. This claim is also refuted. In any event, we welcome the
opportunity to clarify the situation for a wider audience.Comment: This is the co-published Reply to the Comment made by Z.L. Yuan and
A.J. Shields published in Physical Review Letters, 94 (2005
Quantum Noise Randomized Ciphers
We review the notion of a classical random cipher and its advantages. We
sharpen the usual description of random ciphers to a particular mathematical
characterization suggested by the salient feature responsible for their
increased security. We describe a concrete system known as AlphaEta and show
that it is equivalent to a random cipher in which the required randomization is
effected by coherent-state quantum noise. We describe the currently known
security features of AlphaEta and similar systems, including lower bounds on
the unicity distances against ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks. We
show how AlphaEta used in conjunction with any standard stream cipher such as
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) provides an additional, qualitatively
different layer of security from physical encryption against known-plaintext
attacks on the key. We refute some claims in the literature that AlphaEta is
equivalent to a non-random stream cipher.Comment: Accepted for publication in Phys. Rev. A; Discussion augmented and
re-organized; Section 5 contains a detailed response to 'T. Nishioka, T.
Hasegawa, H. Ishizuka, K. Imafuku, H. Imai: Phys. Lett. A 327 (2004) 28-32
/quant-ph/0310168' & 'T. Nishioka, T. Hasegawa, H. Ishizuka, K. Imafuku, H.
Imai: Phys. Lett. A 346 (2005) 7
Exposed-key weakness of
The protocol given by Barbosa \emph{et al.}, PRL 90, 227901
(2003) claims to be a secure way of encrypting messages using mesoscopic
coherent states. We show that transmission under exposes
information about the secret key to an eavesdropper, and we estimate the rate
at which an eavesdropper can learn about the key. We also consider the
consequences of using further randomization to protect the key and how our
analysis applies to this case. We conclude that is not
informationally secure.Comment: 6 pg. Was originally written in May 2006 and has languished in
getting-approved-land for 7 months, but we've tried to keep current with
papers published since then. This version changed for publicatio