General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon: Rule 23\u27s Application to Title VII

Currently, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts are not required to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in orders granting or denying class certification. Because of the complex nature of the law and facts involved in class suits, this note will also suggest a requirement, possibly through amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that such orders make explicit, through written findings and conclusions, the factors taken into account in the court\u27s decision. Such a requirement would aid the courts in properly applying Rule 23 to Title VII. Moreover, written findings of fact and conclusions of law would also provide the parties, especially the losing party, with an articulated basis for the court\u27s decision

The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts Committed by Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction

The present paper is confined to a discussion from an American point of view of the application of the criminal law of a country to acts committed by foreigners outside the territorial limits of the country concerned. It will include a statement of the prevailing theories adopted by American courts and jurists, accompanied by a brief summary of typical cases decided by American Courts, and a critical analysis of these theories and of their application in American judicial opinions

THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

Time was when the students of the physical sciences sought to judge the truth or correctness of any particular statement about a particular physical thing–plant, heavenly body, or case of chemical change–by assuming that they had already in hand a general truth with which to compare the particular empirical occurrence. The assumption was, as John Dewey, from whom I am quoting, puts it, that the human mind was already in possession of fixed truths, universal principles, preordained axioms and that only by their means could contingent, varying particular events be truly known. So long as this assumption maintained its hold upon men\u27s minds no real advance in physical science was possible. Modern science really began only when men trusted themselves to embarking upon the uncertain sea of events and were willing to be instructed by changes in the concrete. Then antecedent principles were tentatively employed as methods for conducting observations and experiments, and for organizing special facts: as hypotheses. In the field of the physical sciences, therefore, the deductive method of ascertaining the truth about nature has given way to what is called–perhaps with not entire accuracy–the inductive method of modern science, in which the so-called laws of nature are reached by collecting data, i.e. by observing concrete phenomena, and then forming, by a process of trial and error, generalizations which are merely useful tools by means of which we describe in mental shorthand as wide a range as possible of the observed physical phenomena, choosing that form of description which on the whole works most simply in the way of enabling us to describe past observations and to predict future observations

Equitable Defenses

The original New York Code of Civil Procedure, which proposed to bring about a fusion of common law and equity, contained no specific provision relating to equitable defenses. In view of doubts that were expressed–doubts which apparently were not shared by the Court of Appeals–the following amendment was made in 1852: The defendant may set forth by answer as many defenses and counter claims as he may have, whether they be such as have heretofore been denominated legal or equitable, or both. A large number of the codes contain substantially similar provisions