Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq

Research Highlights and Abstract: Precedents set in debates over Iraq, Libya and Syria established a new parliamentary prerogative, that MPs must vote before military action can legitimately be launched. Tony Blair conceded the Iraq vote to shore up Labour back-bench support, because he was convinced he would win, and because he was unwilling to change course regardless. David Cameron allowed a vote on Libya because he believed parliament should have a say, because UN support meant he was certain to win, and to gain plaudits for not being Blair. Cameron then had to allow a vote on Syria despite its greater political sensitivity. He mishandled the vote, and lost, and felt constrained to pull out of mooted military action. Collectively these three precedents comprise a new constitutional convention, which will constrain the executive in future whether the law is formally changed or not. Parliament now decides when Britain goes to war. The vote against military intervention in Syria on 29 August 2013 upheld a new parliamentary prerogative that gradually developed through debates over earlier actions in Iraq and Libya. While the academic community and much of the British political elite continue to focus on the free rein granted to prime ministers by the historic royal prerogative, this article argues it is critically constrained by its parliamentary counterpart. It traces the way political conditions, individual policymaker preferences, and the conventional nature of the unwritten British constitution allowed parliament to insert itself into the policymaking process without the consent of successive governments. It concludes that MPs will in future expect the right to vote on proposals to deploy the armed forces overseas, and that the legitimacy of military action will depend on the government winning such a vote

The UK coalition and the civil service: A half-term report

Drawing upon a range of policy documents, government papers and parliamentary reports, as well as published academic and think tank analyses, this article sets out the civil service inheritance bequeathed to the 2010 UK coalition government by its predecessors, examines the pre-election civil service policies of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, illustrates the policy challenges facing the civil service in serving two masters, and analyses the reasons for and early impact of organisational and leadership changes in Whitehall since 2010. The background to, and potential significance of, the 2012 Civil Service Reform Plan are set out. The article provides a succinct overview of the impact of the coalition government on Whitehall during the first two and a half years of its term