History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense /

Shipping list no.: 1989-0218-P (v. 2), 2002-0116-P (v. 3), 1997-0063-S (v. 4), 2007-0058-P (v. 5).Includes bibliographical references and indexes.v. 1. The formative years, 1947-1950 / Steven L. Rearden -- v. 2. The test of war, 1950-1953 / Doris M. Condit -- v. 3. Strategy, money, and the new look, 1953-1956 / Richard M. Leighton -- v. 4. Into the missile age, 1956-1960 / Robert J. Watson -- v. 5. The McNamara ascendancy, 1961-1965 / Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, Edward J. Drea.Mode of access: Internet

White House publicity operations during the Korean War, June 1950 – June 1951

Truman was the first modern president to face the challenge of selling a limited war. Based on a wide range of primary sources, this article explores the impact that the Korean War had on Truman’s publicity operations. Whereas all wars place important new demands on presidents to speak out more frequently and forcefully, limited wars place significant constraints on what presidents can say and do. During the Korean War, Truman refused to go public at key moments, often employed rhetoric that was more restrained than at earlier moments of the Cold War, and shied away from creating new structures to coordinate the official message. Such actions also had important consequences. In 1950-51, they hampered the task of effective presidential communication, and contributed to the war’s growing unpopularity. For the longer term, they demonstrated the difficulties of selling a limited war, and hence place into sharper context the problems that beset Truman’s successors during the subsequent conflict in Vietnam