Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism

Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation that avoids the interpretative dilemma, though difficult questions about the argument remain

Schopenhauer on the Content of Compassion

On the traditional reading, Schopenhauer claims that compassion is the recognition of deep metaphysical unity. In this paper, I defend and develop the traditional reading. I begin by addressing three recent criticisms of the reading from Sandra Shapshay: that it fails to accommodate Schopenhauer's restriction to sentient beings, that it cannot explain his moral ranking of egoism over malice, and that Schopenhauer requires some level of distinction to remain in compassion. Against Shapshay, I argue that Schopenhauer does not restrict compassion to sentient beings and that a more metaphysically refined version of the traditional reading can accommodate both Schopenhauer's moral ranking of characters and allow for some level of distinction in compassion. I then turn to four further questions for the traditional reading: what the relation is between the feeling of compassionate pain and the recognition of metaphysical unity, how cognitions mediate compassion, whether compassion is limited to the present, and how the feeling of compassion relates to Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle. I conclude by explaining how, in a reductive vein, the traditional reading can also allow for compassion to have normative content

The Synergistic Impact of Excessive Alcohol Drinking and Cigarette Smoking upon Prospective Memory

The independent use of excessive amounts of alcohol or persistent cigarette smoking have been found to have a deleterious impact upon Prospective Memory (PM: remembering future intentions and activities), although to date, the effect of their concurrent use upon PM is yet to be explored. The present study investigated the impact of the concurrent use of drinking excessive amounts of alcohol and smoking cigarettes (a “Polydrug” group) in comparison to the combined effect of the single use of these substances upon PM. The study adopted a single factorial independent groups design. The Cambridge Prospective Memory Test (CAMPROMPT) is a test of both time-based and event-based PM and was used here to measure PM. The CAMPROMPT was administered to 125 adults; an excessive alcohol user group (n = 40), a group of smokers who drink very little alcohol (n = 20), a combined user group (the “Polydrug” group) who drink excessively and smoke cigarettes (n = 40) and a non-drinker/low alcohol consumption control group (n = 25). The main findings revealed that the Polydrug users recalled significantly fewer time-based PM tasks than both excessive alcohol users p < 0.001 and smokers p = 0.013. Polydrug users (mean = 11.47) also remembered significantly fewer event-based PM tasks than excessive alcohol users p < 0.001 and smokers p = 0.013. With regards to the main aim of the study, the polydrug users exhibited significantly greater impaired time-based PM than the combined effect of single excessive alcohol users and cigarette smokers p = 0.033. However, no difference was observed between polydrug users and the combined effect of single excessive alcohol users and cigarette smokers in event-based PM p = 0.757. These results provide evidence that concurrent (polydrug) use of these two substances has a synergistic effect in terms of deficits upon time-based PM. The observation that combined excessive drinking and cigarette smoking leads to a greater impairment in time-based PM may be of paramount importance, given the key role PM plays in everyday independent living

Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism

I argue that Schopenhauer’s views on the foundations of morality challenge the widely-held belief that moral realism requires cognitivism about moral judgments. Schopenhauer’s core metaethical view consists of two claims: that moral worth is attributed to actions based in compassion, and that compassion, in contrast to egoism, arises from deep metaphysical insight into the non-distinctness of beings. These claims, I argue, are sufficient for moral realism, but are compatible with either cognitivism or non-cognitivism. While Schopenhauer’s views of moral judgment are not obviously consistent, I show how various passages suggest a form of non-cognitivism. This non-cognitivism, I claim, is compatible with moral realism

Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?

Kant's philosophy promises to explain various synthetic a priori claims. Yet, as several of his commentators have noted, it is hard to see how these explanations could work unless they themselves rested on unexplained synthetic a priori claims. Since Kant appears to demand explanations for all synthetic a priori claims, it would seem that his project fails on its own terms. I argue, however, that Kant holds that explanations are required only for synthetic a priori claims about (purportedly) experience-independent entities, and that his project rests on a rationalist method of reflection that justifies certain basic synthetic a priori claims

Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects

The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in which they can be the same things while differing in many of their feature

Reason in the Short Treatise

Spinoza’s account of reason in the Short Treatise has been largely neglected. That account, I argue, has at least four features which distinguish it from that of the Ethics: in the Short Treatise, (1) reason is more sharply distinguished from the faculty of intuitive knowledge, (2) reason deals with things as though they were ‘outside’ us, (3) reason lacks clarity and distinctness, and (4) reason has no power over many types of passions. I argue that these differences have a unified explanation, consisting of a principle that Spinoza accepts in both works and a central change in his views. The principle is that whatever we find in ourselves has more power over us than anything which comes from outside, and the change is in making the objects of reason common things or common notions. Understanding this, I claim, sheds important light on the psychological and epistemological motivations behind Spinoza's mature doctrines

Lockean Empathy

This paper offers an epistemic defense of empathy, drawing on John Locke's theory of ideas. Locke held that ideas of shape, unlike ideas of color, had a distinctive value: resembling qualities in their objects. I argue that the same is true of empathy, as when someone is pained by someone's pain. This means that empathy has the same epistemic value or objectivity that Locke and other early modern philosophers assigned to veridical perceptions of shape. For this to hold, pain and pleasure must be a primary quality of the mind, just as shape is a primary quality of bodies. Though Locke did not make that claim, I argue that pain and pleasure satisfy his criteria for primary qualities. I consider several objections to the analogy between empathy and shape-perception and show how Locke's theory has resources for answering them. In addition, the claim that empathetic ideas are object-matching sidesteps Berkeley's influential objection to Locke's theory of resemblance. I conclude by briefly considering the prospects for a similar defense of empathy in contemporary term

Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself Distinction

Kant’s transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant’s acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the ‘two-world’ interpretation of his idealism