Deligne's duality for de Rham realizations of 1-motives

We show that the pairing on de Rham realizations of 1-motives in "Theorie di Hodge III", IHES 44, can be defined over any base scheme and we prove that it gives rise to a perfect duality if one is working with a 1-motive and its Cartier dual. Furthermore we study universal extensions of 1-motives and their relation with $\natural$-extensions.Comment: 21 pages. Last section rewritten. New proof

The Problem of Doping

In this Essay, we examine Professor Michael J. Sandel and Judge Richard A. Posner\u27s thoughts on how to draw the line between substances and techniques that are fair game and those that constitute doping; whether there is a difference between sport and spectacle; and the nature of the public’s interest in sport as an institution and in doping as a practice that risks its integrity. Although we do not agree with all of their conclusions, they have made serious contributions to the ongoing discussion of these issues. Their linedrawing work in particular deserves considered attention from WADA and other stakeholders as they continue to work toward a useful and defensible definition of the spirit of sport

"Things that stay":feminist theory, duration and the future

Taking up Grosz's proposal for the `complexities of time and becoming' to be considered seriously, this article explores the status of time and the future within feminist theory through empirical research in which teenage girls describe things `staying'. Focusing on these `things that stay' and drawing on Bergson's concepts of duration and the virtual, the article argues that time is dynamic and heterogeneous; things endure through divergence and transformation. It argues that if the relations of temporality are understood as both continuous and discontinuous, enduring and changing, feminist theory orients to the future in `novel' ways

Quotational higher-order thought theory

© 2015. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. This theory relies on the idea of ‘quoting’ sensory qualities, so is dubbed the ‘quotational higher-order thought theory’. I argue that it can capture something of the idea that we are ‘acquainted’ with our conscious states without slipping beyond the pale for naturalists, whilst also providing satisfying treatments of traditional problems for higher-order theories concerning representational mismatch. The theory achieves this by abandoning a representational mechanism for mental intentionality, in favour of one based on ‘embedding’Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

Doing IT for Themselves: Management versus Autonomy in Youth E-Citizenship

Part of the Volume on Civic Life Online: Learning How Digital Media Can Engage Youth. This chapter explores tensions between managed and autonomous conceptions of youth e-citizenship as manifested in six UK-based projects. Managed youth e-citizenship projects are characterized as seeking to establish "connections" between young people and institutions that have power over their lives. Regarding youth as apprentice citizens who need to learn appropriate ways of engaging with encrusted structures of governance, they seek to promote habits of civility, while at the same time encouraging young people to think of themselves as empowered social actors whose (virtual) voices deserve to be heard. In contrast, autonomous e-citizenship projects tend not to be funded by government, and express strong reservations about having relationship too close to the state. These projects are less interested in engaging with powerful institutions than in forming powerful networks of young people, engaged with one another to resist the power of institutions. Regarding youth as independent political agents, autonomous e-citizens expect less from the communicative potential of having their say; for them, empowerment entails an intimate relationship between voice and action. The chapter concludes by proposing a set of policy recommendations that might lead to a productive convergence between these two models of youth e-citizenship