Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is about whether counterfactuals of freedom concerning what an agent would freely do if they were in certain circumstances even partly determines that agent’s obligations. This debate arose from an argument against the coherence of utilitarianism in the deontic logic literature. In this chapter, we first trace the historical origins of this debate and then examine actualism, possibilism, and securitism through the lens of consequentialism. After examining their respective benefits and drawbacks, we argue that, contrary to what has been assumed, actualism and securitism both succumb to the so-called nonratifiability problem. In making this argument, we develop this problem in detail and argue that it’s a much more serious problem than has been appreciated. We conclude by arguing that an alternative view, hybridism, is independently the most plausible position and best fits with the nature of consequentialism, partly in light of avoiding the nonratifiability problem

Incompatibilist Alternative Possibilities

This dissertation has two primary aims. The first aim is to defend the position that the alternative possibilities that are required for basic desert moral responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism. The second aim is to investigate such incompatibilist alternative possibilities, specifically in relation to manipulation, deliberation, and Molinist counterfactuals of freedom. In chapter 1, “Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument”, I examine John Martin Fischer’s deterministic Frankfurt-style argument against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent’s moral responsibility, it is not in virtue of its eliminating the agent’s alternative possibilities. I contend that, once we focus upon the distinction between entailment and explanation, the incompatibilist defender of PAP can successfully rebut Fischer’s argument. I argue for this claim while granting Fischer a number of assumptions that only render a defense of PAP more difficult. Additionally, I cast doubt upon David Palmer’s critique of Fischer’s argument, which in turn renders my defense of PAP all the more critical. In chapter 2, “Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt-Style Cases”, I examine the new dispositionalists’ defense of the position that an agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) has the ability to do otherwise, where that ability is the one at issue in PAP. Focusing specifically on Kadri Vihvelin’s proposal, I argue against this position by showing that it is incompatible with the existence of structurally similar cases to FSCs in which a preemptive intervener bestows an agent with an ability. In chapter 3, “The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism”, I argue precisely what the title suggests. More specifically, I argue that classical compatibilism, in conjunction with any type of reply to the manipulation argument, has counterintuitive implications. In order to avoid such implications, we need not hold that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. But we must hold that determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise. In chapter 4, “Manipulating Deliberators”, I offer a counterexample to Derk Pereboom’s account of rational deliberation, and then employ it to develop a four-case manipulated deliberation argument against deliberation compatibilism, the view that rational deliberation is compatible with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined by factors beyond one’s control. Given the structural similarity between my argument and Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism, both arguments stand or fall to together. As a result, a hard incompatibilist such as Pereboom faces a dilemma: either give up deliberation compatibilism, as well as the view that one can (as a hard incompatibilist) rationally deliberate, or give up the four-case manipulation argument. In chapter 5, “Counterfactuals of Divine Freedom”, I argue that, contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, counterfactuals of divine freedom (CDFs) are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God’s will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize. In chapter 6, “Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument”, I defend Ken Perszyk’s argument for the claim that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom (CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. More specifically, Edward Wierenga has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s argument by highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws of nature

Agential Settling Requires a Conscious Intention

Helen Steward holds that an agent’s settling something does not require a conscious, full-fledged intention. Rather, sub-intentional acts can be instances of settling by the agent if that act is subordinated to the agent’s personal-level conscious systems. I argue that this position is mistaken, and that agential settling does in fact require a conscious intention. I argue for this claim by offering a case which on Steward’s position has counterintuitive implications. I consider a variety of ways in which Steward might respond, and show how each response incurs serious dialectical burdens. I then propose my preferred view of agential settling which does not share the aforementioned counterintuitive claims

Reasons-Responsiveness and Time Travel

I argue that the theory of moral responsibility defended by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of time travel

Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting

Suppose you can save only one of two groups of people from harm, with one person in one group, and five persons in the other group. Are you obligated to save the greater number? While common sense seems to say ‘yes’, the numbers skeptic says ‘no’. Numbers Skepticism has been partly motivated by the anti-consequentialist thought that the goods, harms and well-being of individual people do not aggregate in any morally significant way. However, even many non-consequentialists think that Numbers Skepticism goes too far in rejecting the claim that you ought to save the greater number. Besides the prima facie implausibility of Numbers Skepticism, Michael Otsuka has developed an intriguing argument against this position. Otsuka argues that Numbers Skepticism, in conjunction with an independently plausible moral principle, leads to inconsistent choices regarding what ought to be done in certain circumstances. This inconsistency in turn provides us with a good reason to reject Numbers Skepticism. Kirsten Meyer offers a notable challenge to Otsuka’s argument. I argue that Meyer’s challenge can be met, and then offer my own reasons for rejecting Otsuka’s argument. In light of these criticisms, I then develop an improved, yet structurally similar argument to Otsuka’s argument. I argue for the slightly different conclusion that the view proposed by John Taurek that ‘the numbers don’t count’ leads to inconsistent choices, which in turn provides us with a good reason to reject Taurek’s position

An Analysis of Recent Empirical Data on ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’

Recent experimental studies dispute the position that commonsense morality accepts ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ (OIC), the view that, necessarily, if an agent ought to perform some action, then she can perform that action. This paper considers and supports explanations for the results of these studies on the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive and true

Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalām Cosmological Argument

Wes Morriston contends that William Lane Craig\u27s argument for the impossibility of a beginningless past results in an equally good argument for the impossibility of an endless future (or at least a pre-determined one). Craig disagrees. I show that Craig\u27s reply reveals a commitment to an unmotivated position concerning the relationship between actuality and the actual infinite. I then assess alternative routes to the impossibility of a beginningless past that have been offered in the literature, and show that, contrary to initial appearances, these routes similarly seem to support the impossibility of an endless future

Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt‐Style Cases

The new dispositionalists defend the position that an agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) has the ability to do otherwise, where that ability is the one at issue in the principle of alternative possibilities. Focusing specifically on Kadri Vihvelin\u27s proposal, I argue against this position by showing that it is incompatible with the existence of structurally similar cases to FSCs in which a preemptive intervener bestows an agent with an ability