Subsidies under United States Countervailing Duty Law: The Case of Taiwan

The rapid industrialization of the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan during the past thirty years has been accompanied by the entry of goods made in Taiwan into markets around the world. Indeed, foreign trade has become the backbone of Taiwan\u27s economy and the impetus for its economic growth. Between 1976 and 1984, for example, year-to-year growth rates of imports ranged from 7.4% to 34.0%, while export growth ranged from 14.1% to 53.8%. In its ninth medium-term economic plan, the Council of Economic Planning and Development ( CEPD ) calls for Taiwan\u27s economy to grow by an annual average of 6.5% and exports of merchandise to increase by 8.2% annually from 1986 to 1989. The four-year plan projects merchandise exports of $40.3 billion and imports of$ 30.4 billion by 1989. This Article analyzes Taiwan\u27s government policies affecting production for export and their treatment under United States countervailing duty law. After describing the evolution of Taiwan\u27s trade policy and the present formulation of Taiwan\u27s law and regulation affecting production for export, the Article sets forth the applicable provisions of United States countervailing duty law. Discussion then focuses upon recent countervailing duty proceedings involving Taiwanese products, and concludes with the observation that the Taiwanese government subsidizes its exports minimally, if at all. This observation will refute the recurring argument that Taiwanese export subsidies have contributed to the United States-Taiwan trade deficit

Overview: U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Taiwan Trade Law Issues in Comparative Perspective

Since the mid-1950s, the economies of Korea and Taiwan have achieved remarkable results, with annual growth rates of ten percent not unusual in some years. During the past couple of decades, they have relied heavily on export trade, particularly with the United States, to maintain rapid growth rates and continued economic development. In 1988, for example, Korea and Taiwan enjoyed a combined trade surplus with the United States of $21.6 billion on total trade of$68.4 billion

Subsidies under United States Countervailing Duty Law: The Case of Taiwan

The rapid industrialization of the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan during the past thirty years has been accompanied by the entry of goods made in Taiwan into markets around the world. Indeed, foreign trade has become the backbone of Taiwan\u27s economy and the impetus for its economic growth. Between 1976 and 1984, for example, year-to-year growth rates of imports ranged from 7.4% to 34.0%, while export growth ranged from 14.1% to 53.8%. In its ninth medium-term economic plan, the Council of Economic Planning and Development ( CEPD ) calls for Taiwan\u27s economy to grow by an annual average of 6.5% and exports of merchandise to increase by 8.2% annually from 1986 to 1989. The four-year plan projects merchandise exports of $40.3 billion and imports of$ 30.4 billion by 1989. This Article analyzes Taiwan\u27s government policies affecting production for export and their treatment under United States countervailing duty law. After describing the evolution of Taiwan\u27s trade policy and the present formulation of Taiwan\u27s law and regulation affecting production for export, the Article sets forth the applicable provisions of United States countervailing duty law. Discussion then focuses upon recent countervailing duty proceedings involving Taiwanese products, and concludes with the observation that the Taiwanese government subsidizes its exports minimally, if at all. This observation will refute the recurring argument that Taiwanese export subsidies have contributed to the United States-Taiwan trade deficit

Overview: U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Taiwan Trade Law Issues in Comparative Perspective

Since the mid-1950s, the economies of Korea and Taiwan have achieved remarkable results, with annual growth rates of ten percent not unusual in some years. During the past couple of decades, they have relied heavily on export trade, particularly with the United States, to maintain rapid growth rates and continued economic development. In 1988, for example, Korea and Taiwan enjoyed a combined trade surplus with the United States of $21.6 billion on total trade of$68.4 billion

A Review of Institutional Influences on the Rise of Made-in-China Multinationals

Purpose – This paper aims to re-examine the role of institutions in the rise of made-in-China multinationals. Specifically, the paper seeks to understand how changes in the global environment, especially global financial crisis, have solidified the Chinese government\u27s role in pushing and encouraging Chinese firms to engage in outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) activities. Design/methodology/approach – This is a conceptual paper. The analysis is based on a large number of publicly available sources, including research papers, government documents, and reports. The paper strives to triangulate the validity of the data with multiple sources. Findings – The study finds that while the role of the state in China has been evolving since the start of the economic reforms in 1978, by no means has it been lessened. Instead, the state has asserted its role specifically to grow Chinese multinationals in size and in number, by leveraging the financial resources accumulated over the last 30 years, by taking advantage of the cheap assets made available globally by the recent financial crisis and by institutionalizing its “Go Global” strategy. Research limitations/implications – The study implies that the role of the state will be further solidified through China\u27s national goal of enhancing competitiveness via knowledge acquisition through OFDI and simultaneously, multinationals’ OFDI initiatives and strategies will be reinforced by the state\u27s economic policies and goals while their commercial interests will take on an increasing importance in the global marketplace and their behavior will co-evolve with and be reshaped by local, national, and international environments. The paper suggests that future studies employ co-evolutionary theory to investigate the role of state-owned enterprises (especially the functions of their CEOs) as well as non-state actors in shaping the institutional framework in China. Future studies should verify some of the ideas with empirical data and strive to triangulate different data sources to increase data quality. Practical implications – The study also provides implications to Chinese policy makers on how to balance the government\u27s role as conductor, enabler, protector, and constrainer while allowing Chinese multinationals to integrate into the global market for the benefit of both China and the world economy. Originality/value – This study represents an original contribution to this topic. The research contributes to the study of globalization of Chinese enterprises by exploring the renewed dynamic relationship between the state and the firm after the 2008 global financial crisis

Chinese Multinationals and the State: An Institutional Perspective

Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) remained largely insignificant until 2004, and Chinese multinationals were rarely heard about in the news. Yet, China’s OFDI flow in 2010 amounted to more than $60 billion (see Figure 4.1). By 2010, about 17 000 Chinese companies had invested abroad, reaching virtually every country in the world. China’s shopping spree continues in defiance of the current global economic crisis. High-profile acquisitions include Sinopec’s$7.2 billion purchase of Addax, a Swiss oil company with extensive holdings in Iraq, in 2009. More recently, Sichuan Tengzhong Heavy Industrial Machinery Co., a Chinese heavy construction equipment maker, acquired General Motors’ Hummer brand for US$150 million, and Geely acquired the Volvo brand from Ford for US$1.8 billion in 2010. Chinese OFDI has been characterised by a number of unique features: (1) Chinese multinational firms are backed by strong government support, unlike their counterparts from other countries; (2) large state-owned enterprises are the key investors among all those going global; (3) Chinese firms invest with lightning speed, primarily through acquisitions; (4) Chinese firms have invested in a large spectrum of industries, ranging from natural resources to high-technology sectors; and (5) most Chinese firms do not normally possess advanced technologies