Central Banking and the Choice of Currency Regime in Accession Countries

The subject matter of this paper is the design of appropriate Central Banking arrangements and exchange rate regimes for those former centrally planned Central and East European countries that are candidates for full membership in the European Union. We give an overview of the existing arrangements and point out to which extent monetary arrangements are restricted by conditions for entry both into the European Union and eventually into the European Monetary Union. Furthermore we investigate to which degree countries are fulfilling the accession criteria and compare their performance with the performance of earlier EU joiners like the countries of the Iberian Peninsula, Ireland and Greece.

The real exchange rate in transition economies

Real exchange rates appear to present a specific behaviour in the early phase of transition: they are largely unaffected by nominal exchange rate movements and exibit trend appreciation. The model presented here describes the transition process as the emergence of two new (traded and non-traded good) sectors and the decline of an inefficient and subsidised state sector. The absence of financial markets means that firms accumulate capital through retained earnings. Labour markets are imperfect giving rise to a wage gap. The model shows that the real exchange rate plays the crucial role of determining real wages. Through real wages it sets the pace for the development of the new sectors as workers are attracted out of the state sector. The link between growth and real appreciation differs from the usual Balassa Samuelson effect. The paper also explores the role of labour market distortions and foreign financing

Banque centrale et choix de régimes de change pour les pays candidats à l’adhésion

Central Banking and the Choice of Currency Regime in Accession Countries This paper deals with the design of appropriate Central Banking arrangements and exchange rate regimes for those CEECs that are candidates for full membership in the EU. We give an overview of the existing arrangements and point out to which extent monetary arrangements are restricted by conditions for entry both into the EU and into the EMU. Furthermore we investigate to which degree countries are fulfilling the accession criteria and compare their performance with the performance of earlier EU joiners. After concluding that the accession criteria do not necessarily favour a particular monetary regime, we analyse the pros and cons of the two regimes widely believed to be most stable - currency boards or inflation targeting. Under either regime tensions are likely to arise from the attempt to meet the accession criteria of a low inflation rate and a stable exchange rate. JEL classifications : E58, F31, P20Cet article étudie les évolutions institutionnelles des Banques centrales ainsi que les régimes de change des pays de l’Est, candidats à l’UE. Nous examinons les régimes actuels et comment ils doivent évoluer afin de respecter les critères d’entrée dans l’UE et l’UEM. De plus, nous étudions avec quel degré les pays candidats satisfont les critères d’accession et nous les comparons aux performances des derniers entrants dans l’UE. Après avoir conclu que les critères d’accession ne favorisent pas nécessairement un régime de change particulier, nous analysons le pour et le contre des deux régimes envisagés comme les plus stables - le currency board et la cible d’inflation. Sous ces deux régimes, le respect des critères de faible inflation et de stabilité des changes est susceptible de produire de fortes tensions. Classification JEL : E58, F31, P20Buiter Willem, Grafe Clemens. Banque centrale et choix de régimes de change pour les pays candidats à l’adhésion. In: Revue d'économie financière. Hors-série, 2001. Dix ans de transition en Europe de l'Est : bilan et perspectives. pp. 315-347

Central Banking and the Choice of Currency Regime in Accession Countries

This paper deals with the design of appropriate Central Banking arrangements and exchange rate regimes for those CEECs that are candidates for full membership in the EU. We give an overview of the existing arrangements and point out to which extent monetary arrangements are restricted by conditions for entry both into the EU and into the EMU. Furthermore we investigate to which degree countries are fulfilling the accession criteria and compare their performance with the performance of earlier EU joiners. After concluding that the accession criteria do not necessarily favour a particular monetary regime, we analyse the pros and cons of the two regimes widely believed to be most stable-currency boards or inflation targeting. Under either regime tensions are likely to arise from the attempt to meet the accession criteria of a low inflation rate and a stable exchange rate. JEL classifications : E58, F31, P20Banque centrale et choix de régimes de change pour les pays candidats à l’adhésion Cet article étudie les évolutions institutionnelles des Banques centrales ainsi que les régimes de change des pays de l’Est, candidats à l’UE. Nous examinons les régimes actuels et comment ils doivent évoluer afin des respecter les critères d’entrée dans l’UE et l’UEM. De plus, nous étudions avec quel degré les pays candidats satisfont les critères d’accession et nous les comparons aux performances des derniers entrants dans l’UE. Après avoir conclu que les critères d’accession ne favorisent pas nécessairement un régime de change particulier, nous analysons le pour et le contre des deux régimes envisagés comme les plus stables - le currency board et la cible d’inflation. Sous ces deux régimes, le respect des critères de faible inflation et de stabilité des changes est susceptible de produire de fortes tensions. Classification JEL : E58, F31, P20Buiter Willem, Grafe Clemens. Central Banking and the Choice of Currency Regime in Accession Countries . In: Revue d'économie financière (English ed.). Hors-série, 2001. Ten years of transition in Eastern European countries. pp. 287-318

The Real Exchange Rate in Transition Economies

Real exchange rates appear to present a specific behaviour in the early phase of transition: they are largely unaffected by nominal exchange rate movements and exhibit trend appreciation. The model presented here describes the transition process as the emergence of two new (traded and non-traded good) sectors and the decline of an inefficient and subsidized state sector. The absence of financial markets means that firms accumulate capital through retained earnings. Labour markets are imperfect giving rise to a wage gap. The model shows that the real exchange plays the crucial role of determining real wages. Through real wages it sets the pace for the development of the new sectors as workers are attracted out of the state sector. The link between growth and real appreciation differs from the usual Balassa-Samuelson effect. The paper also explores the role of labour market distortions and foreign financing.foreign financing; Real Exchange Rate; Transition; Wage Gap