For there is nothing either good or bad: a study of the mediating effect of interpretation bias on the association between mindfulness and reduced post-traumatic stress vulnerability

BACKGROUND: Despite increasing interest in the association between mindfulness and reduced trauma vulnerability, and the use of mindfulness in the latest interventions for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), few studies have examined the mechanisms through which mindfulness may influence post-trauma psychopathology. The present study aimed to determine whether negative interpretation bias, the tendency to interpret ambiguous information as negative or threatening rather than positive or safe, mediates the association between higher levels of trait mindfulness and lower levels of PTSD symptoms. Negative interpretation bias was examined due to prior evidence indicating it is associated with being less mindful and post trauma psychopathology. METHODS: The study examined 133 undergraduate students who reported exposure to one or more potentially traumatic events in their lifetime. Participants completed self-report measures of trait mindfulness (Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire – Short Form; FFMQ-SF) and PTSD symptoms (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Checklist – Civilian version; PCL-C) as well an interpretation bias task that assessed the degree to which participants interpreted a range of everyday hypothetical scenarios to be threatening to their physical and/or psychological wellbeing. RESULTS: Results of a mediation analysis indicated a significant negative direct effect of trait mindfulness on PTSD symptomatology (p < .001). There was no evidence that negative interpretation bias mediated this relationship [BCa CI [-0.04, 0.03)], nor was it associated with trait mindfulness (p = .90) and PTSD symptomatology (p = .37). CONCLUSIONS: The results of the current study provide further evidence of the link between trait mindfulness and reduced post-trauma psychopathology while providing no support for the role of negative interpretation bias in this relationship. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12888-022-03950-y

The role of performance beliefs in the difference between self-report and behavioural measures of attentional control and their relationship with anxiety

While empirical findings closely link poor attentional control with elevated anxiety, this relationship is more consistently evident and stronger when attentional control is measured through self-report than through behaviour. One possible explanation for these diverging findings is that people lack insight into their attentional control capabilities, and people with elevated anxiety hold more negative beliefs about their level of attentional control, resulting in lower self-reported levels of attentional control. In two studies, participants (N = 78 and N = 207) completed the attentional control scale, the attentional network test (ANT), a questionnaire measuring beliefs about attentional control in the ANT, and a measure of anxiety. In both studies, no significant associations were present between beliefs about attentional control in the ANT and participants' performance on the ANT, suggesting a lack of insight in attentional control capabilities. Both studies further demonstrated that only beliefs about attentional control but not performance in the ANT were related to self-reported attentional control and anxiety. We thus show that evidence supporting the relationship between self-reported attentional control and anxiety is driven by biased beliefs about ability to control attention in people with heightened anxiety, and not by behavioural indices of attentional control.</p

Effects of cognitive load during interpretation bias modification on interpretation bias and stress reactivity

Background and objectives Interpretation bias modification can affect stress reactivity, yet results have not been consistent. This inconsistency may be partly due to variability in the degree to which training procedures alter interpretation at a more automatic, rather than strategic, level of processing, and a mismatch in available resources between the training and the stress situation. We tested this possibility by investigating whether imposing a secondary cognitive load during interpretation bias modification would strengthen training-induced effects on both interpretation bias and emotional reactivity. Method We trained 71 participants in a single session to interpret ambiguity either positively or negatively. Half of our participants did so while performing a cognitively demanding secondary task. We assessed the effects of these different training regimes on interpretation bias and both self-reported and physiological indices of stress reactivity. Results Positive and negative interpretation bias modification resulted in training-congruent changes in interpretation bias. There were no group differences in self-reported stress reactivity, but positive interpretation training did improve recovery from stress as indexed by the heart rate measurement. Countering our hypothesis, the addition of cognitive load during the training increased neither the induced interpretive change nor its emotional impact. Limitations Sample size was relatively small, though sufficient to detect medium sized effects. Conclusions Adding cognitive load to interpretation bias modification does not alter training-induced change in interpretation bias or emotional reactivity

Effects of cognitive load during interpretation bias modification on interpretation bias and stress reactivity

Background and objectives: Interpretation bias modification can affect stress reactivity, yet results have not been consistent. This inconsistency may be partly due to variability in the degree to which training procedures alter interpretation at a more automatic, rather than strategic, level of processing, and a mismatch in available resources between the training and the stress situation. We tested this possibility by investigating whether imposing a secondary cognitive load during interpretation bias modification would strengthen training-induced effects on both interpretation bias and emotional reactivity. Method: We trained 71 participants in a single session to interpret ambiguity either positively or negatively. Half of our participants did so while performing a cognitively demanding secondary task. We assessed the effects of these different training regimes on interpretation bias and both self-reported and physiological indices of stress reactivity. Results: Positive and negative interpretation bias modification resulted in training-congruent changes in interpretation bias. There were no group differences in self-reported stress reactivity, but positive interpretation training did improve recovery from stress as indexed by the heart rate measurement. Countering our hypothesis, the addition of cognitive load during the training increased neither the induced interpretive change nor its emotional impact. Limitations: Sample size was relatively small, though sufficient to detect medium sized effects. Conclusions: Adding cognitive load to interpretation bias modification does not alter training-induced change in interpretation bias or emotional reactivity

Frontal tDCS and emotional reactivity to negative content: Examining the roles of biased interpretation and emotion regulation

Background: Given findings showing that emotion regulation may be enhanced through prefrontal neurostimulation, the present study examined whether the effect of transcranial direct current stimulation on emotional reactivity is mediated via biased interpretation, and whether emotion regulation goals further moderate this relationship. Methods: Healthy participants (n = 79) were allocated to one of four conditions to receive either active or sham tDCS concurrently with an emotion regulation task during which they were instructed to maintain or down-regulate their emotional reactions (between groups). A homograph priming task assessed biased interpretation, and emotional reactivity was assessed in response to a negative video viewing task. Results: Those receiving active tDCS showed smaller elevations in negative mood in response to viewing negative videos compared to sham stimulation. Neither tDCS condition nor emotion regulation condition had an impact on interpretive bias, and there was no evidence for tDCS-enhancement of emotion regulation. As such, interpretive bias did not significantly mediate the relationship between tDCS and emotional reactivity, and no moderating role of emotion regulation was observed. Conclusions: The present results are consistent with neural models implicating increased frontal activity with reduction in emotional reactivity, but provides no support for the role of interpretive bias in this relationship, and no evidence that tDCS enhanced the effects of emotion regulation

Frontal tDCS and Emotional Reactivity to Negative Content: Examining the Roles of Biased Interpretation and Emotion Regulation

Background: Given findings showing that emotion regulation may be enhanced through prefrontal neurostimulation, the present study examined whether the effect of transcranial direct current stimulation on emotional reactivity is mediated via biased interpretation, and whether emotion regulation goals further moderate this relationship. Methods: Healthy participants (n = 79) were allocated to one of four conditions to receive either active or sham tDCS concurrently with an emotion regulation task during which they were instructed to maintain or down-regulate their emotional reactions (between groups). A homograph priming task assessed biased interpretation, and emotional reactivity was assessed in response to a negative video viewing task. Results: Those receiving active tDCS showed smaller elevations in negative mood in response to viewing negative videos compared to sham stimulation. Neither tDCS condition nor emotion regulation condition had an impact on interpretive bias, and there was no evidence for tDCS-enhancement of emotion regulation. As such, interpretive bias did not significantly mediate the relationship between tDCS and emotional reactivity, and no moderating role of emotion regulation was observed. Conclusions: The present results are consistent with neural models implicating increased frontal activity with reduction in emotional reactivity, but provides no support for the role of interpretive bias in this relationship, and no evidence that tDCS enhanced the effects of emotion regulation