What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms

This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of two forms of corruption supply, administrative corruption and state capture, by Maghrebi firms. This study is based on a new database of nearly 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. I show that tax evasion is a major factor in the engagement of firms in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the share of sales hidden by the firm as long as it is below half of total sales, and slightly decreases thereafter. State capture is fostered by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Interestingly, less competitive firms appear to engage more in both forms of corruption than the most dynamic ones. After assessing the robustness of my empirical results, I draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries.Supply of Corruption, Administrative Corruption, State Capture, Tax Evasion, Competitiveness, North Africa

Why do North African firms involve in corruption ?

URL des Documents de travail :http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CESFramDP2007.htmDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2007.02 - ISSN : 1955-611XThis paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of different forms of corruption supply. Our study is based on a new database of near 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. We show that the undeclared part of firms' sales is a major factor of their involvement in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the part of the firm's informal activity as far as it is inferior to 55% of total sales, before slightly decreasing. State capture is rather strengthened by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Moreover, both forms of corruption help to compensate a loss of competitiveness, which contradicts previous results on this issue. Finally, we draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries and derive policy recommendations.Dans cet article, nous analysons empiriquement les principaux déterminants microéconomiques de différentes formes de corruption active. Notre étude se fonde sur une nouvelle base de données de près de 600 entreprises algériennes, marocaines et tunisiennes. Nous montrons que l'occultation par les firmes d'une partie de leurs ventes est un facteur majeur de corruption administrative. Cette dernière augmente avec le pourcentage de ventes informelles des firmes tant qu'il est inférieur à 55% des ventes totales, puis diminue. La captation de l'Etat s'explique davantage par une mise en vigueur défaillante des droits de propriété et de contrat. Par ailleurs, ces deux formes de corruption constituent des recours face à une perte de compétitivité, ce qui contredit les résultats sur ce sujet. Nous menons enfin une comparaison entre les facteurs de corruption en Afrique du Nord, en Ouganda et dans les pays en transition et nous en tirons des recommandations de politique économique

What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms

We estimate the effect of the child support grant on mothers' labour supply in South Africa. Identification is based on the use of specific samples, such as black mothers, aged 20 to 45, whose youngest child is aged within 2 years of the age eligibility cut-off, and unanticipated variation over the years in the age eligibility cut-off. Balancing tests across the age cut-o s are used to show that there are no signi cant di erences between mothers of eligible and ineligible children in the samples used, over the years. Different techniques are used to estimate the effect of the child support grant from many angles, including simple OLS as a bench mark, a difference in difference estimator, using appropriately constructed treatment and control groups, instrumental variables estimates, and descriptive analysis. The effect of having an age eligible child is large. Mothers who become recipients in their twenties see an average increase in employment probability of 15%, and in labour force participation of 9%. Many robustness and specification checks are used, including placebo regressions in the pre-treatment years, to ensure the estimated effect is not due to age or another variable.Supply of Corruption, Administrative Corruption, State Capture, Tax Evasion, Competitiveness, North Africa

Why corrupt governments may receive more foreign aid

In this paper we argue that if the cross-country heterogeneity in productivity is more important than the heterogeneity in government quality, it can be optimal to give more foreign aid to more corrupt countries. We build a multi-country model of optimal aid in which we disentangle the correlation between aid and equilibrium corruption into two components: the first one reflects variations in the quality of institutions and the second encompasses variations in productivity levels. The data suggest that both components of the correlation are significant, however the effect of variations in productivity levels is stronger. This implies that most corrupt countries, since they are also the poorest, receive higher amounts of foreign aid.corruption, aid, government spending, institutions

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching-up. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth : public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose an optimal growth model where households vote for the composition of public spending subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. At equilibrium, the intensity of corruption and the structure of public investment are determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption yet still the possibility of corruption distorts the allocation of public investment, thus hampering growth. We test the implications of the model on a panel of countries estimating a system of equations which instrumental variables. We find that countries with a high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. For equal initial conditions, such countries grow slower and have higher corruption, in particular when political power is concentratedPublic investment, Optimal growth, Corruption, Political power

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The "concentration of political power" is the extent to which rent-seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions respectively are limited.economic growth, corruption, rule of law, incentive constraint, political power

Why Corrupt Governments May Receive More Foreign Aid

In this paper we argue that if the cross-country heterogeneity in productivity is more important than the heterogeneity in government quality, it can be optimal to give more foreign aid to more corrupt countries. We build a multi-country model of optimal aid in which we disentangle the correlation between aid and equilibrium corruption into two components: the first one reflects variations in the quality of institutions and the second encompasses variations in productivity levels. The data suggest that both components of the correlation are significant, however the effect of variations in productivity levels is stronger. This implies that most corrupt countries, since they are also the poorest, receive higher amounts of foreign aid.Corruption, Aid, Government spending, Institutions

Growth, Public Investment and Corruption with Failing Institutions

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching-up. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose an optimal growth model where households vote for the composition of public spending subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. At equilibrium, the intensity of corruption and the structure of public investment are determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption yet still the possibility of corruption distorts the allocation of public investment, thus hampering growth. We test the implications of the model on a panel of countries estimating a system of equations with instrumental variables. We find that countries with a high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. For equal initial conditions, such countries grow slower and have higher corruption, in particular when political power is concentratedPublic investment, optimal growth, corruption, political power.

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters : the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent-seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and incime growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and politiccal institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions respectively are limited.economic growth, corruption, rule of law, incentive constraint, political power

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching up with richer ones. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth : public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distorsion, we propose a dynamic model where households vote for the composition of public spending, subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals' choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, the structure of public investment is determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption but the possibility of corruption still distorts the allocation of public investment. We test the implications of the model on a set of countries using a two-stage least squares estimation. We find that developing countries with high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. The reverse is true for developed countries.Public investment, optimal growth, corruption, political power.