Closed-form approximations of first-passage distributions for a stochastic decision making model

In free response choice tasks, decision making is often modeled as a first-passage problem for a stochastic differential equation. In particular, drift-diffusion processes with constant or time-varying drift rates and noise can reproduce behavioral data (accuracy and response-time distributions) and neuronal firing rates. However, no exact solutions are known for the first-passage problem with time-varying data. Recognizing the importance of simple closed-form expressions for modeling and inference, we show that an interrogation or cued-response protocol, appropriately interpreted, can yield approximate first-passage (response time) distributions for a specific class of time-varying processes used to model evidence accumulation. We test these against exact expressions for the constant drift case and compare them with data from a class of sigmoidal functions. We find that both the direct interrogation approximation and an error-minimizing interrogation approximation can capture a variety of distribution shapes and mode numbers but that the direct approximation, in particular, is systematically biased away from the correct free response distribution

Emergence of qualia from brain activity or from an interaction of proto-consciousness with the brain: which one is the weirder? Available evidence and a research agenda

This contribution to the science of consciousness aims at comparing how two different theories can explain the emergence of different qualia experiences, meta-awareness, meta-cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive therapy and meditation-induced brain changes, etc. The first theory postulates that qualia experiences derive from specific neural patterns, the second one, that qualia experiences derive from the interaction of a proto-consciousness with the brain\u2019s neural activity. From this comparison it will be possible to judge which one seems to better explain the different qualia experiences and to offer a more promising research agenda

A quantitative description of the transition between intuitive altruism and rational deliberation in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma experiments

What is intuitive: pro-social or anti-social behaviour? To answer this fundamental question, recent studies analyse decision times in game theory experiments under the assumption that intuitive decisions are fast and that deliberation is slow. These analyses keep track of the average time taken to make decisions under different conditions. Lacking any knowledge of the underlying dynamics, such simplistic approach might however lead to erroneous interpretations. Here we model the cognitive basis of strategic cooperative decision making using the Drift Diffusion Model to discern between deliberation and intuition and describe the evolution of the decision making in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma experiments. We find that, although initially people's intuitive decision is to cooperate, rational deliberation quickly becomes dominant over an initial intuitive bias towards cooperation, which is fostered by positive interactions as much as frustrated by a negative one. However, this initial pro-social tendency is resilient, as after a pause it resets to the same initial value. These results illustrate the new insight that can be achieved thanks to a quantitative modelling of human behavior

Factive Scientific Understanding Without Accurate Representation

This paper analyzes two ways idealized biological models produce factive scientific understanding. I then argue that models can provide factive scientific understanding of a phenomenon without providing an accurate representation of the (difference-making) features of their real-world target system(s). My analysis of these cases also suggests that the debate over scientific realism needs to investigate the factive scientific understanding produced by scientists’ use of idealized models rather than the accuracy of scientific models themselves

How does our motor system determine its learning rate?

Motor learning is driven by movement errors. The speed of learning can be quantified by the learning rate, which is the proportion of an error that is corrected for in the planning of the next movement. Previous studies have shown that the learning rate depends on the reliability of the error signal and on the uncertainty of the motor system’s own state. These dependences are in agreement with the predictions of the Kalman filter, which is a state estimator that can be used to determine the optimal learning rate for each movement such that the expected movement error is minimized. Here we test whether not only the average behaviour is optimal, as the previous studies showed, but if the learning rate is chosen optimally in every individual movement. Subjects made repeated movements to visual targets with their unseen hand. They received visual feedback about their endpoint error immediately after each movement. The reliability of these error-signals was varied across three conditions. The results are inconsistent with the predictions of the Kalman filter because correction for large errors in the beginning of a series of movements to a fixed target was not as fast as predicted and the learning rates for the extent and the direction of the movements did not differ in the way predicted by the Kalman filter. Instead, a simpler model that uses the same learning rate for all movements with the same error-signal reliability can explain the data. We conclude that our brain does not apply state estimation to determine the optimal planning correction for every individual movement, but it employs a simpler strategy of using a fixed learning rate for all movements with the same level of error-signal reliability

Of monkeys and men:Impatience in perceptual decision-making

For decades sequential sampling models have successfully accounted for human and monkey decision-making, relying on the standard assumption that decision makers maintain a pre-set decision standard throughout the decision process. Based on the theoretical argument of reward rate maximization, some authors have recently suggested that decision makers become increasingly impatient as time passes and therefore lower their decision standard. Indeed, a number of studies show that computational models with an impatience component provide a good fit to human and monkey decision behavior. However, many of these studies lack quantitative model comparisons and systematic manipulations of rewards. Moreover, the often-cited evidence from single-cell recordings is not unequivocal and complimentary data from human subjects is largely missing. We conclude that, despite some enthusiastic calls for the abandonment of the standard model, the idea of an impatience component has yet to be fully established; we suggest a number of recently developed tools that will help bring the debate to a conclusive settlement

Paradoxical Evidence Integration in Rapid Decision Processes

Decisions about noisy stimuli require evidence integration over time. Traditionally, evidence integration and decision making are described as a one-stage process: a decision is made when evidence for the presence of a stimulus crosses a threshold. Here, we show that one-stage models cannot explain psychophysical experiments on feature fusion, where two visual stimuli are presented in rapid succession. Paradoxically, the second stimulus biases decisions more strongly than the first one, contrary to predictions of one-stage models and intuition. We present a two-stage model where sensory information is integrated and buffered before it is fed into a drift diffusion process. The model is tested in a series of psychophysical experiments and explains both accuracy and reaction time distributions

Short-term variations in response distribution to cortical stimulation

Patterns of responses in the cerebral cortex can vary, and are influenced by pre-existing cortical function, but it is not known how rapidly these variations can occur in humans. We investigated how rapidly response patterns to electrical stimulation can vary in intact human brain. We also investigated whether the type of functional change occurring at a given location with stimulation would help predict the distribution of responses elsewhere over the cortex to stimulation at that given location. We did this by studying cortical afterdischarges following electrical stimulation of the cortex in awake humans undergoing evaluations for brain surgery. Response occurrence and location could change within seconds, both nearby to and distant from stimulation sites. Responses might occur at a given location during one trial but not the next. They could occur at electrodes adjacent or not adjacent to those directly stimulated or to other electrodes showing afterdischarges. The likelihood of an afterdischarge at an individual site after stimulation was predicted by spontaneous electroencephalographic activity at that specific site just prior to stimulation, but not by overall cortical activity. When stimulation at a site interrupted motor, sensory or language function, afterdischarges were more likely to occur at other sites where stimulation interrupted similar functions. These results show that widespread dynamic changes in cortical responses can occur in intact cortex within short periods of time, and that the distribution of these responses depends on local brain states and functional brain architecture at the time of stimulation. Similar rapid variations may occur during normal intracortical communication and may underlie changes in the cortical organization of function. Possibly these variations, and the occurrence and distribution of responses to cortical stimulation, could be predicted. If so, interventions such as stimulation might be used to alter spread of epileptogenic activity, accelerate learning or enhance cortical reorganization after brain injury

Dynamic excitatory and inhibitory gain modulation can produce flexible, robust and optimal decision-making

<div><p>Behavioural and neurophysiological studies in primates have increasingly shown the involvement of urgency signals during the temporal integration of sensory evidence in perceptual decision-making. Neuronal correlates of such signals have been found in the parietal cortex, and in separate studies, demonstrated attention-induced gain modulation of both excitatory and inhibitory neurons. Although previous computational models of decision-making have incorporated gain modulation, their abstract forms do not permit an understanding of the contribution of inhibitory gain modulation. Thus, the effects of co-modulating both excitatory and inhibitory neuronal gains on decision-making dynamics and behavioural performance remain unclear. In this work, we incorporate time-dependent co-modulation of the gains of both excitatory and inhibitory neurons into our previous biologically based decision circuit model. We base our computational study in the context of two classic motion-discrimination tasks performed in animals. Our model shows that by simultaneously increasing the gains of both excitatory and inhibitory neurons, a variety of the observed dynamic neuronal firing activities can be replicated. In particular, the model can exhibit winner-take-all decision-making behaviour with higher firing rates and within a significantly more robust model parameter range. It also exhibits short-tailed reaction time distributions even when operating near a dynamical bifurcation point. The model further shows that neuronal gain modulation can compensate for weaker recurrent excitation in a decision neural circuit, and support decision formation and storage. Higher neuronal gain is also suggested in the more cognitively demanding reaction time than in the fixed delay version of the task. Using the exact temporal delays from the animal experiments, fast recruitment of gain co-modulation is shown to maximize reward rate, with a timescale that is surprisingly near the experimentally fitted value. Our work provides insights into the simultaneous and rapid modulation of excitatory and inhibitory neuronal gains, which enables flexible, robust, and optimal decision-making.</p></div