Transfers and Labor Market Behavior of the Elderly in Developing Countries: Theory and Evidence from Vietnam

In this paper, I analyze the crowding-out effects of public transfers on labor supply of the elderly in the context of developing countries. I argue that the interactions between private transfers received and labor supplied by the elderly affect the opportunity cost of retirement and, therefore, magnify the crowding-out effects of public transfers on the labor supply of the elderly. Using household survey data from Vietnam, I find the evidence supporting this hypothesis. That is, the crowding-out effect is about two times larger when accounting for the endogeneity of private transfers, which is caused by the interactions of private transfers and the labor supply.Altruism, Crowding-out, Social Security, Retirement, Transfers

State of Evaluation in Colorado's Nonprofit Sector

This report presents findings and recommendations from a research project to understand the state of evaluation in Colorado's nonprofit sector. Adopting a national survey conducted by the Innovation Network, a Washington DCbased nonprofit evaluation, research and consulting firm, in addition to a set of in-depth interviews, the following study examined:1. The role of evaluation in nonprofit organizations in Colorado;2. The challenges to implementing evaluation practices; and3. Recommendations to support or enhance evaluation practices

Trade-Offs in Means Tested Pension Design

Inclusion of means testing into age pension programs allows governments to better direct benefits to those most in need and to control funding costs by providing flexibility to control the participation rate (extensive margin) and the benefit level (intensive margin). The former is aimed at mitigating adverse effects on incentives and to strengthen the insurance function of an age pension system. In this paper, we investigate how means tests alter the trade-off between these insurance and incentive effects and the consequent welfare outcomes. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the means test effect via the intensive margin potentially improves the insurance aspect but introduces two opposing impacts on incentives, the final welfare outcome depending upon the interaction between the two margins. Second, conditioning on the compulsory existence of pension systems, we find that the introduction of a means test results in nonlinear welfare effects that depend on the level of maximum pension benefits. More specifically, when the maximum pension benefit is relatively low, an increase in the taper rate always leads to a welfare gain, since the insurance and the positive incentive effects are always dominant. However, when maximum pension benefits are relatively more generous the negative incentive effect becomes dominant and welfare declines.

Health Care Financing over the Life Cycle, Universal Medical Vouchers and Welfare

In this paper we develop a general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model with health shocks to analyze the life-cycle pattern of insurance choice and health care spending. We use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and show that our model is able to match the life-cycle trends of insurance take up ratios and average medical expenditures in the U.S. We then demonstrate how this model can be used to conduct health care policy analysis by evaluating the macroeconomic effects of a counter factual health care reform using a system of universal health insurance vouchers. Our results suggest that health insurance vouchers are able to extend insurance coverage to the entire population but they also increase aggregate spending on health. More importantly, we find that the positive insurance effect (efficient risk pooling) dominates the negative incentive effect (tax distortions and moral hazard) which results in significant welfare gains for all generations when a payroll tax is used to finance the voucher program. In addition, our results suggest that the choice of tax financing instrument and accounting for general equilibrium price adjustments are critical in determining the performance of the voucher program.Public health insurance; private health insurance; vouchers; dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model; endogenous health production

The Macroeconomics of Health Savings Accounts

We analyze whether a consumer driven health care plan like the newly established Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) can reduce health care expenditures in the United States and increase the fraction of the population with health insurance. Unlike previous literature, our analysis relies on a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogenous agents. We endogenize health care expenditure and insurance choice, so that the model fully accounts for feedback effects from both factor markets and insurance markets. We then highlight the importance of including general equilibrium effects into the policy analysis. Specifically, our results from numerical simulations indicate that the success of HSAs depends critically on the productivity of health and the annual contribution limit to HSAs. In addition, we find that taxpayers can face substantial costs when HSAs are introduced to insure more people and to curb aggregate health expenditures.Health Savings Accounts, Consumer Driven Health Care Plans, Health Insurance, Privatization of Health Care, General Equilibrium Health Uncertainty Model, Numerical Simulation of Health Care Reform

Market Inefficiency, Insurance Mandate and Welfare: U.S. Health Care Reform 2010

In this paper we develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model with endogenous health capital to study the macroeconomic effects of the Affordable Care Act of March 2010 also known as the Obama health care reform. We find that the insurance mandate enforced with fines and premium subsidies successfully reduces adverse selection in private health insurance markets and subsequently leads to almost universal coverage of the working age population. On other hand, spending on health care services increases by almost 6 percent due to moral hazard of the newly insured. Notably, this increase in health spending is partly financed by the larger pool of insured individuals and by government spending. In order to finance the subsidies the government needs to either introduce a 2.7 percent payroll tax on individuals with incomes over $200,000, increase the consumption tax rate by about 1.1 percent, or cut government spending about 1 percent of GDP. A stable outcome across all simulated policies is that the reform triggers increases in health capital, decreases in labor supply, and decreases in the capital stock due to crowding out effects and tax distortions. As a consequence steady state output decreases by up to 2 percent. Overall, we find that the reform is socially beneficial as welfare gains are observed for most generations along the transition path to the new long run equilibrium.Affordable Care Act 2010; Endogenous Health Capital; Life-Cycle Health Spending and Financing; Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium

Market Inefficiency, Insurance Mandate and Welfare: U.S. Health Care Reform 2010

In this paper we develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model with endogenous health capital to study the macroeconomic effects of the Affordable Care Act of March 2010 also known as the Obama health care reform. We find that the insurance mandate enforced with fines and premium subsidies successfully reduces adverse selection in private health insurance markets and subsequently leads to almost universal coverage of the working age population. On other hand, spending on health care services increases by almost 6 percent due to moral hazard of the newly insured. Notably, this increase in health spending is partly financed by the larger pool of insured individuals and by government spending. In order to finance the subsidies the government needs to either introduce a 2.7 percent payroll tax on individuals with incomes over $200, 000, increase the consumption tax rate by about 1.1 percent, or cut government spending about 1 percent of GDP. A stable outcome across all simulated policies is that the reform triggers increases in health capital, decreases in labor supply, and decreases in the capital stock due to crowding out effects and tax distortions. As a consequence steady state output decreases by up to 2 percent. Overall, we find that the reform is socially beneficial as welfare gains are observed for most generations along the transition path to the new long-run equilibrium.

The Extension of Social Security Coverage in Developing Countries

We investigate the effects of extending the coverage of social security to uncovered elderly individuals in the informal sector in developing countries. We use a stochastic overlapping generations framework and incorporate important characteristics of developing countries including family transfers and a sizeable informal sector. Our calibrated model predicts that the introduction of a moderately sized social assistance program decreases steady state output by up to 3.25% and labor supply by up to 2.5%. In contrast to literature focusing on developed countries, the model predicts that extending the coverage of the social security system results in welfare gains for low income households. This result indicates that the insurance function and the redistribution function of the social assistance program dominate the distortionary effects in an environment without adequate risk sharing mechanisms and high inequality.Social Security Reform, Altruism, Informal Sector, Private Transfers, Savings, Labor Supply and Welfare

Temptation and Social Security in a Dynastic Framework

We investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay as you go (PAYG) social security system in a dynastic framework in which agents have self-control problems. The presence of these two additional factors at the same time affects individuals’ intertemporal decision problems in two opposite directions. That is, on the one hand individuals prefer to save more because of their altruistic concerns, on the other hand, they prefer to save less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption. Individuals’ efforts to balance between the long-term commitment (consumption smoothing and altruism) and the short-term urge for temptation result in self-control costs. In this environment the existence of social security system provides not only consumption smoothing and risk sharing mechanisms but also a channel that reduces the severity of temptation. We find that the adverse welfare effects of a PAYG system are further mitigated relative to the environments that incorporates altruism and self control issues separately.Temptation; Self-control preferences; Altruism; Social security; Dynamic general equilibrium; Overlapping generations; Welfare