The Determinants of Inter-Firm trust in Supplier-Automaker Relationships In the U.S., Japan, and Korea

In this paper we examine the determinants of supplier trust in the buyer in 453supplier-automaker relationships in the U. S., Japan, and Korea. We define trust and derive a model of its determinants drawing upon (1) an embeddedness (relationship-based) perspective, (2) a processbased perspective, and an (3) economic (hostage-based) perspective. Our findings indicate strong support for the process-based perspective in all countries; embeddedness (e.g., length of relationship) was only important as a determinant of trust in Japan, and the hostage-based variable (stock ownership) was not important in any country. More specifically, we found that high supplier trust emerges when (1) automakers have developed supplier-selection routines that favor incumbents and which maintain a continuing (repeated) exchange relationship with the supplier, and (2) automakers have developed assistance-giving routines to help suppliers solve problems and improve. Although there were some differences across institutional environments, notably higher trust in Japan, the findings are quite robust across the institutional environments. Indeed, in a sample of U.S. suppliers selling to both U.S. and Japanese automakers in the United States, we found that Japanese automakers were more effective than U.S. automakers at building trusting relations with U.S. suppliers. The ability of Japanese automakers to build high levels of trust with suppliers in the United States suggests that the institutional environment may be less important than firm-level practices in the production of inter-organizational trust

The Determinants and Economic Outcomes of Trust in Supplier-Buyer Relations

In this paper we examine the antecedents and outcomes of supplier trust in 453 supplier-automaker relationships in the U.S., Japan and Korea. Our findings indicate that high supplier trust emerges when (1) automakers have developed assistance-giving routines to help suppliers improve, and (2) automakers maintain a continuing (repeated) exchange relationship with the supplier. We also found that trust reduces transaction costs and increases information sharing in supplier-buyer relationships. Moreover, the findings suggest that the economic value created for tmnsactors may be substantial as evidenced by the fact that the automaker with the least trusting supplier relations had five times the procurement costs and spent tice as much of its face-to-face interaction time with suppliers on ex ante contracting and ex post haggling when compared to the most trusted automakers. Thus, our findings suggest that trust in supplier-buyer relations can create economic value and may be an important source of competitive advantage

The Economic Value of Trust in Supplier-Buyer Relationships

In this paper we investigate the relationship between supplier trust in the buyer and transaction costs, information sharing, and re[ation-specific investments in a sample of 453 supplier automaker exchange relationships in the U. S., Japan, and Korea. Our findings indicate that trust reduces transaction costs and increases information sharing in supplier-buyer relationships. Moreover, the findings suggest that the economic value created for transactors, in terms of lower transaction costs, may be substantial. In particular, we found that the automaker with the least trusting supplier relations spent twice as much of its face-to-face interaction time with suppliers on ex ante contracting and ex post haggling when compared to the most trusted automakers. This translated into procurement (transaction) costs which were as much as five times higher for the least trusted automaker compared to the most trusted automaker. Finally, we argue that trust is unique as a governance mechanism because it not only minimizes transaction costs, but also has a mutually causal relationship with other behaviors (i.e. information sharing. buyer technical assistance) that create value in the exchange relationship. Other governance mechanisms (e. g.. contracts. financial hostages) are necessary costs incurred to prevent opportunistic behavior but do not create value beyond transaction cost minimization. Thus, our findings indicate that trust in supplier-buyer relations can create economic value and may be an important source of competitive advantage

The Determinants of Interfirm Trust: Evidence from Supplier Automaker Relationships in the U.S., Japan and Korea

This paper has been accepted for presentation at the Academy of Management Meetings, Cincinnati, 1996.The determinants of interfirm trust are examined in 453 supplier automaker relationships in the U.S., Japan, and Korea. The findings indicate high supplier trust emerges when (1) suppliers receive assistance from the automaker, (2) the automaker has a track record of maintaining a continuing (repeated) exchange relationship with the supplier. Although there were some differences across institutional environments, notably higher trust in Japan, the findings are robust across the three institutional environments. Indeed, in a sample of U.S. suppliers that worked with both U.S. and Japanese automakers in the United States, we found that Japanese automakers were more effective than U.S. automakers at building trusting relations with U.S. suppliers. Thus, firm level practices appear to be more important than the institutional environment in the development of interfirm trust. A central issue in the literature on strategic alliances and interfirm cooperation is how firms create trust and control opportunism, particularly when the transactors have made investments in transaction specific assets. Under these conditions, trust has been described as an important antecedent to interorganizational cooperation and economic efficiency (Sako, 1991; Smith, Carroll, and Ashford, 1995). In fact, recent research suggests that trust in supplier buyer relations may be an important source of competitive advantage because it: (1) lowers transaction costs and allows for greater flexibility to respond to changing market conditions (Dore, 1983; Sako, 1991; Barney & Hansen, 1995; Dyer, forthcoming), (2) facilitates investments in special purpose assets and technologies which enhance productivity (Asanuma, 1989; Lorenz, 1988; Dyer, 1994), and (3) leads to superior information sharing routines which improve coordination and joint efforts to minimize inefficiencies (Fruin, 1992; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994). Moreover, some scholars claim that national economic efficiency is highly correlated with the existence of a high trust institutional environment (North, 1990; Casson, 1991; Hill, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995). For example, Fukuyama (1995:7) argues that the economic success of a nation, "as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by the level of trust inherent in the society." The findings from these, and other, studies have increased our attention on the important role of trust in economic exchanges. A natural response to these studies has been to exhort companies to build trust with their trading partners (Business Week, 1986, 1992) and to call for increased research on the role of trust in coordinating economic activity (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford, 1995). However, before an explicit strategy for developing trust can be developed, or considered feasible, the determinants of trust must be identified. Despite considerable academic and managerial interest in trust between trading partners, to date there has been little empirical research on the antecedents or determinants of interorganizational trust (i.e. between supplier buyer). Further, there has been little research on whether the determinants of trust differ in different institutional (i.e. country) environments. The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of supplier trust in a sample of supplier/automaker relationships in the United States, Japan, and Korea. Given the recent attention on the importance of trust in exchange relationships, an examination of the determinants of trust is, by itself, a valuable undertaking. However, due to the globalization of industries and a dramatic increase in international joint ventures, a study of the determinants of trust in different institutional environments is particularly valuable. Such a study is useful because it allows for an examination of those factors that are important determinants of trust both within, as well as across, countries.The International Motor Vehicle Program at MI

Strategic Supplier Segmentation: The Next "Best Practice" In Supply Chain Management

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Project Report to International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP), M.I.T.International Assembly Plant Study

INTRODUCTION: During the past fiscal year, we have worked closely with a number of researchers from around the world to develop a questionnaire that will provide us with a fuller understanding of the value-chain issues that surround current automobile manufacturing. While centered on the assembly plant, we are also looking at the interface between the plants and their suppliers, as well as the plants and their distributors. We will summarize these efforts, as well as our timetable for data collection. In this writeup we are focusing only on the work undertaken in relation to assembly plants. We have also done extensive work in the Modularization/Outsourcing project that is helping to pave the way for some of the assembly plant work; please refer to the separate report on that project

International Assembly Plant Study: " Management of the Extended Enterprise" Research Team

During the past fiscal year, we have worked closely with a number of researchers from around the world to develop a questionnaire that will provide us with a fuller understanding of the value-chain issues that surround current automobile manufacturing. While centered on the assembly plant, we are also looking at the interface between the plants and their suppliers, as well as the plants and their distributors. We will summarize these efforts, as well as our timetable for data collection. In this writeup we are focusing only on the work undertaken in relation to assembly plants. We have also done extensive work in the Modularization/Outsourcing project that is helping to pave the way for some of the assembly plant work; please refer to the separate report on that project

Product Proliferation and the Determination of Slotting and Renewal Allowances

We examine the roles of slotting and renewal allowances in the allocation of scarce retail shelf space. Several contrasting features of the two shelf allocational mechanisms are shown. With slotting allowances, manufacturers can signal the profitability of new products and retailers can screen out the least profitable products. With renewal allowances in a full information context, manufacturers can induce retailers to carry their less profitable products, illustrating a "push" approach to attaining shelf placement: manufacturers of product that enjoy strong consumer "pull* obtain shelf placement without paying renewal allowances. In both cases, product proliferation results in higher slotting and renewal allowances by raising the opportunity cost of shelf space. However, as countervailing leverage against retailers, manufacturers of successful product lines can use their successful products to help attain placement for their relatively weak products

Partial Refunds or Money-Back Guarantees ?

A partial-refund policy is superior to a "full money-back policy when a seller faces a significant amount of opportunistic return behavior-i.e., consumers order a product for short term usage only to return it for a refund later. In a partial-refund policy, the seller charges a rent (the nonrefundable portion of price) to those who return the product; this discourages opportunistism, but also penalizes consumers who only return because merchandise is unsatisfactory. The optimal partial refund policy balances this tradeoff. Profit is higher under the partial refund policy because of a lower number of returns and because a higher price can be charged. Mail-order clothing and personal computer industries demonstrate that catalogers typically offer only partial refunds

Optimal Timing of Collaborative Alliances in Technology Commercialization

1999-09As the need for time-to-market becomes an imperative in high-tech industries. more and more firms find that they can get to market quicker by collaborating with partners. However. more collaboration also engenders an environment where there will be intellectual property rights infringements and appropriation issues. In this paper. we show that in addition to patents and contracts. a firm can protect its innovation by finding the optimal time for releasing information to a potential partner. Our model. which derives the optimal timing function. balances the trade-off between the benefits of minimizing delay cost in commercialization with the risk of having the information appropriated by the potential partner. We show that firms should release information early when the cost of delay is high and when the salvage value of the idea after being rejected is high. We also show that the optimal timing approach mitigates the negative effects of increases in delay cost and exaggerates the positive effects of increases in the salvage valu