Price of Anarchy for Mean Field Games

The price of anarchy, originally introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior in routing games, is extended to mean field games. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio of a worst case social cost computed for a mean field game equilibrium to the optimal social cost as computed by a central planner. We illustrate properties of such a price of anarchy on linear quadratic extended mean field games, for which explicit computations are possible. Various asymptotic behaviors of the price of anarchy are proved for limiting behaviors of the coefficients in the model and numerics are presented.Comment: 38 pages, 10 plot

Price of anarchy for Mean Field Games

The price of anarchy, originally introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior in routing games, is extended to mean field games. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio of a worst case social cost computed for a mean field game equilibrium to the optimal social cost as computed by a central planner. We illustrate properties of such a price of anarchy on linear quadratic extended mean field games, for which explicit computations are possible. A sufficient and necessary condition to have no price of anarchy is presented. Various asymptotic behaviors of the price of anarchy are proved for limiting behaviors of the coefficients in the model and numerics are presented

Cemracs 2017: numerical probabilistic approach to MFG

This project investigates numerical methods for solving fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of McKean-Vlasov type. Having numerical solvers for such mean field FBSDEs is of interest because of the potential application of these equations to optimization problems over a large population, say for instance mean field games (MFG) and optimal mean field control problems. Theory for this kind of problems has met with great success since the early works on mean field games by Lasry and Lions, see [29], and by Huang, Caines, and Malhamé, see [26]. Generally speaking, the purpose is to understand the continuum limit of optimizers or of equilibria (say in Nash sense) as the number of underlying players tends to infinity. When approached from the probabilistic viewpoint, solutions to these control problems (or games) can be described by coupled mean field FBSDEs, meaning that the coefficients depend upon the own marginal laws of the solution. In this note, we detail two methods for solving such FBSDEs which we implement and apply to five benchmark problems. The first method uses a tree structure to represent the pathwise laws of the solution, whereas the second method uses a grid discretization to represent the time marginal laws of the solutions. Both are based on a Picard scheme; importantly, we combine each of them with a generic continuation method that permits to extend the time horizon (or equivalently the coupling strength between the two equations) for which the Picard iteration converges

31st Annual Meeting and Associated Programs of the Society for Immunotherapy of Cancer (SITC 2016) : part two

Background The immunological escape of tumors represents one of the main ob- stacles to the treatment of malignancies. The blockade of PD-1 or CTLA-4 receptors represented a milestone in the history of immunotherapy. However, immune checkpoint inhibitors seem to be effective in specific cohorts of patients. It has been proposed that their efficacy relies on the presence of an immunological response. Thus, we hypothesized that disruption of the PD-L1/PD-1 axis would synergize with our oncolytic vaccine platform PeptiCRAd. Methods We used murine B16OVA in vivo tumor models and flow cytometry analysis to investigate the immunological background. Results First, we found that high-burden B16OVA tumors were refractory to combination immunotherapy. However, with a more aggressive schedule, tumors with a lower burden were more susceptible to the combination of PeptiCRAd and PD-L1 blockade. The therapy signifi- cantly increased the median survival of mice (Fig. 7). Interestingly, the reduced growth of contralaterally injected B16F10 cells sug- gested the presence of a long lasting immunological memory also against non-targeted antigens. Concerning the functional state of tumor infiltrating lymphocytes (TILs), we found that all the immune therapies would enhance the percentage of activated (PD-1pos TIM- 3neg) T lymphocytes and reduce the amount of exhausted (PD-1pos TIM-3pos) cells compared to placebo. As expected, we found that PeptiCRAd monotherapy could increase the number of antigen spe- cific CD8+ T cells compared to other treatments. However, only the combination with PD-L1 blockade could significantly increase the ra- tio between activated and exhausted pentamer positive cells (p= 0.0058), suggesting that by disrupting the PD-1/PD-L1 axis we could decrease the amount of dysfunctional antigen specific T cells. We ob- served that the anatomical location deeply influenced the state of CD4+ and CD8+ T lymphocytes. In fact, TIM-3 expression was in- creased by 2 fold on TILs compared to splenic and lymphoid T cells. In the CD8+ compartment, the expression of PD-1 on the surface seemed to be restricted to the tumor micro-environment, while CD4 + T cells had a high expression of PD-1 also in lymphoid organs. Interestingly, we found that the levels of PD-1 were significantly higher on CD8+ T cells than on CD4+ T cells into the tumor micro- environment (p < 0.0001). Conclusions In conclusion, we demonstrated that the efficacy of immune check- point inhibitors might be strongly enhanced by their combination with cancer vaccines. PeptiCRAd was able to increase the number of antigen-specific T cells and PD-L1 blockade prevented their exhaus- tion, resulting in long-lasting immunological memory and increased median survival

Price of anarchy for Mean Field Games

The price of anarchy, originally introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior in routing games, is extended to mean field games. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio of a worst case social cost computed for a mean field game equilibrium to the optimal social cost as computed by a central planner. We illustrate properties of such a price of anarchy on linear quadratic extended mean field games, for which explicit computations are possible. A sufficient and necessary condition to have no price of anarchy is presented. Various asymptotic behaviors of the price of anarchy are proved for limiting behaviors of the coefficients in the model and numerics are presented

Numerical Probabilistic Approach to MFG

This project investigates numerical methods for solving fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of McKean-Vlasov type. Having numerical solvers for such mean field FBSDEs is of interest because of the potential application of these equations to optimization problems over a large population, say for instance mean field games (MFG) and optimal mean field control problems. Theory for this kind of problems has met with great success since the early works on mean field games by Lasry and Lions, see \cite{Lasry_Lions}, and by Huang, Caines, and Malham\'{e}, see \cite{Huang}. Generally speaking, the purpose is to understand the continuum limit of optimizers or of equilibria (say in Nash sense) as the number of underlying players tends to infinity. When approached from the probabilistic viewpoint, solutions to these control problems (or games) can be described by coupled mean field FBSDEs, meaning that the coefficients depend upon the own marginal laws of the solution. In this note, we detail two methods for solving such FBSDEs which we implement and apply to five benchmark problems. The first method uses a tree structure to represent the pathwise laws of the solution, whereas the second method uses a grid discretization to represent the time marginal laws of the solutions. Both are based on a Picard scheme; importantly, we combine each of them with a generic continuation method that permits to extend the time horizon (or equivalently the coupling strength between the two equations) for which the Picard iteration converges

Cemracs 2017: numerical probabilistic approach to MFG

This project investigates numerical methods for solving fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of McKean-Vlasov type. Having numerical solvers for such mean field FBSDEs is of interest because of the potential application of these equations to optimization problems over a large population, say for instance mean field games (MFG) and optimal mean field control problems. Theory for this kind of problems has met with great success since the early works on mean field games by Lasry and Lions, see [29], and by Huang, Caines, and Malhamé, see [26]. Generally speaking, the purpose is to understand the continuum limit of optimizers or of equilibria (say in Nash sense) as the number of underlying players tends to infinity. When approached from the probabilistic viewpoint, solutions to these control problems (or games) can be described by coupled mean field FBSDEs, meaning that the coefficients depend upon the own marginal laws of the solution. In this note, we detail two methods for solving such FBSDEs which we implement and apply to five benchmark problems. The first method uses a tree structure to represent the pathwise laws of the solution, whereas the second method uses a grid discretization to represent the time marginal laws of the solutions. Both are based on a Picard scheme; importantly, we combine each of them with a generic continuation method that permits to extend the time horizon (or equivalently the coupling strength between the two equations) for which the Picard iteration converges