What are we learning from business training and entrepreneurship evaluations around the developing world?

Business training programs are a popular policy option to try to improve the performance of enterprises around the world. The last few years have seen rapid growth in the number of evaluations of these programs in developing countries. We undertake a critical review of these studies with the goal of synthesizing the emerging lessons and understanding the limitations of the existing research and the areas in which more work is needed. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the length, content, and types of firms participating in the training programs evaluated. Many evaluations suffer from low statistical power, measure impacts only within a year of training, and experience problems with survey attrition and measurement of firm profits and revenues. Over these short time horizons, there are relatively modest impacts of training on survivorship of existing firms, but stronger evidence that training programs help prospective owners launch new businesses more quickly. Most studies find that existing firm owners implement some of the practices taught in training, but the magnitudes of these improvements in practices are often relatively modest. Few studies find significant impacts on profits or sales, although a couple of the studies with more statistical power have done so. Some studies have also found benefits to microfinance organizations of offering training. To date there is little evidence to help guide policymakers as to whether any impacts found come from trained firms competing away sales from other businesses versus through productivity improvements, and little evidence to guide the development of the provision of training at market prices. We conclude by summarizing some directions and key questions for future studies

The quality of the legal system, firm ownership, andfirm size

Employment in developing countries is disproportionately concentrated in very small firms. The authors examine the extent to which the distribution of firm size is related to the quality of the legal system using data from Mexico. They combine Lucas'(1978) model of firm size with Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love's (2001) consideration of idiosyncratic risk in a framework in which the distribution of entrepreneurial talent and aversion to idiosyncratic risk combine to determine the optimal size of firms. Their data allows them to focus on the differential impact of the legal system on proprietorships and corporations. Moreover, by focusing on firms in a single country, the data draw attention to the importance of variation in the administration of justice and the enforcement of legal verdicts. The authors find that Mexican states with more effective legal systems have larger firms. A one-standard deviation improvement in the quality of the legal system increases the average firm size by about 10-15 percent. The impact of the legal system is greatest in sectors in which proprietorships dominate. This pattern is consistent with better legal systems increasing the investment of firm owners by reducing the idiosyncratic risk they face. All of these findings are upheld when the authors instrument for institutional variables using the log of indigenous population in 1900 and the active presence of the drug trade in the state.Small Scale Enterprise,Small and Medium Size Enterprises,Banks&Banking Reform,Microfinance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Small Scale Enterprise,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Microfinance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform

Mexican-American Entrepreneurship

Although business ownership has implications for income inequality, wealth accumulation and job creation, surprisingly little research explores why Mexican-Americans are less likely to start businesses and why the businesses that they start are less successful on average than non-Latino whites. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of Mexican-American entrepreneurship using microdata from the 2000 U.S. Census, the matched and unmatched March and Outgoing Rotation Group Files of the Current Population Survey from 1994 to 2004, and the Legalized Population Survey (LPS). We find that low levels of education and wealth explain the entire gap between Mexican immigrants and non-Latino whites in business formation rates. Nearly the entire gap in business income for Mexican immigrants is explained by low levels of education and limited English language ability. Using the natural experiment created by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), we find that legal status represents an additional barrier for Mexican immigrants. A conservative estimate suggests that the lack of legal status reduces business ownership rates by roughly seven-tenths of a percentage point for both men and women. Human and financial capital deficiencies are found to limit business ownership and business success among second and third-generation Mexican-Americans, but to a lesser extent. These findings have implications for the debates over the selection of immigrants and the assimilation of Mexican-Americans in the U.S. economy.Mexican-Americans, entrepreneurship, inequality

Mexican-American Entrepreneurship

Although business ownership has implications for income inequality, wealth accumulation and job creation, surprisingly little research explores why Mexican-Americans are less likely to start businesses and why the businesses that they start are less successful on average than non-Latino whites. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of Mexican-American entrepreneurship using microdata from the 2000 U.S. Census, the matched and unmatched March and Outgoing Rotation Group Files of the Current Population Survey from 1994 to 2004, and the Legalized Population Survey (LPS). We find that low levels of education and wealth explain the entire gap between Mexican immigrants and non-Latino whites in business formation rates. Nearly the entire gap in business income for Mexican immigrants is explained by low levels of education and limited English language ability. Using the natural experiment created by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), we find that legal status represents an additional barrier for Mexican immigrants. A conservative estimate suggests that the lack of legal status reduces business ownership rates by roughly seven-tenths of a percentage point for both men and women. Human and financial capital deficiencies are found to limit business ownership and business success among second and third-generation Mexican-Americans, but to a lesser extent. These findings have implications for the debates over the selection of immigrants and the assimilation of Mexican-Americans in the U.S. economy.Mexican-Americans, entrepreneurship, self-employment

Business training and female enterprise start-up, growth, and dynamics : experimental evidence from Sri Lanka

We conduct a randomized experiment among women in urban Sri Lanka to measure the impact of the most commonly used business training course in developing countries, the Start-and- Improve Your Business (SIYB) program. We work with two representative groups of women: random sample of women operating subsistence enterprises and a random sample of women who are out of the labor force but interested in starting a business. We track impacts of two treatments – training only and training plus a cash grant – over two years with four follow-up surveys and find that the short- and medium-term impacts differ. For women already in business, training alone leads to some changes in business practices but has no impact on business profits, sales or capital stock. In contrast the combination of training and a grant leads to large and significant improvements in business profitability in the first eight months, but this impact dissipates in the second year. For women interested in starting enterprises, we find that business training speeds up entry but leads to no increase in net business ownership by our final survey round. Both profitability and business practices of the new entrants are increased by training, suggesting training may be more effective for new owners than for existing businesses. We also find that the two treatments have selection effects, leading to entrants being less analytically skilled and poorer

Contract Enforcement in Transition

The mix of formal and informal mechanisms for contract enforcement is examined using survey data from Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia. Using the size of trade credit to quantify the success of contracting, we ask: Do the courts have a perceptible effect on contracting? When can a firm rely on its customer to repay trade credit voluntarily? Which is more effective, the courts or relational contracting? Do trade associations play a role in contract enforcement? Does relational contracting entail inefficiencies? Is the reliance on relation contracting merely a transitory phenomenon, reflecting the inadequacy of these countries' legal systems?

Property Rights, Finance, and Entrepreneurship

Is investment constrained more by insecure property rights or by limited external finance? For five transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we find that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in startup ma nufacturing firms. Access to credit does not appear to explain differences in investment. At least in the early stages of post-communist reform, retained earnings appear to have been enough to finance the investments that managers wanted to make.

Property Rights and Finance

Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.