Employment Protection Legislation and Labor Markets in Transition: Assessing the Effects of the Labor Code in Armenia

The effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) on a country's labor market are clear in theory but empirical evidence is only starting to catch up. In particular, EPL is not robust as an indicator of overall unemployment, but previous panel data analyses have shown it affects the flow of workers into and out of employment. Examining monthly and quarterly data from Armenia, I find that the country's package of EPL has this same effect, and worker flows have slowed under the country's new Labor Code. The paradox of where Armenia's workforce is going still remains but can be hypothesized as entering the informal sector.employment protection legislation, labor markets, transition

Old wine and new bottles: A critical appraisal of the middle-income trap in BRICS countries

The idea of a middle-income trap is now over a decade old and continues to be applied to growth paths which have not been self-sustaining. With the bulk of emerging markets now approaching middle-income status, and given the reality of slower growth for many countries (and the policy recommendations that currently exist for overcoming this problem), is the middle-income trap still a relevant framework? Using reference to the BRICS countries, the key finding of this analysis is that the middle-income trap conceptualization is of little value-added, as fundamentals still matter, especially in relation to macroeconomic stability. Similarly, we note that "quality" institutions are necessary, both political and economic, including (smaller) size of government and property rights. The "trap" as currently formulated is thus nothing new or particularly relevant, as it repackages some familiar structural issues while avoiding other crucial ones

Firm-Level and Institutional Determinants of Corporate Capital Structure in Poland

This paper discusses how well major capital structure theories incorporate firm-level and institutional factors into short-term firm financing decisions in a specific context, that of a transition economy. Using a new dataset of non-financial companies quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange between 2007-2015, we argue that neither the trade-off nor the pecking order theories fully explain corporate debt policies in Poland. The results of dynamic panel data modelling highlight the importance of the strength of property rights and stock market capitalisation as driving forces behind corporate financing decisions

Firm-level and institutional determinants of corporate capital structure in Poland: New evidence from the Warsaw stock exchange

This paper discusses how well major capital structure theories incorporate firm-level and institutional factors into short-term firm financing decisions in a specific context, that of a transition economy. Using a new dataset of non-financial companies quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange between 2007-2015, we argue that neither the trade-off nor the pecking order theories fully explain corporate debt policies in Poland. The results of dynamic panel data modelling highlight the importance of the strength of property rights and stock market capitalisation as driving forces behind corporate financing decisions

The Price of Empire: Unrest Location and Sovereign Risk in Tsarist Russia

Research on politically motivated unrest and sovereign risk overlooks whether and how unrest location matters for sovereign risk in geographically extensive states. Intuitively, political violence in the capital or nearby would seem to directly threaten the state's ability to pay its debts. However, it is possible that the effect on a government could be more pronounced the farther away the violence is, connected to the longer-term costs of suppressing rebellion. We use Tsarist Russia to assess these differences in risk effects when unrest occurs in Russian homeland territories versus more remote imperial territories. Our analysis of unrest events across the Russian imperium from 1820 to 1914 suggests that unrest increases risk more in imperial territories. Echoing current events, we find that unrest in Ukraine increases risk most. The price of empire included higher costs in projecting force to repress unrest and retain the confidence of the foreign investors financing those costs.Comment: 13 Tables, 8 Figure

Does Financial Market Development Explain (or at Least Predict) the Demand for Wealth Management and Private Banking Services in Developing Markets?

How should wealth managers and private bankers find and serve the wealthy – particularly in developing countries? Several banks and consulting firms provide market sizing estimates for the number of high net worth and ultra-high net worth individuals. However, it is still an open question whether financial management services actually create wealth (or increase the number of wealthy persons). How can financial advisors know if, on a macro-level, their service offerings grow their collective assets under management and increase their prospect numbers? In this paper, we find evidence that advanced wealth management and private banking services might help grow a wirehouse’s book of business in developed, but not developing, markets. If wealth management and private banking follow general trends affecting the broader financial sector, their business also grows wealth in less advanced economies. Such evidence sheds light on the currently ambiguous role that financial development seems to play in creating affluent, high net worth and ultra-high net worth individuals

All That’s Old is New Again: Capital Controls and the Macroeconomic Determinants of Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets

While a growing amount of economic evidence has emerged that capital controls as a tool may both be ineffective for many of their stated purposes, there has been little examination of their long-term effects that can harm rather than help entrepreneurship in emerging markets. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap and examine capital controls in both a historical and recent context, ascertaining their possible effect on firms and entrepreneurship in emerging markets in coming years. What will the impact be on emerging markets and firms in developing countries if capital controls continue to gain credibility? How has the rebirth of controls in the wake of the global financial crisis affected entrepreneurship in emerging markets

Identity and the evolution of institutions : evidence from partition and interwar Poland

This paper advances a logical, if possibly controversial, thesis: institutional design is inherently a product of identity, at both the individual and group level. Building on recent advances in identity economics and new institutional economics, this research shows how identity can be used to explain institutional genesis and the persistence of “inefficient” institutions. Applying this model to Poland in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is evident that the identity-based institutional building which had served individuals so well under occupation in Poland resulted in “inefficient” institutions, unsuited for the changing external environment. Only taking an identity lens to the Polish experience can we see a satisfactory explanation for the failure of institutions in interwar Poland

Market behavior in the face of political violence : evidence from Tsarist Russia

Even efficient financial markets may break down under periods of prolonged stress, especially when the ramification of an event is unclear. Political violence is such an event, sending immediate signals about possible impact on firm valuations but unclear information about the future viability of existing institutions. This paper examines the effect of political violence in 19th century Russia on its stock market; using a battery of unit root and variance ratio tests, the evidence is that Russian financial markets were mostly efficient in processing short-term information from political violence. However, when violence was at its peak between the assassination of the Tsar in 1881 and the 1905 revolution, large deviations from efficiency can be detected, as markets were unsure about the viability of the existing rules of the game

In our (frozen) backyard : the Eurasian Union and regional environmental governance in the Arctic

Erworben im Rahmen der Schweizer Nationallizenzen (http://www.nationallizenzen.ch)Regional environmental governance has emerged as a viable alternative to supranational environmental solutions, using regional and local knowledge and actors to tailor more efective policies. This does not deny a role for supranational institutions, however, which can enable their members to efectively shift towards such a decentralized and polycen tric approach. In specifc regions such as the Arctic, with many national and local actors interested in environmental improvement, such impetus from meta-organizations (i.e., organizations comprised of organizations) could result in benefcial environmental out comes. This paper examines an underutilized institution, the Eurasian Union (EaEU), and the role it currently plays in facilitating regional environmental governance. Focusing on its largest member, Russia—and the only member with an Arctic linkage—I explore the tension between supranational facilitation and interference in an area not directly afect ing all members. Despite explicit Russian interest in this realm, the EaEU may be able to infuence Russian environmental policy for the better via multilateral means and internal mechanisms. By challenging the Russian monopoly on Arctic policy in the EaEU, these additional voices may