477 research outputs found
Measuring Inequality Attitudes by Defective Leaky Buckets A Comment
Amiel et al. (1999) use the Atkinson and the Gini social welfare functions to measure income inequality attitudes based on data from leaky-bucket experiments. Yet the experimental de-sign does not allow their subjects to perceive income inequality according to the Gini or the Atkinson inequality measures. Moreover, their experimental design tries to measure inequal-ity aversion by forcing their subjects to behave in accordance with inequality predilection. --Inequality aversion,leaky-bucket experiment.
Lorenz meets rating but misses valuation
Using an experiment with material incentives, this paper investigates the violation of Lorenz relations in the case of dominant and single?crossing Lorenz curves. Our experimental design consists of two treatments: an income distribution treatment and a lottery treatment. Both treatments were conducted in Italy and Spain. In each treatment, subjects were asked to judge ten multiple?outcome lotteries or ten n?dimensional income distributions in terms of both ratings and valuations. This 2 × 2 × 2 experimental design, allows us to investigate the response?mode (rating versus valuation) and framing (lotteries versus income distributions) effects in subjects? perceptions concerning the two types of Lorenz relations. We found the existence of a marked response?mode effect, as only the ratings of the lotteries and income distributions confirm both Lorenz relations, whereas the valuations violate them. The framing effect is significant only for the Spanish data. For this data the sign of the framing effect depends on the type of the Lorenz relation considered. For crossing Lorenz curves, a higher conformity corresponds to the lottery frame, for Lorenz dominance a higher conformity corresponds to the income distribution frame. --Income Distributions,Lotteries,Lorenz Curves,Inequality and Risk Aversion,Response?Mode Effects
Tax progression: International and intertemporal comparisons using LIS data
The conventional approach to comparing tax progression (using local measures, global measures or dominance relations for first moment distribution functions) often lacks applicability to the real world: local measures of tax progression have the disadvantage of ignoring the income distribution entirely. Global measures are affected by the drawback of all aggregation, viz. ignoring structural differences between the objects to be compared. Dominance relations of comparing tax progression depend heavily on the assumption that the same income distribution holds for both situations to be compared, which renders this approach impossible for international and intertemporal comparisons. Based on the earlier work of one of the authors, this paper develops a unified methodology to compare tax progression for dominance relations under different income distributions. We address it as uniform tax progression for different income distributions and present the respective approach for both continuous and discrete cases, the latter also being employed for empirical investigations. Using dominance relations, we define tax progression under different income distributions as a class of natural extensions of uniform tax progression in terms of taxes, net incomes, and differences of first moment distribution functions. To cope with different monetary units and different supports of the income distributions involved, we utilized their transformations to population and income quantiles. Altogether, we applied six methods of comparing tax progression, three in terms of taxes and three in terms of net incomes, which we utilized for empirical analyses of comparisons of tax progression using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. This is the first paper that performs international and intertemporal comparisons of uniform tax progression with actual data. For our analysis we chose those countries for which LIS disposes of data on gross incomes, taxes, payroll taxes and net incomes. This pertains to 15 countries, out of which we selected 13. This gave rise to 78 international comparisons, which we carried out for household data, equivalized data, direct taxes and direct taxes inclusive of payroll taxes. In total we investigated 312 international comparisons for each of the six methods of comparing tax progression. In two thirds of all cases we observed uniformly greater tax progression for international comparisons. In a bit more than one fifth of all cases we observed bifurcate tax progression, that is, progression is higher for one country up to some population or income quantile threshold, beyond which the situation is the opposite, i.e., progression is higher for the second country. No clear-cut findings can be reported for just one tenth of all cases. But even in these cases some curve differences are so small that they may well be ignored. We also test consistency of our results with regard to the six methods of comparing tax progression and present here twelve (Germany, the UK and the US) plus four comparing Germany and Sweden out of the total of 312 graphs, each containing six differences of first moment distribution functions. These differences can be interpreted as intensity of greater tax progression. We demonstrate the overall picture of uniform tax progression for international comparisons using Hasse diagrams.Concerning intertemporal comparisons of tax progression, we present the results for the US, the UK, and Germany for several time periods. We align our findings with respect to major political eras in these countries, e.g., G. Bush senior, W. Clinton, and G. Bush junior for the United States; M. Thatcher, J. Major, and A. Blair for the United Kingdom, and for Germany, the last year before German re-unification (1989), the beginning of H. Kohl’s last term as chancellor (1994), and G. Schröder (2000). In addition, we study sensitivity of our results to the equivalence scale parameter.income tax progression, measurement of uniform tax progression, comparisons of tax progression, tax progression with different income distributions.
Tax progression: International and intertemporal comparison using LIS data
The conventional approach to comparing tax progression (using local measures, global measures or dominance relations for first moment distribution functions) often lacks applicability to the real world: local measures of tax progression have the disadvantage of ignoring the income distribution entirely. Global measures are affected by the drawback of all aggregation, viz. ignoring structural differences between the objects to be compared. Dominance relations of comparing tax progression depend heavily on the assumption that the same income distribution holds for both situations to be compared, which renders this approach impossible for international and intertemporal comparisons. Based on the earlier work of one of the authors, this paper develops a unified methodology to compare tax progression for dominance relations under different income distributions. We address it as uniform tax progression for different income distributions and present the respective approach for both continuous and discrete cases, the latter also being employed for empirical investigations. Using dominance relations, we define tax progression under different income distributions as a class of natural extensions of uniform tax progression in terms of taxes, net incomes, and differences of first moment distribution functions. To cope with different monetary units and different supports of the income distributions involved, we utilized their transformations to population and income quantiles. Altogether, we applied six methods of comparing tax progression, three in terms of taxes and three in terms of net incomes, which we utilized for empirical analyses of comparisons of tax progression using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. This is the first paper that performs international and intertemporal comparisons of uniform tax progression with actual data. For our analysis we chose those countries for which LIS disposes of data on gross incomes, taxes, payroll taxes and net incomes. This pertains to 15 countries, out of which we selected 13. This gave rise to 78 international comparisons, which we carried out for household data, equivalized data, direct taxes and direct taxes inclusive of payroll taxes. In total we investigated 312 international comparisons for each of the six methods of comparing tax progression. In two thirds of all cases we observed uniformly greater tax progression for international comparisons. In a bit more than one fifth of all cases we observed bifurcate tax progression, that is, progression is higher for one country up to some population or income quantile threshold, beyond which the situation is the opposite, i.e., progression is higher for the second country. No clear-cut findings can be reported for just one tenth of all cases. But even in these cases some curve differences are so small that they may well be ignored. We also test consistency of our results with regard to the six methods of comparing tax progression and present here twelve (Germany, the UK and the US) plus four comparing Germany and Sweden out of the total of 312 graphs, each containing six differences of first moment distribution functions. These differences can be interpreted as intensity of greater tax progression. We demonstrate the overall picture of uniform tax progression for international comparisons using Hasse diagrams. Concerning intertemporal comparisons of tax progression, we present the results for the US, the UK, and Germany for several time periods. We align our findings with respect to major political eras in these countries, e.g., G. Bush senior, W. Clinton, and G. Bush junior for the United States; M. Thatcher, J. Major, and A. Blair for the United Kingdom, and for Germany, the last year before German re-unification (1989), the beginning of H. Kohl's last term as chancellor (1994), and G. Schröder (2000). In addition, we study sensitivity of our results to the equivalence scale parameter. --income tax progression,measurement of uniform tax progression,comparisons of tax progression,tax progression with different income distributions
Relative Deprivation, Personal Income Satisfaction, and Average Well-being under Different Income Distributions
relative deprivation, income distributions, income satisfaction, context effects
Relative Deprivation, Personal Income Satisfaction, and Average Well-Being under Different Income Distributions
This paper uses the data gained from an income categorization experiment for five shapes of income distributions to investigate background context effects, relative deprivation, range-frequency theory to explain back-ground context effects,individual income satisfaction versus aggregate well-being, and the dual patterns of income categorization and limen setting. It is shown that background context effects exist and are reected in relative deprivation. Not all precepts of range-frequency theory can be evidenced. Moreover, we demonstrate a welfare paradox which concerns a contradiction between individual income satisfaction and aggregate well-being. Finally, income categorization and limen setting harbor no response-mode effects, but exhibit conformity.Relative Deprivation; Income Distributions; Income Satisfaction; Context Effects
Lorenz, Pareto, Pigou: Who Scores Best? Experimental Evidence on Dominance Relations of Income Distributions
Using an experiment with material incentives, this paper investigates the violation of composite dominance relationships, viz. absolute Pareto dominance, Pareto rank dominance, transfer dominance, Lorenz dominance, and generalized Lorenz dominance. Moreover, we test tail independence. The experiment consists of two treatments, a self-concern mode (in which each subject expects payoffs according to her own choices), and a social-planner mode (in which subjects form their preferences without any chance of receiving payoffs when they became effective). The main focus of this paper centers on the behavioral shifts between the self-concern and the social-planner modes. We show, first, that subjects' behavior is different under the two treatments. Second, we show that there are less violations of the two Pareto dominance relations and of generalized Lorenz dominance and more violations of Lorenz dominance and of transfer dominance under the self-concern mode than under the social-planner mode. Within these groups, behavior is more similar under the self-concern mode than under the social-planner mode. Tail independence is widely rejected. --Income distributions,dominance relations,tail independence
Inequality measurement and the leaky-bucket paradox
The transfer principle requires inequality measures to decrease for mean preserving contractions. How much leakage of transfers can preserve inequality? Conditions are shown for leaky transfers to preserve inequality. We find that positive remainders with positive or negative leakage as well as negative remainders with positive leakage may occur. This constitutes the leaky-bucket paradox.
Flat Tax mit sozialer Grundsicherung : die optimale Kombination
Deutschland leidet unter einer zu hohen marginalen Abgabenbelastung. Investitionen und Arbeitsplätze wandern in Niedrigsteuerländer und in Länder mit niedrigen Arbeitskosten [das heißt, in Länder mit niedrigen Löhnen und/oder niedrigen lohnbezogenen Abgaben] ab. Im Inland selbst führt die Zusatzlast der Abgabenerhebung zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten und Abgabenaufkommensverlusten durch partielle Leistungsverweigerung. Isolierte Reformvorschläge des Steuersystems zur Senkung der Marginalbelastung – und damit der Durchschnittsbelastung – leiden unter Finanzierungsdefiziten, isolierte Reformvorschläge des sozialen Siche-rungssystems leiden unter Leistungseinschränkungen, welchen der soziale Ausgleich ermangelt. Eine flat tax mit sozialer Grundsicherung vermag hingegen eine optimale Kombination der Effizienz- und der Gerechtigkeitsseite der Abgabenerhebung zu realisieren. Das vorgestellte Reformkonzept ist gesamtwirtschaftlich finanzierbar, gestattet gleichzeitig eine radikale Unternehmenssteuerreform, schafft maximale Effizienz des Abgabensystems und ermöglicht dabei dennoch eine gleichmäßigere Einkommensverteilung mit eingebauter Förderung kinderreicher Familien. Dass es in Deutschland Politiker wie den Thüringer Ministerpräsidenten Dieter Althaus und in Großbritannien die Bow Group und die UK Independence Party gibt, die verwandte Reformkonzepte ansteuern, gibt Anlass zu Optimismus. --
Kommentar zu Bruno Deffains and Dominique Demougin - Das doppelte Holdup-Problem und der Wettbewerb der Rechtssysteme
Die Arbeit von Deffains und Demougin betrachtet ein Modell mit zwei Produktionsfaktoren, Arbeit und Kapital, einem Konsumgut, welches mit zwei Technologien, einer mit ausschließlichem Kapitaleinsatz und einer mit additiv-separablem Arbeits- und Kapitaleinsatz, produziert werden könne, und zwei Ländern mit jeweils einem Gesetzgeber, welcher die relative Verhandlungsmacht der Produktionsfaktoren bestimmen könne. Der Produktionsfaktor Kapital sei vollkommen mobil, der Produktionsfaktor Arbeit vollkommen immobil. In diesem Szenario bewirkt eine höhere Verhandlungsmacht des Faktors Arbeit, dass Kapital einmal von der Technologie 2 in Richtung Technologie 1 verdrängt wird, zum anderen aber auch, dass Kapital von Land mit höherer Verhandlungsmacht des Faktors Arbeit in das Land mit geringerer Verhandlungsmacht des Faktors Arbeit ausweicht. Die Autoren kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass, wenn jeder der Gesetzgeber in den einzelnen Ländern isoliert handelt und eine soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion maximiert, das erstbeste Optimum verfehlt wird, weil jeder Gesetzgeber in dem Bestreben, den Faktor Kapital im eigenen Land zu halten, die Verhandlungsmacht des Faktors Arbeit zu gering ausstatten wird. Eine Rechtsharmonisierung könnte so in beiden Ländern die soziale Wohlfahrt erhöhen. Methodisch läuft das Modell auf ein Gefangenendilemma hinaus, in welchem ein Nash-Gleichgewicht suboptimal ist und eine Pareto-optimale Lösung verfehlt wird. Das Modell ist extrem einfach gehalten, wird didaktisch gut präsentiert, seine Argumentation ist transparent und leicht zugänglich.
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