VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES: WHEN DOES "NO SURPRISES" MEAN NO CONSERVATION

Voluntary conservation agreements are becoming increasingly important in implementing the Endangered Species Act on private land. We analyze when such agreements arise and what level of conservation they generate in the presence of uncertainty about future government regulation and conservation benefits. Our results suggest that the likelihood of an agreement depends on the availability of assurances regarding future regulation. In particular, an agreement may not be reached if there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding future conservation requirements. The level of conservation attainable from an agreement depends on the likelihood of regulation, the bargaining power of the parties, the irreversibility of development, and the availability of assurances. Under conditions likely to hold in practice, a higher conservation level may be achieved by offering assurances. However, this level of conservation will not be optimal, and may be lower than that attainable from regulation.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

CONSERVATION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES: CAN INCENTIVES WORK FOR PRIVATE LANDOWNERS?

It has been argued that the traditional regulatory approach of the Endangered Species Act, based on land-use restrictions, has failed to protect endangered species on private land. In response, there has been a call for the use of incentives to complement this regulatory approach. This paper examines the potential of incentives programs to elicit conservation-oriented management choices from landowners. Data obtained from a survey of non-industrial private forest owners in Oregon and Washington is used to examine the effectiveness of various incentives. The results indicate that incentives, in particular compensation and assurances, can be effective in increasing the conservation effort provided by landowners. The results also suggest that conservation policy for private lands could be improved by relying on a combination of incentives, including financial incentives and assurances, rather than exclusively on the threat of regulation.endangered species, incentives, regulation, Endangered Species Act, conservation, Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Q220, Q230, Q280, K320,

SUCCESS OR FAILURE? ORDERED PROBIT APPROACHES TO MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is one of the most controversial pieces of environmental legislation. Part of the controversy stems from doubts about its effectiveness in generating improvements in species viability. This paper uses ordered probit models to test whether the ESA has been successful in promoting species recovery. We find a negative correlation between listing and species recovery. Additionally, we find evidence of positive effects for species-specific spending and the achievement of recovery goals. The evidence also shows that recovery plan completion and the designation of critical habit are not correlated or negatively correlated with recovery.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Allocating Conservation Resources under the Endangered Species Act

The necessity to develop a priority system to guide the allocation of resources to the conservation of endangered species is widely recognized. The economic theory of biodiversity has established a framework to do so, and has identified priority criteria that should be considered when making conservation decisions. This paper uses a random effects ordered probit model of endangered species recovery to simulate the effects of reallocating conservation funds among species listed under the Endangered Species Act according to these criteria. Our results suggest that if the goal of conservation policy is to preserve a diverse set of species, reallocating conservation funds according to criteria identified by economic theory would yield an improvement over actual spending patterns without significant tradeoffs in terms of overall species recovery.Endangered Species Act, endangered species, recovery plans, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, biodiversity, critical habitat, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Modeling conservation incentives for private landowners

This dissertation consists of three papers on the use of incentives for conservation of endangered species on private land. The first paper examines incentives based on providing landowners with assurances regarding future regulation in exchange for their participation in a conservation agreement. The second and third papers are empirical analyses of landowners' decisions to participate in an incentives program, and of the effect of different types of incentives on the level of conservation effort provided by landowners. The first paper examines when a landowner and a regulator reach a voluntary conservation agreement, and what level of conservation the agreement generates in the presence of uncertainty about future conservation benefits and irreversibility of habitat loss and species extinction. The results suggest that the likelihood of an agreement and the resulting conservation levels depend on the background threat of regulation, the cost advantage offered by voluntary agreements, and the availability of assurances regarding future regulation. In practice, conservation agreements that offer assurances may generate higher levels of conservation and higher net social benefits than agreements that do not offer assurances. However, the resulting level of conservation will not be optimal, and may be lower than that attainable under regulation. The second paper conducts an empirical analysis of the demographic and land characteristics that determine landowner participation in incentives programs using data obtained from a survey of non-industrial private forest owners in Oregon and Washington. The results suggest that targeting incentives programs to younger landowners who have acquired their property more recently, own more woodland, and are interested in conservation and providing wildlife habitat on their forests may be effective in attaining higher participation rates. The third paper uses the data obtained from the survey to examine the potential of incentives programs to elicit conservation-oriented management choices from landowners. The results indicate that incentives, in particular compensation and assurances, can be effective in increasing the conservation effort provided by landowners. The results also suggest that conservation policy for private lands could be improved by relying on a combination of incentives, including financial incentives and assurances, rather than exclusively on the threat of regulation

Voluntary Agreements and Private Enforcement of Environmental Regulation

This paper focuses on a type of voluntary pollution abatement agreement (VA) in which the regulator offers regulatory relief for the participating firm in exchange for environmental improvements. If the regulator does not have statutory authority to provide regulatory relief, the VA can leave the firm more vulnerable to legal challenges through citizen lawsuits. I use a model of negotiated VAs to examine the impact of citizen enforcement on the likelihood of an agreement and on the outcome of a VA. The results indicate that both the probabilities of enforcement by the regulatory agency and of private enforcement through a citizen lawsuit affect the likelihood of a VA and the level of abatement when an agreement is reached. A VA can result in higher abatement and net social benefits than regulation if the probability of private enforcement and accompanying costs are high and the probability of agency enforcement is low.Keywords: Bargaining, Regulation, Pollution policy, Citizen suits, Voluntary agreement, Citizen enforcemen

Endangered Species Conservation on Private Land: Assessing the Effectiveness of Habitat Conservation Plans

Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) have become a key instrument for implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) on private land. However, there is no systematic analysis of their effectiveness in promoting endangered species recovery. This paper is the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of HCPs on species recovery status. We find evidence that HCPs have a significant positive impact on species recovery. Our results also suggest that the recovery benefits are larger when species have relatively larger plans. However, we fail to find strong evidence that multispecies plans covering more species are more effective than plans which include fewer species.Keywords: Private Land, Recovery, Endangered Species Act, Fish and Wildlife Service, Habitat Conservation Plans, Conservatio

Agricultural Landowners’ Response to Incentives for Afforestation

Previous research has shown that afforestation of agricultural land is a relatively low-cost option compared to energy-based approaches for mitigating net carbon dioxide emissions, and that financial incentives affect landowner behavior and can be used to increase carbon sequestration on private land. In this paper we use stated preference data from private landowners in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S. to examine the key factors affecting participation in an incentive program for carbon sequestration through afforestation. We also estimate the corresponding potential for carbon sequestration and its cost. Our results suggest that incentive payments would significantly and positively affect landowners’ level of enrollment in a tree planting program.Keywords: Stated preference, Incentives, Carbon supply function, Carbon sequestration, Afforestatio

Finding Water Scarcity Amid Abundance Using Human–Natural System Models

Water scarcity afflicts societies worldwide. Anticipating water shortages is vital because of water’s indispensable role in social-ecological systems. But the challenge is daunting due to heterogeneity, feedbacks, and water’s spatial-temporal sequencing throughout such systems. Regional system models with sufficient detail can help address this challenge. In our study, a detailed coupled human–natural system model of one such region identifies how climate change and socioeconomic growth will alter the availability and use of water in coming decades. Results demonstrate how water scarcity varies greatly across small distances and brief time periods, even in basins where water may be relatively abundant overall. Some of these results were unexpected and may appear counterintuitive to some observers. Key determinants of water scarcity are found to be the cost of transporting and storing water, society’s institutions that circumscribe human choices, and the opportunity cost of water when alternative uses compete