Get paid more, work more? Lessons from French physicians' labour supply responses to hypothetic fee increases

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the General Practitioners' (GPs) labour supply, specifically focusing on the physicians' labour supply responses to higher compensations. This analysis is mainly aimed at challenging the reality of a ‘backward bending' form for the labour supply of GPs. Because GPs' fees only evolve very slowly and are mainly fixed by the National Health Insurance Fund, we designed a contingent valuation survey in which hypothetical fee increases are randomly submitted to GPs. Empirical evidence from 1,400 French GPs supports the hypothesis of a negative slope for the GPs' labour supply curve. Therefore, increasing the supply of physicians' services through an increase in fees is not a feasible policy.General practitioners; contingent valuation; price of leisure; labour supply; backward bending curve

Contingent Valuation of Competing Public Sector Programmes: An Experiment of Single versus Joint Evaluation

In this paper, we compare single and joint evaluation (JE) of competing public sector programmes in a contingent valuation exercise. Using survey data aimed at evaluating WTP for cancer interventions (n = 2628), we disantangle two types of effects of JE: informational effects and sequence effects. By the former, wemean: by presenting different programmes to respondents, they will acquire more information on each programme than they would if each programme was valued in isolation. Sequence effects are underisable and induced by the JE exercise itself: changing the order of the valuation sequence induces different WTP values.Our results show that there are informational effects but no sequence effects. We therefore argue that JE approaches can be added to the armoury of techniques aimed at designing better survey instruments in a way that induces informational effects without incurring problems of sequencing.Single Evaluation; Joint Evaluation Willingness to Pay; Contingent Valuation; Priorities Setting

Les consentements à payer pour des programmes de prévention sanitaire incluent-ils de l'altruisme ? Enseignements d'une enquête sur la fièvre Q

L'évaluation de politiques de prévention sanitaire par le recours à des Consentements A Payer (CAP) issus d'enquêtes auprès de la population est de plus en plus fréquent. Lorsque ces politiques revêtent une dimension collective, les CAP déclarés par les individus peuvent refléter une composante altruiste, ce qui rend problématique le calcul économique. A partir d'une enquête d'évaluation contingente portant sur deux politiques de prévention de la Fièvre Q, l'une collective et l'autre individuelle, nous mobilisons le cadre théorique de l'utilité espérée pour déterminer le caractère altruiste (ou non) des individus, que nous expliquons ensuite par certaines de leurs caractéristiques socio-économiques. Le principal résultat est que 66% des répondants incluent une composante altruiste lors de la révélation du CAP pour le programme collectif. Elle représente 3,6 euro en moyenne, soit environ 25% du CAP considéré.altruisme