1,956 research outputs found
Ownership, Incentives and Monitoring
This paper studies the effect of ownership structure on workers' incentives for investing in firm-specific human capital. Particularly, we analyse such incentivers and monitoring under employee ownership and capitalist ownership. In our model, the employee-owned firm is a firm bought by its workers who pay the competitive price. Under certain conditions, we show that the workers' investment and expected income are higher and the monitoring intensity is lower in an employee-owned firm than they are in a capitalist firm. We also show that the incentive effect of employee ownership increases as a worker's reservation wage decreases, as the monitoring cost or as the productivity uncertainty increases. Most of our results are consistent with the available empirical evidenceEmployee ownership, monitoring, incentives, property rights
Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures.*
This paper presents a model of the joint venture that is grounded in the stylized facts we found from a sample of 200 joint venture contracts. The model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the incomplete contract frameworks of Grossman-Hart-Moore Property Rights Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory of the firm, and emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue-sharing and control arrangements o?ers strong support to our Property-Rights-Theory motivated model with self investment but rejects that with cooperative investment. The Transaction-Cost-Theory motivated model leaves some important empirical findings unexplained. Our findings also reject some of the existing theories of joint ownership.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39948/2/wp563.pd
Quality of Bureaucracy and Open-Economy Macro Policies
Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic polices can be implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. In this paper, we study the possibility that quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open-economy macro-policies, in particular, the imposition/removal of capital controls, and financial repression. We first derive a model that delivers such a result. Bureaucratic corruption translates into reduced ability by the government to collect tax revenue. Even if capital control/financial repression is otherwise inefficient, as long as the government needs the revenue for public goods provision, it would have to rely more on capital control/financial repression. For all countries for which we can obtain relevant data, we find that more corrupt countries are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. The result of this paper suggests that a premature removal of capital controls mandated by outside institutions could reduce rather than enhance economic efficiency.
The quality of bureaucracy and capital account policies
The extent of bureaucracy varies extensively across countries, but the quality of bureaucracy within a country changes more slowly than economic policies. The authors propose that the quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open economy macroeconomic policies - especially the imposition or removal of capital control. In their model, capital controls are an instrument of financial repression. They entail efficiency loss for the economy but also generate implicit revenue for the government. The results show that bureaucratic corruption translates into the government's reduced ability to collect tax revenues. Even if capital controls and financial repression are otherwise inefficient, the government still has to rely on them to raise revenues to provide public goods. Among the countries for which the authors could get relevant data, they find that the more corrupt ones are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. To deal with possible reverse causality, they use the extent of corruption in a country's judicial system, and the degree of democracy, as the instrumental variables for bureaucratic corruption. The instrumental variable regressions show the same result: more corrupt countries are associated with more severe capital controls. The results suggest that as countries develop and improve their public institutions, reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they will choose to gradually liberalize their capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely when forced by outside institutions to do so could reduce rather than improve their economic efficiency.Banks&Banking Reform,Governance Indicators,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance
How Does Privatization Work in China?
Using a comprehensive panel data set of China’s state-owned enterprises, we investigate the impacts of privatization, of different time sequences and extent of non-state ownership, on social welfare and firm performance. Attention has been focused on the sources of gain in firm performance and the long-run impacts of privatization. It is found that the privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited compromise on social welfare responsibilities, and significant gain in firm performance was obtained by motivating the management and reducing agency cost at the management level.
Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures.*
This paper presents a model of the joint venture that is grounded in the stylized facts we found from a sample of 200 joint venture contracts. The model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the incomplete contract frameworks of Grossman-Hart-Moore Property Rights Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory of the firm, and emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue-sharing and control arrangements o?ers strong support to our Property-Rights-Theory motivated model with self investment but rejects that with cooperative investment. The Transaction-Cost-Theory motivated model leaves some important empirical findings unexplained. Our findings also reject some of the existing theories of joint ownership.Joint Ventures, Control Right, Revenue-Sharing Contracts, Expropriation, Theory of the Firm
Limiting Government Predation Through Anonymous Banking: A Theory with Evidence from China
China's economic performance of the past two decades presents a puzzle for the economics of transition and development: Enormous private business incentives were unleashed that have fueled rapid economic growth despite the fact that China has had very weak "conventional institutions" (such as the rule of law and separation of powers) to constrain the government from arbitrary intrusion into economic activities. We argue that one mechanism that has limited the government's ability for predation and harassment is commitment through information decentralization, where the key institutiton is "anonymous banking," that is, a combination of the use of cash for transactions and the use of anonymous savings deposits. The government's incentive for such a mechanism comes form the increased quasi-fiscal revenues collected from the state banking system through "financial repression," a combination of controls on international capital flows with restrictions on domestic interest rates. The major features of China's economy concerning its fiscal decline, financial deepening, and the sectoral dual-track can be better understood using this analytical framework.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39659/3/wp275.pd
A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform
During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net to the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit incentives have little incentives to promote social stability due to its public good nature, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are needed to continue their role in providing social welfare. Charged with the multi-tasks of efficient production as well as social welfare provision, SOEs continue to be given low profit incentives and consequently, their financial performance continues to be poor.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39751/3/wp367.pd
Local Protectionism and Regional Specialization: Evidence from China’s Industries
This paper uses a dynamic panel estimation method to investigate the determinants of regional specialization in China’s industries, paying particular attention to local protectionism. Less geographic concentration is found in industries where the past tax-plus-profit margins and the shares of state ownership are high, re- flecting stronger local government protection of these industries. The evidence also supports the scale-economies theory of regional specialization. Finally, the overall time trend of regional specialization of China’s industries is found to have reversed an early drop in the mid 1980s, and registered a significant increase in the later years.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39951/3/wp565.pd
The Return to Capital in China
China's investment rate is one of the highest in the world, which naturally leads one to suspect that the return to capital in China must be quite low. Using the data from China's national accounts, we estimate the rate of return to capital in China. We find that the aggregate rate of return to capital averaged 25% during 1978-1993, fell during 1993-1998, and has become flat at roughly 20% since 1998. This evidence suggests that the aggregate return to capital in China does not appear to be significantly lower than the return to capital in the rest of the world. We also find that the standard deviation of the rate of return to capital across Chinese provinces has fallen since 1978.
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