16 research outputs found
The spatial structure of unified consciousness
In this dissertation, I defend two theses: first, that experiences with spatial phenomenology represent space as single and unitary, and, second, that every experience has a spatial phenomenology. The two theses entail the conclusion that the unity of conscious spatial representation is necessary for the unity of consciousness. This means that unified consciousness has a (partially) spatial structure. In what follows, I adopt the mereological conception of unified consciousness according to which experiences are unified just in case they are parts of a subject’s total phenomenal state. I also assume that the unity relation is a relation among experiences. Most philosophers working on the unity of consciousness reject the conclusion that unity of consciousness requires the unity of spatial representation. But in my dissertation I show that there are compelling reasons to accept the two theses that jointly entail it. First, I argue that all spatial perceptual representations represent space as single and unitary. Then, I argue that non-perceptual spatial experiences: imagination experiences, recollective experiences, as well as experiences of afterimages and phosphenes have the kind of spatial content that relates the locations represented in these experiences to the locations represented in perception. In short, the locations represented in perceptual and non-perceptual experiences are represented as belonging to the same space. Secondly, I argue that experiences standardly taken not to possess spatial phenomenology, such as conscious thoughts and moods, either do in fact possess such phenomenology (thoughts), or wholly depend for their own phenomenology on spatially unified experiences (moods). When it comes to conscious thoughts, I argue that the view that they exhibit spatial phenomenology is dialectically privileged over its denial. This means that granting spatial phenomenology to conscious thoughts is a more reasonable default starting position. Considerations marshalled from the philosophical accounts concerning what it’s like to have conscious thoughts, as well as those marshalled from the literature on the pathologies of cognitive experience (especially schizophrenia) strongly suggest that what it’s like to have thoughts does involve awareness of the thoughts’ locations (typically in one’s head). When it comes to mood experiences, I argue that all it takes to account for the phenomenal character of such experiences are modifications to other, non-mood experiences. Such modifications are not, however, free-standing experiences for which the question of unity arises. This is because the unity relation is a relation between experiences, not between non-detachable aspects of a single, free-standing experience. Hence, the view that for the mood experience to obtain, other experiences must simply be modified in certain ways is compatible with the view that spatial unity is necessary for phenomenal unity. This is because the relation between an experience and its modification is not the phenomenal unity relation. The way mood experiences are unified with other experiences is wholly captured by the way in which a modification of an experience is unified with that experience. And this is not a phenomenal unity relation. On the other hand, the experiences that collectively give rise to the mood experience are spatially and phenomenally unified. Hence, mood experiences do not pose a special problem for my account. I conclude that unified consciousness requires unified conscious spatial representation. Consciousness has a spatial structure
Consciousness and information integration
Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory. We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize. We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim
A Moral Bind? — Autonomous Weapons, Moral Responsibility, and Institutional Reality
In “Accepting Moral Responsibility for the Actions of Autonomous Weapons Systems—a Moral Gambit” (2022), Mariarosaria Taddeo and Alexander Blanchard answer one of the most vexing issues in current ethics of technology: how to close the so-called “responsibility gap”? Their solution is to require that autonomous weapons systems (AWSs) may only be used if there is some human being who accepts the ex ante responsibility for those actions of the AWS that could not have been predicted or intended (in such cases, the human being takes what the authors call the “moral gambit”). The authors then propose several institutional safeguards to implement in order to ensure that the moral gambit is taken in a fair and just way. This paper explores this suggestion in the context of the institutional settings within which AWSs are most likely to be deployed. It raises some concerns as to the feasibility of Taddeo and Blanchard’s proposal, in light of the recent empirical work on the incentive structures likely to exist within militaries. It then presents a potential problem that may arise in case the accountability mechanisms are successfully implemented
Should the State Prohibit the Production of Artificial Persons?
This article argues that criminal law should not, in general, prevent the creation of artificially intelligent servants who achieve
humanlike moral status, even though it may well be immoral to construct such beings. In defending this claim, a series of thought experiments intended to evoke clear intuitions is proposed, and presuppositions about any particular theory of criminalization or any particular moral theory are kept to a minimum
Mental Integrity in the Attention Economy: in Search of the Right to Attention
Is it wrong to distract? Is it wrong to direct others’ attention in ways they otherwise would not choose? If so, what are the grounds of this wrong – and, in expounding them, do we have to at once condemn large chunks of contemporary digital commerce (also known as the attention economy)?
In what follows, I attempt to cast light on these questions. Specifically, I argue – following the pioneering work of Jasper Tran and Anuj Puri – that there is a right to attention, and that its existence underlies some of our claims regarding the wrongness of distractions. However, I depart from both these authors in two respects: first, I present a new way of deriving the right to attention, grounding it in the more fundamental right to mental integrity. Second, I remain agnostic on whether the contemporary business practices of capturing attention in exchange for a variety of digital products and services are plagued by routine violations of the right
Sims and Vulnerability: On the Ethics of Creating Emulated Minds
It might become possible to build artificial minds with the capacity for experience. This raises a plethora of ethical issues, explored, among others, in the context of whole brain emulations (WBE). In this paper, I will take up the problem of vulnerability – given, for various reasons, less attention in the literature – that the conscious emulations will likely exhibit. Specifically, I will examine the role that vulnerability plays in generating ethical issues that may arise when dealing with WBEs. I will argue that concerns about vulnerability are more matters of institutional design than individual ethics, both when it comes to creating humanlike brain emulations, and when animal-like emulations are concerned. Consequently, the article contains reflection on some institutional measures that can be taken to protect the sims' interests. It concludes that an institutional framework more likely to succeed in this task is competitive and poly-centric, rather than monopolistic and centralized
Digital privacy and the law: the challenge of regulatory capture
Digital privacy scholars tend to bemoan ordinary people’s limited knowledge of and lukewarm interest in what happens to their digital data. This general lack of interest and knowledge is often taken as a consideration in favor of legislation aiming to force internet companies into adopting more responsible data practices. While we remain silent on whether any new laws are called for, in this paper we wish to underline a neglected consequence of people’s ignorance of and apathy for digital privacy: their potential to encourage capture by industry interests. In particular, we argue that such laws may be at increased risk of capture because they are unlikely to be democratically responsive. We make this claim on a twofold basis: first, well-known theoretical mechanisms explaining how the absence of responsiveness leads to capture, identified in prior political science and political philosophy literature, yield the prediction that digital privacy legislation is likely to be unresponsive and thus captured; second, empirical data concerning the European Union’s digital privacy laws, with a special focus on the General Data Protection Regulation, appears to confirm these predictions: the bloc’s (world’s?) flagship privacy protection law seems more responsive to corporate than citizen interests
Online consent: how much do we need to know?
This paper argues, against the prevailing view, that consent to privacy policies that regular internet users usually give is largely unproblematic from the moral point of view. To substantiate this claim, we rely on the idea of the right not to know (RNTK), as developed by bioethicists. Defenders of the RNTK in bioethical literature on informed consent claim that patients generally have the right to refuse medically relevant information. In this article we extend the application of the RNTK to online privacy. We then argue that if internet users can be thought of as exercising their RNTK before consenting to privacy policies, their consent ought to be considered free of the standard charges leveled against it by critics
Molyneux’s Question and the Semantics of Seeing
The aim of this chapter is to shed new light on the question of what newly sighted subjects are capable of seeing on the basis of previous experience with mind- independent, external objects and their properties through touch alone. This question is also known as “Molyneux’s question.” Much of the empirically driven debate surrounding this question has been centered on the nature of the representational content of the subjects’ visual experiences. It has generally been assumed that the meaning of “seeing” deployed in these disputes is more or less clear and unproblematic, and therefore requires no analysis or clarification. In this chapter, we wish to challenge this assumption. We argue that getting clear on the meaning of “seeing” is the only feasible way to determine whether the empirical attempts to answer Molyneux’s question accurately capture what newly sighted subjects are in fact capable of seeing. Specifically, we show that the dominant interpretations of the empirical results from a recent study (Held et al., 2011) fail to take into account that seeing can be not only purely visual but also epistemic in that it requires background knowledge (such as what an object with a particular viewpointindependent shape looks like from a particular perspective)