8 research outputs found
Goodwill Hunting:Why and When Ultimate Controlling Owners Affect Their Firms' Corporate Social Responsibility Performance
Researchers have long been interested in how owners affect firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. However, owners face diverging ethical preferences between funding and potentially benefiting from their firms’ CSR performance. To better understand owners’ influence on firms’ CSR performance, we focus on ultimate controlling owners with the highest control rights over their firms. We theorize that ultimate controlling owners with more control rights have stronger motivations and greater decision-making power to promote firms’ CSR performance to demonstrate that they are responsible owners and gain legitimacy and goodwill from their stakeholders. Moreover, we explore how this positive relationship is strengthened when ultimate controlling owners and their firms share similar corporate names and receive increased financial analyst coverage, as these conditions increase the likelihood of gaining legitimacy and goodwill through their firms’ improved CSR performance. We test our theory using a sample of 852 publicly listed Chinese firms from 2008 to 2017. Our findings support our theoretical predictions and contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how differences in ownership structure and owner type associated with ultimate controlling owners shape their motives and power to affect CSR performance in their firms
Improving subsidiary performance via inpatriate assignments:The role of host country national subsidiary CEOs' social ties and motivational cultural intelligence
From local modification to global innovation:How research units in emerging economies innovate for the world
She’-E-O Compensation Gap: A Role Congruity View
Is there a compensation gap between female CEOs (She’-E-Os) and male CEOs? If so, are there mechanisms to mitigate the compensation gap? Extending role congruity theory, we argue that the perception mismatch between the female gender role (that assumes communal traits) and the leadership role (that assumes agentic traits) may lead to lower compensation to female CEOs, resulting in a gender compensation gap. Nevertheless, the compensation gap may be narrowed if female CEOs display agentic traits through risk-taking, or alternatively, work in female-dominated industries where communal traits are valued. Additionally, we expect that female CEOs’ risk-taking is less effective in reducing the gender compensation gap in female-dominated industries due to the conflicting emphases on agentic and communal traits. Leveraging a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, we find support for our hypotheses. Overall, this study contributes to the ethics literature on income inequality issues, by highlighting the effectiveness of potential mechanisms to close the gender compensation gap between female and male CEOs
Managers’ Marketing Strategy Decision Making During Performance Decline and the Moderating Influence of Incentive Pay
This paper focuses on managers’ marketing decision making during performance decline. Drawing on the reconciliation of theories of failure-induced change and threat-rigidity by Ocasio (1995), we examine how performance decline may result in a rigid decision-making process and decision characteristics that reflect the narrowing of attention and increased risk seeking. Furthermore, drawing on managerial compensation research, we consider how incentive pay may affect the marketing decision-making process and decision characteristics of managers during performance decline. Using a simulation game with experienced Chinese managers, our results indicate that performance decline decreases marketing strategy process comprehensiveness but increases reliance on short-term marketing decisions, strategic change, and strategic risk taking. Moreover, incentive pay attenuates the rigid decision-making process of managers but accentuates their heightened risk seeking during performance decline. This paper offers unique behavioral insights into how managers make marketing decisions