Djela koja ubijaju i djela koja ne ubijaju — filozofska analiza pravila mrtvog donora

In response to recent debates on the need to abandon the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) to facilitate vital-organ transplantation, I claim that, through a detailed philosophical analysis of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the DDR, some acts that seem to violate DDR in fact do not, thus DDR can be upheld. The paper consists of two parts. First, standard apparatuses of the philosophy of language, such as sense, referent, truth condition, and definite description are employed to show that there exists an internally consistent and coherent interpretation of UDDA which resolves the Reduction Problem and the Ambiguity Problem that allegedly threaten the UDDA framework, and as a corollary, the practice of Donation after the Circulatory Determination of Death (DCDD) does not violate DDR. Second, an interpretation of the DDR, termed ‘No Hastening Death Rule’ (NHDR), is formulated so that, given that autonomy and non-maleficence principles are observed, the waiting time for organ procurement can be further shortened without DDR being violated.Kao odgovor na nedavne rasprave o potrebi napuštanja pravila mrtvog donora (DDR) radi olakšavanja transplantacije vitalnih organa, oslanjajući se na detaljnu filozofsku analizu Jedinstvenog zakona o utvrđivanju smrti (UDDA) i DDR-a, tvrdim da za neka djela za koja se čini da krše DDR, zapravo ga ne krše, stoga se DDR može podržati. Rad se sastoji od dva dijela. Prvo, koriste se standardni alati filozofije jezika, poput smisla, referencije, istinosnih uvjeta i određenog opisa kako bi se pokazalo da postoji interno konzistentna i koherentna interpretacija UDDA koja rješava problem redukcije i problem dvosmislenosti koji navodno prijete UDDA okviru, te kao posljedica toga, praksa darivanja nakon cirkulacijskog utvrđivanja smrti (DCDD) ne krši DDR. Drugo, tumačenje DDR-a, nazvano ‘Pravilo brze smrti’ (NHDR), formulirano je tako da se, s obzirom na poštivanje načela autonomije i ne-zlonamjernosti, vrijeme čekanja na nabavu organa može dodatno skratiti bez kršenja DDR-a

On Killing as Causing Death

Common sense has that killing someone amounts to causing the death of someone. This makes killing a physical, biological, or, at best, metaphysical issue, and, as a consequence, the ethics of killing can be dealt with independently of the non-ethical issue of who the killer is. However, in this paper, we show that this is not the case. A physical/biological definition of death plus a metaphysical definition of causation does not exhaust the meaning of killing. Rather, the notion of killing per se generally presumes a notion of default, which often involves ethical considerations

The Ethics of Killing, an Amoral Enquiry

In ‘What Makes Killing Wrong?’ Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller make the bold claim that killing in itself is not wrong, what is wrong is totally-disabling. In ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ Giubilini and Minerva argue for allowing infanticide. Both papers challenge the stigma commonly associated with killing, and emphasize that killing is not wrong at some margins of life. In this paper, we first generalize the above claims to the thesis that there is nothing morally wrong with killing per se, so long as it is instant and unannounced. Then, from the perspective of social evolution, we explain why people refrain from killing others, the general guideline being that it is unadvisable to kill someone with whom you associate a Second Person Perspective (SPP). Finally, drawing from a seminal paper of Press and Dyson on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we stress that an SPP without an SP (Second Person), or the other way around, can both lead to unwelcome results

Multiview Regenerative Morphing with Dual Flows

This paper aims to address a new task of image morphing under a multiview setting, which takes two sets of multiview images as the input and generates intermediate renderings that not only exhibit smooth transitions between the two input sets but also ensure visual consistency across different views at any transition state. To achieve this goal, we propose a novel approach called Multiview Regenerative Morphing that formulates the morphing process as an optimization to solve for rigid transformation and optimal-transport interpolation. Given the multiview input images of the source and target scenes, we first learn a volumetric representation that models the geometry and appearance for each scene to enable the rendering of novel views. Then, the morphing between the two scenes is obtained by solving optimal transport between the two volumetric representations in Wasserstein metrics. Our approach does not rely on user-specified correspondences or 2D/3D input meshes, and we do not assume any predefined categories of the source and target scenes. The proposed view-consistent interpolation scheme directly works on multiview images to yield a novel and visually plausible effect of multiview free-form morphing