Spirit and Utopia: (German) Idealism as Political Theology

Can we understand (German) idealism as emancipatory today, after the new realist critique? In this paper, I argue that we can do so by identifying a political theology of revolution and utopia at the theoretical heart of German Idealism. First, idealism implies a certain revolutionary event at its foundation. Kant’s Copernicanism is ingrained, methodologically and ontologically, into the idealist system itself. Secondly, this revolutionary origin remains a “non-place” for the idealist system, which thereby receives a utopian character. I define the utopian as the ideal gap, produced by and from within the real, between the non-place of the real as origin and its reduplication as the non-place of knowledge’s closure, as well as the impulse, inherent in idealism, to attempt to close that gap and fully replace the old with the new. Based on this definition, I outline how the utopian functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Furthermore, I suggest that idealism may be seen as a political-theological offshoot of realism, via the objective creation of a revolutionary condition. The origin of the ideal remains in the real, maintaining the utopian gap and the essentially critical character of idealism, both at the level of theory and as social critique

Nature, Spirit, and Revolution: Situating Hegel's Philosophy of Nature

This paper ties together several anthropological and naturphilosophische themes in Hegel in order to re-examine the place of the philosophy of nature in the Encyclopedia. By taking Hegel’s anthropology as a starting point, I argue that his philosophy of nature has for its subject not nature “as such,” but nature as cognized by Geist, so that the identity of these two natures is only constructed by spirit itself retroactively. I trace the origin of this difference to the revolutionary event that institutes Hegel’s anthropology – which is not a transition from nature to spirit, but a pure break or new beginning, culminating in the creation of the conceptual world of nature as “we” know it. As a result, the philosophy of nature does not precede, but follows from, the anthropology and the philosophy of spirit; the natural foundation is retroactively replaced by the philosopher with the anthropological one

Sovereign Nothingness: Pyotr Chaadaev's Political Theology

This paper speculatively reconstructs the unique intervention that Pyotr Chaadaev, the early nineteenth-century Russian thinker, made into the political-theological debate. Instead of positioning sovereignty and exception against each other, Chaadaev seeks to think the (Russian) exception immanently, affirming its nonrelation to, and even nullity or nothingness vis-à-vis, the (European, Christian-modern) world-historical regime—and to theorize the logic of sovereignty that could arise from within this nullity. As a result, we argue, nothingness itself becomes, in Chaadaev, operative through and as the sovereign act and the figure of the sovereign, exemplified for him by the Russian emperor Peter the Great (1672–1725)

The Sovereignty of the World: Towards a Political Theology of Modernity (After Blumenberg)

Reading with and against Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, and following his own account of the epochal shift from the Middle Ages to modernity, this chapter takes up the genealogy and the political theology of Blumenbergian modernity so as to reanimate its relevance for contemporary theory. Beginning with the shared opposition to Gnosticism found in both Christianity and modernity, we trace the emergence of modernity as creating a “counterworld” of possibility in the face of the alienation engendered by medieval nominalist ideas of God’s absolute transcendence and hiddenness. In modernity, the world becomes sovereign: the modern world positions—and reproduces—itself as a sovereign and transcendent totality of possibility that its subjects must endlessly work to actualize, thus creating new operations and legitimations of domination. We conclude by outlining a programme of thinking what is constitutively foreclosed by Blumenberg’s modernity: an immanence alien to this Christian-modern apparatus of transcendence and possibility, a life for disorder and against the world

Pantheism and the Dangers of Hegelianism in Nineteenth-Century France

This study rethinks the critical reception of Hegelianism in nineteenth-century France, arguing that this reception orbits around "pantheism" as the central political-theological threat. It is Hegel’s alleged pantheism that French authors often take to be the root cause of the other dangers that become associated with Hegelianism over the course of the century, ranging from the defence of the status quo to radical socialism to pangermanism. Moreover, the widespread fixation on the term "pantheism" as the enemy of all that is true, and as the term that defines the age, is symptomatic of the perception of the nineteenth century by its contemporaries as a period of crisis and turmoil, in which heretical energies are let loose that threaten to unground all authority and all transcendence. More speculatively, I suggest in the conclusion that it is the same energies that the term "communism" comes to capture, too

The hydrography and circulation of the upper 1200 meters in the tropical North Atlantic during 1982-91

We assemble a collection of 7591 conductivity-temperature-depth stations in the tropical Atlantic between 5S and 20N for the period 1982–1991 using data from the Soviet SECTIONS program enhanced by contributions primarily from the WESTRAX and FOCAL/SEQUAL programs. Most of the stations are west of 30W, forming a series of 21 surveys. In addition there were five multi-ship basinwide surveys, each taking 1.5–3 months to complete. The quality of the SECTIONS data is discussed and comparisons between the data sets are shown. Within the pycnocline, southern water is distinguished by salinity that is 0.3 psu lower than its northern counterpart at the same density. This difference allows us to distinguish the origin of pycnocline water. Based on this information together with geostrophic analysis we confirm that much of the water transported across the equator in the North Brazil Current retroflects eastward south of 8N. In summer and fall the water of the North Brazil Current merges with the water of the North Equatorial Current to form the North Equatorial Countercurrent, whose axis shifts southward with depth. East of 35W part of the mass transport in the Countercurrent is lost to the equatorial zone, while the rest continues eastward. During winter and spring eastward currents are found in two latitude bands, a surface current between 5–10N and a weaker current south of 5N confined to the thermocline. This latter North Equatorial Undercurrent has no surface expression in winter. During the summer and fall the northern boundary of Southern Hemisphere water at pycnocline depths is given by the North Equatorial Countercurrent. During the rest of the year the northern boundary of Southern Hemisphere water only penetrates to the edge of the weaker North Equatorial Undercurrent south of 5N. The availability of ten years of data allows us to examine aspects of year-to-year variability. Among these results the data set reveals strong meandering of the North Equatorial Countercurrent between 42W and 35W during the summer of 1987. The meandering also appears in contemporaneous Geosat altimetry. Another unusual feature occurred in the summer 1986 when there was a strong thermocline current transporting water northward at the rate of 26 Sv. Water mass analysis shows that this current was the result of a pressure gradient set up by an intrusion of warm low-salinity water from the Southern Hemisphere. The fact that this high transport occurred in the interior ocean suggests that interior flows must be monitored during any attempt to observe meridional transports of mass or heat

Knot of the World: German Idealism between Annihilation and Construction

Through an analysis of the ultimate telos of the world and of the subject’s striving in Schelling, the late Fichte, and Friedrich Schlegel—as well as via such concepts as the absolute, bliss, nothingness, God, chaos, and irony—this essay reconfigures German Idealism and Romanticism as spanning the conceptual space between two poles, world-annihilation and world-construction, and traces the ways in which these thinkers attempted to resolve what this essay calls the "transcendental knot," or to think the way the world is without absolutizing it

Romantic Bliss—or, Romanticism Is Not an Optimism

This essay proposes to rethink Romanticism through the concept of bliss. I suggest not only that bliss is a core Romantic concept but also, more speculatively, that Romanticism as both a project and tendency is generated out of an antagonistic entanglement between bliss and the world of Western modernity. As the state of immediate fulfillment, free of alienation or negativity, bliss is what modernity at once promises and endlessly defers—and so bliss erupts in Romanticism against the modern world. In bliss, the world is dissolved as in water, consumed as in fire, so that nothing remains except the ecstasy of the world’s annihilation or termination. Romanticism seeks to inhabit the utopia of bliss immanently; however, the world re-mediates bliss into a long-lost past or an unreachable future, because it is through this re-mediation that the world reproduces and justifies itself. As a result, Romanticism falls into endless approximation, into nostalgia and longing—and bliss becomes infinitely not-yet, fragmented, defused by the world. This essay moves through German and British Romanticism so as to collect the scattered fragments of bliss, and to re-assemble Romantic bliss in its a-worldly immanence, its post-Copernican cosmic infinity, and its (often violent) clash with the world

To Break All Finite Spheres: Bliss, the Absolute I, and the End of the World in Schelling's 1795 Metaphysics

"The ultimate end goal of the finite I and the not-I, i.e., the end goal of the world," writes Schelling in Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy (1795), "is its annihilation as a world, i.e., as the exemplification of finitude." In this paper, I explicate this statement and its theoretical stakes through a comprehensive re-reading of Schelling's 1795 writings: Of the I and Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, written later in the same year, in relation to what Schelling proclaims to be the central problem of all philosophy: the existence of the world (Dasein der Welt). To that end, I analyze Schelling's 1795 conceptions of synthesis and morality, and the structure of the I's striving in the world that they serve to create and uphold – a structure in which the I is torn between a paradisal past and a striven-for future that it constitutively cannot reach as long as the world is there. Schelling's 1795 metaphysics is ultimately caught, I argue, in the tension between two poles: justifying the world, this world of negativity, division, and endless striving – and annihilating or dissolving it in the bliss of absolute identity and freedom, in which there is no world, and no possibility of or need for a world