Defense for Advanced Persistent Threat with Inadvertent or Malicious Insider Threats

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical framework to investigate advanced persistent threat problems with two types of insider threats: malicious and inadvertent. Within this framework, a unified three-player game is established and Nash equilibria are obtained in response to different insiders. By analyzing Nash equilibria, we provide quantitative solutions to the advanced persistent threat problems with insider threats. Furthermore, optimal defense strategy and defender's cost comparisons between two insider threats have been performed. The findings suggest that the defender should employ more active defense strategies against inadvertent insider threats than against malicious insider threats, despite the fact that malicious insider threats cost the defender more. Our theoretical analysis is validated by numerical results, including an additional examination of the conditions of the risky strategies adopted by different insiders. This may help the defender in determining monitoring intensities and defensive strategies

Distributed Algorithm for Continuous-type Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Subnetwork Zero-sum Games

In this paper, we consider a continuous-type Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in subnetwork zero-sum games, which is a generalization of deterministic subnetwork zero-sum games and discrete-type Bayesian zero-sum games. In this continuous-type model, because the feasible strategy set is composed of infinite-dimensional functions and is not compact, it is hard to seek a BNE in a non-compact set and convey such complex strategies in network communication. To this end, we design two steps to overcome the above bottleneck. One is a discretization step, where we discretize continuous types and prove that the BNE of the discretized model is an approximate BNE of the continuous model with an explicit error bound. The other one is a communication step, where we adopt a novel compression scheme with a designed sparsification rule and prove that agents can obtain unbiased estimations through compressed communication. Based on the above two steps, we propose a distributed communication-efficient algorithm to practicably seek an approximate BNE, and further provide an explicit error bound and an $O(\ln T/\sqrt{T})$ convergence rate.Comment: Submitted to SIAM Journal on Control and Optimizatio

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Distributed Incomplete-information Aggregative Games

In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation function for distributed incomplete-information situations. Since the feasible strategies are infinite-dimensional functions and lie in a non-compact set, the continuity of types brings barriers to seeking equilibria. To this end, we discretize the continuous types and then prove that the equilibrium of the derived discretized model is an $\epsilon$-BNE. On this basis, we propose a distributed algorithm for an $\epsilon$-BNE and further prove its convergence

Bayesian Nash equilibrium seeking for multi-agent incomplete-information aggregative games

summary:In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of either Bayesian games or deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation function to adapt to incomplete-information situations. Since the feasible strategies are infinite-dimensional functions and lie in a non-compact set, the continuity of types brings barriers to seeking equilibria. To this end, we discretize the continuous types and then prove that the equilibrium of the derived discretized model is an $\epsilon$-BNE. On this basis, we propose a distributed algorithm for an $\epsilon$-BNE and further prove its convergence

OmniForce: On Human-Centered, Large Model Empowered and Cloud-Edge Collaborative AutoML System

Automated machine learning (AutoML) seeks to build ML models with minimal human effort. While considerable research has been conducted in the area of AutoML in general, aiming to take humans out of the loop when building artificial intelligence (AI) applications, scant literature has focused on how AutoML works well in open-environment scenarios such as the process of training and updating large models, industrial supply chains or the industrial metaverse, where people often face open-loop problems during the search process: they must continuously collect data, update data and models, satisfy the requirements of the development and deployment environment, support massive devices, modify evaluation metrics, etc. Addressing the open-environment issue with pure data-driven approaches requires considerable data, computing resources, and effort from dedicated data engineers, making current AutoML systems and platforms inefficient and computationally intractable. Human-computer interaction is a practical and feasible way to tackle the problem of open-environment AI. In this paper, we introduce OmniForce, a human-centered AutoML (HAML) system that yields both human-assisted ML and ML-assisted human techniques, to put an AutoML system into practice and build adaptive AI in open-environment scenarios. Specifically, we present OmniForce in terms of ML version management; pipeline-driven development and deployment collaborations; a flexible search strategy framework; and widely provisioned and crowdsourced application algorithms, including large models. Furthermore, the (large) models constructed by OmniForce can be automatically turned into remote services in a few minutes; this process is dubbed model as a service (MaaS). Experimental results obtained in multiple search spaces and real-world use cases demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of OmniForce

Zero-determinant strategy in stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game

Abstract In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the attacker may be a boundedly rational player, who adopts a combination of the BR strategy and a fixed stubborn one. In such a condition, the SSE strategy may not maintain the defensive performance due to the stubbornness. In this paper, we focus on how the defender can adopt the unilateral-control zero-determinate (ZD) strategy to confront the boundedly rational attacker. At first, we verify the existence of ZD strategies for the defender. We then investigate the performance of the defender’s ZD strategy against a boundedly rational attacker, with a comparison of the SSE strategy. Specifically, when the attacker’s strategy is close to the BR strategy, the ZD strategy admits a bounded loss for the defender compared with the SSE strategy. Conversely, when the attacker’s strategy is close to the stubborn strategy, the ZD strategy can bring higher defensive performance for the defender than the SSE strategy does

Quantitative Assessment of Domino Effect Caused by Heat Radiation in Industrial Sites

International audienceAccidents caused by the domino effect or chain of accidents are the most destructive accidents related to industrial sites. The probability of domino effects is increasingly high due to the development of industrial complexes, their proximity, and storage of dangerous substances, transportation networks and population growth. Fires are among the most frequent accidents due to the installations or storage equipment under pressure, and storage of flammable substances. The thermal radiation generated by fire is one of the main factors leading to domino effects and may cause severe consequences on industrial sites, people, structures, environment and economy. This paper presents a methodology for quantitative assessment of domino effect caused by heat radiation on storage areas, a model for the estimation of the human vulnerability is also proposed, individual and societal risk are estimated. The results have proved the importance of domino effect in quantitative risk analysis