505 research outputs found
Regular moral hazard economies
That paper formalizes the idea that when the magnitude of the moral hazard phenomenon is not important, the distortions like equilibria multiplicity or equilibrium discontinuity relative to the economic fundamentals disappear. We study a two state of nature insurance model, with a risk neutral principal, a risk averse agent and separable costs. Typically, in such economies, non convexities imply that the set of Pareto optimal allocations is not connected. Surprisingly, we prove that it is never the case under weak and realistic assumptions. That result is in particular valid under simple regularity assumptions on the cost function when the productivity of effort is always positive. We show that such regularity of the moral hazard economy is compatible with remaining strong non convexities.moral hazard ; non convexities ; equilibrium uniqueness
The Network-Firm as a Single Real Entity: Beyond the Aggregate of Distinct Legal Entities
This paper intends to depart from a critique of the nexus of contracts theory of the firm endowed with its moral personification to propose some theoretical foundations of the firm as a real entity. Some old legal views of the corporation are mobilized to complete the conceptual vacuity of economic theories. This provides crucial insights for modern complex organizations such as the network-firm. The integrating and unifying role of intra-network power relationships is then emphasized and some law and economics of the network-firm are ultimately proposed to clarify the argument that the network-firm â as the firm stricto sensu â is a singular real entity composed from distinct legal entities.Law and economics, contract theory of the firm, network-firm, legal fiction, real entity
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium characterization.non-exclusivity ; insurance ; moral hazard
La dĂ©mocratisation de lâentreprise dans la sociĂ©tĂ© : pensons un capitalisme plus juste
Grenoble : Centre de recherche en Ă©conomie de GrenobleCet essai vise Ă comprendre comment lâentreprise en tant quâentitĂ© Ă©conomique, sociale et politique peut contribuer Ă lâĂ©mergence dâun nouveau capitalisme, dâun capitalisme plus juste et plus respectueux de nos contraintes humaines. Pour honorer cette ambition, lâargumentation se dĂ©veloppe en quatre temps. Tout dâabord, une analyse des maux actuels de notre sociĂ©tĂ© est proposĂ©e Ă lâaune des grands enjeux contemporains. Est ensuite questionnĂ©e la nature du capitalisme afin de circonscrire son pouvoir de rĂ©silience et ses capacitĂ©s de transformation. Un dĂ©tour par la pensĂ©e humaniste progressiste du siĂšcle dernier est alors suggĂ©rĂ© afin de mieux rĂ©interroger les fondements dâun capitalisme raisonnable et juste. Puis lâargumentation se fige sur le coeur de lâessai : le rĂŽle de lâentreprise comme "bien commun" dans la crĂ©ation dâun agir dĂ©mocratique qui servirait le vivre-ensemble de la CitĂ©. Lâessai se termine par lâĂ©noncĂ© argumentĂ© de recommandations et de pistes de progrĂšs institutionnels
Comparative Risk Aversion: A Formal Approach with Applications to Saving Behaviors
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26], Epstein and Zin [9] and Quiggin [24] are well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. Moreover, opting for this model-free approach allows us to establish new general results on the impact of risk aversion on savings behaviors. In particular, we show that risk aversion enhances precautionary savings, clarifying the link that exists between the notions of prudence and risk aversion.Risk aversion, Savings behaviors, Precautionary savings
Qu'est-ce qu'une firme (-réseau) ?
Partant d'une critique de la thĂ©orie fictionnaliste de la firme en tant que noeud de contrats, cetarticle met en exergue les fondements ontologiques de la firme en tant qu'entitĂ© rĂ©elle. LesdĂ©bats juridiques traditionnels sur la nature de la firme sont « recontextualisĂ©s » dansl'intention de pallier l'insuffisance conceptuelle des thĂ©ories Ă©conomiques. La portĂ©ethĂ©orique de cette reprĂ©sentation de la firme en tant qu'entitĂ© rĂ©elle transparait clairementdans l'analyse de la firme-rĂ©seau. Le rĂŽle unificateur des relations de pouvoir intra-rĂ©seau estexplicitĂ©. Et une discussion mĂȘlant considĂ©rations juridiques et rĂ©alitĂ©s Ă©conomiques estproposĂ©e afin de circonscrire les implications juridico-Ă©conomiques qui dĂ©coulent del'Ă©mergence de cette entitĂ© productive complexe. La firme-rĂ©seau est une entitĂ© rĂ©ellesinguliĂšre composĂ©e d'entitĂ©s lĂ©gales distinctes â tout comme l'est la firme stricto sensu.thĂ©ories de la firme, firme-rĂ©seau, fiction lĂ©gale, entitĂ© rĂ©elle, pouvoir, droit etĂ©conomie
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium characterization.Cet article étudie une économie dans laquelle des assureurs, en concurrence, ne peuvent pas proposer de clauses d'exclusivitéé alors que l'on est dans un contexte d'alea moral. Notre modÚle est identique à celui développé dans "Alberto Bisin and Danilo Guaitoli. Moral hazard with non-exclusive contracts. Rand Journal of Economics, 2:306-328, 2004." La présente note développe un contrexemple aux propositions 2, 3 et 4 dans Bisin and Guaitoli [2004], suggérant une caractérisation différente des équilibres qui incitent les assurés à choisir un effort élevé
Responsabilité sociale inter-firmes, coordination et régulation de la firme-réseau multinationale : une analyse économique
This paper deals with the issues of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the lens of inter-firm relationships. This form of "inter-firm social responsibility" (IFSR) is based on the implementation of different institutional mechanisms of coordination such as labels, codes, agreements and certificates. The aim of this paper is to study the normative scope of the regulatory principle of socioeconomic relationships from two of these mechanisms, namely, conduct codes and ISO norms, from an economic perspective, of which both the logic and the efficacy of these devices were analyzed. (...)Nous analysons dans ce texte la question de la responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise (RSE), en nous limitant au seul point de vue des relations inter-firmes. Ce type de " responsabilités sociales inter-firmes " (RSIF) se traduit par la mise en place de nombreux dispositifs institutionnels de coordination (labels, codes, accords, certificats, etc.). L'objet de cet article est de s'intéresser à la question de la portée normative de ce principe de régulation à partir de deux mécanismes, les codes de conduite et les normes ISO, sous le prisme de l'analyse économique, en s'interrogeant sur leur logique et leur efficacité. (...) Le texte intégral en libre accÚs sera disponible à cette adresse en janvier 2016 : [ http://rei.revues.org/5286
The regulation of collective labour relationships : an assessment of the Oliver Williamson's private ordering-public ordering divide
This research article proposes to undertake a critical review of Oliver Williamson's law and economic theory from the analysis of collective labour relationships in the United States. From a positive point of view, the 2009 Nobel Prize laureate explains that law determines the rules of play (public ordering), and then individuals freely negotiate the rules that constitute the institutions of governance (private ordering). From a normative perspective, Williamson argues that this partition is efficient with respect to the economizing logic of individuals. However, we show that, actually, the American law of labour relationships is based on legal pluralism and that the model of private ordering, which has been less and less used since the 1980s, has strong limitations. In this context, the analysis of the public ordering/private ordering framework that Williamson proposes is of little interest
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