Banking Crises Yesterday and Today

Provides an overview of the history of banking crises, as distinguished from financial crises, and the role of microeconomic and regulatory policy, both as causes of and as responses to the crises. Examines how politics can limit improved regulation

Bank Failures in Theory and History: The Great Depression and Other "Contagious" Events

Bank failures during banking crises, in theory, can result either from unwarranted depositor withdrawals during events characterized by contagion or panic, or as the result of fundamental bank insolvency. Various views of contagion are described and compared to historical evidence from banking crises, with special emphasis on the U.S. experience during and prior to the Great Depression. Panics or "contagion" played a small role in bank failure, during or before the Great Depression-era distress. Ironically, the government safety net, which was designed to forestall the (overestimated) risks of contagion, seems to have become the primary source of systemic instability in banking in the current era.

Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game

This paper is aimed to address when and why do banking crises occur, and whether financial reforms in reaction to crises are generally beneficial. It is argued that banking crises properly defined consist either of panics or of waves of costly bank failures, and they do not necessarily coincide. Risk-inviting microeconomic rules of the banking game that are established by government are viewed as the key necessary condition to producing a propensity for banking distress, whether in the form of a high propensity for banking panics or a high propensity for waves of bank failures.Banking, banking crises, financial reforms, microeconomic rules.

Universal banking and the financing of industrial development

In universal banking, large banks operate extensive networks of branches, provide many different services, hold several claims on firms (including equity and debt), and participate directly in the corporate governance of firms that rely on the banks for funding or as insurance underwriters. In this paper, the author contrasts the cost of financing industrialization in the United States and in Germany during the second industrial revolution. He explains that large production is typical of modern industrial practice, so the lessons from that period apply broadly to contemporary developing countries. The second industrial revolution involved many new products and technologies. Firms were producing new goods in new ways on an unprecedented scale. Therefore, they needed quick access to heavy financing. Finance costs for industry were lower in Germany than in the United States, because U.S.regulations prevented the universal banking from which Germany benefited. High finance costs retarded U.S. realization of its full industrial potential. The potential to expand quickly and reap economies of scale was greater in German industrialization. The cost of industrial financing began to decline when institutional changes came about that increased the concentration of financial market transactions. In recent decades, a combination of macroeconomic distress, international competitive pressure, and the creative invention of new financial intermediaries has helped the U.S. financial system overcome the regulatory mandate of financial fragmentation.Financial Intermediation,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Labor Policies,Decentralization,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Housing Finance

The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payments Systems: Learning From the Suffolk System

This paper analyzes the operation of the Suffolk System, an interbank note-clearing network operating throughout New England from the 1820s through the 1850s. Banks made markets in each other's notes at par, which allowed New England to avoid discounting of bank notes in trade. Privately enforced regu- lations prevented free riding in the form of excessive risk taking. Observers of the Suffolk System have been divided. Some emphasized the stability and effi these arrangements. Others argued that the arrangements were motivated by rent-seeking on the part of Boston banks, and were primarily coervice and exploitative. In the neighboring Mid-Atlantic states, regulations limited the potential for developing a regional clearing system centered in New York City on the model of the Suffolk System. This difference makes it possible to compare the performance of banks across regulatory regimes to judge the relative merits of the sanguine and jaundiced views of the Suffolk System. Evidence supports the sanguine view. New England's banks were able to issue more notes and these notes traded at uniform and low discount rates compared to those of other banks. An examination of the balance sheets and stock returns of Boston and New York City banks indicates that the stock market perceived that bank lending produced less risk for bank debt holders in Boston than in New York. The benefits of the system extended outside of Boston. Peripheral New England banks displayed high propensities to issue notes, and wer able to maintain low specie reserves. Boston banks did not show high profit rates or high ratios of market-to-book values of equity; thus there is no evidence that Boston banks extracted rents from their control of the payments system.

Activity-Based Valuation of Bank Holding Companies

Standard valuation methods do not lend themselves to bank holding companies. Banks create value through the types of assets and liabilities they create (e.g., lending and deposit taking relationships). Bank income streams reflect heterogeneous sources of income which differ in their margins of profitability and persistence. Our approach to valuation permits potential differences in the composition of assets, liabilities, income and expenses, and in the profitability and persistence of different sources of income, to reflect themselves in estimated relationships that relate the composition of the balance sheet and income statement to bank value. Our approach explains substantial cross-sectional variation in observed market-to-book values, and residuals from cross-sectional regressions of market-to-book values are useful for predicting future stock returns. Predictable future variation in returns does not reflect priced risk factors, but is related to trading costs.

Historical Macroeconomics and American Macroeconomic History

What can macroeconomic history offer macroeconomic theorists and macroeconometricians? Macroeconomic history offers more than longer time series or special `controlled experiments.' It suggests an historical definition of the economy, which has implications for macroeconometric methods. The defining characteristic of the historical view is its emphasis on `path dependence': ways in which the cumulative past, including the history of shocks and their effects, change the structure of the economy. This essay reviews American macroeconomic history to illustrate its potential uses and draw out methodological implications. `Keynesian' models can account for the most obvious cycle patterns in all historical periods, while `new classical' models cannot. Nominal wage rigidity was important historically and some models of wage rigidity receive more support from history than others.A shortcoming of both Keynesian and new-classical approaches is the assumption that low-frequency change is exogenous to demand. The history of the Kuznets cycle shows how aggregate-demand shocks can produce endogenous changes in aggregate supply. Economies of scale, learning effects, and convergences of expectations-many within the spatial contexts of city building and frontier settlement-seem to have been very important in making the aggregate supply `path-dependent.' Institutional innovation (especially government regulation) has been another source of endogenous change in aggregate supply. The historical view's emphasis on endogenous structural change points in the analysis over short sample periods to identify the sources and consequences of macroeconomic shocks.

Monopoly-Creating Bank Consolidation? The Merger of Fleet and BankBoston

The merger of Fleet and BankBoston in September 1999 resulted in a regional New England lending market in which only one large, universal bank remained. We explore the extent to which that merger resulted in monopoly rents for the combined entity in some niches within the regional loan market. For small- and medium-sized middle-market borrowers, prior to the merger, Fleet and BankBoston charged unusually low loan interest rates, reflecting their ability to realize economies of scope and scale. After the merger, those cost savings were no longer passed on to medium-sized middle-market borrowers, which resulted in an increase in the average interest rate credit spreads to those borrowers of roughly one percent. Small-sized middle-market borrowers (which continued to enjoy the advantage of loan market competition from remaining small banks) maintained their low spreads. Our results suggest that it may be desirable for regulators to consider the concentration in lending markets in addition to deposit markets when evaluating mergers and structuring appropriate divestiture requirements.