Investment, protection, ownership, and the cost of capital

We investigate the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside managers and outside shareholders. Inside ownership reflects the classic tradeoff between incentives and risk diversification, and the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor protection. In equilibrium, the marginal cost of capital is a weighted average of terms reflecting both idiosyncratic and systematic risk, and weaker investor protection increases the weight on idiosyncratic risk. Using firm-level data from 38 countries, we estimate the predicted relationships among investor protection, inside ownership, and the marginal cost of capital. We discuss implications for the determinants of firm size, the relationship between Tobin's Q and ownership, and the effect of financial liberalizations.Investor protection, ownership, investment, cost of capital, agency costs

Investment, protection, ownership, and the cost of capital

We investigate the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside managers and outside shareholders. Inside ownership reflects the classic tradeoff between incentives and risk diversification, and the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor protection. In equilibrium, the marginal cost of capital is a weighted average of terms reflecting both idiosyncratic and systematic risk, and weaker investor protection increases the weight on idiosyncratic risk. Using firm-level data from 38 countries, we estimate the predicted relationships among investor protection, inside ownership, and the marginal cost of capital. We discuss implications for the determinants of firm size, the relationship between Tobin's Q and ownership, and the effect of financial liberalizations

Financial Constraints and the Cyclicality of R&D Investment: Evidence from Slovenia

This paper uses firm level data to show how R&D investment responds to shocks in sales growth in credit constrained firms. A credit constrained firm has to rely on its cash flow and borrowing capacity to survive its short-run liquidity shock when hit by a negative shock. This reduces the possibility for further borrowing in order to invest in non-tangible long tfirm R&D, hence a negative shock should hit R&D investments more in firms that are more credit constrained. We find that in financially constrained firms sales growth is positively associated with R&D investment, suggesting procyclical behavior of R&D investment in credit constrained firms. In contrast, we find that in firms with no financial constraints R&D investment is negatively correlated with sales growth, suggesting countercyclical behavior of R&D, consistent with the Schumpeterian idea of restructuring. Furthfirmore, we find that the firm level response in R&D investment to sales growth is stronger in firms that are more financially dependent, such as firms that are no part of a multinational, firms not receiving subsidies or firms with less collateral

Investor protection, ownership, and the cost of capital

This paper combines the agency theory of the firm with risk diversification incentives for insiders. Principal-agent problems between insiders and outsiders force insiders to retain a larger share in their firm than they would under a perfect risk diversification strategy. We predict that this higher share of insider ownership and the resulting exposure of insiders to higher idiosyncratic risk will result in underinvestment and higher cost of capital. Using firm-level data from 38 countries, the authors provide evidence in support of their theoretical model, showing that the premium for bearing idiosyncratic risk varies between zero and six percent and decreases in the level of outside investor protection. The results of the paper imply that policies aimed at strengthening investor protection laws and their enforcement will improve capital allocation and result in higher growth