140 research outputs found
A Market with Frictions in the Matching Process: An Experimental Study
We construct a laboratory market with the structure of the theoretical model of Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). The model is a simple and natural way to represent a market in which there is a friction in the matching process between buyers and sellers. Sellers first simultaneously post prices at which they are willing to sell their single unit of a good. Buyers then simultaneously choose a seller from whom to attempt to purchase a unit. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the good is randomly sold to one of the buyers. If a seller is not chosen by any buyer, his unit is not sold. Our experimental results show a broad consistency with the model of Burdett et al. and less support for an alternative model, which is analogous to the model of Montgomery (1991), and which has different assumptions on the strategic interaction between sellers. The main departures that we observe from the Burdett et al. model are that (a) price dispersion exists and is slow to decay, (b) prices exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and (c) buyers’ purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.
The Principles of Exchange Rate Determination in an International Finance Experiment
This paper reports the first experiments designed to explore the behavior of economies with prominent features of international finance. Two “countries,” each with its own currency, were created. International trade could take place only through the operation of markets for currency. The law of one price and the flow of funds theory of exchange rate determination were used to produce general equilibrium models that captured much of the behavior of the economies. Prices of goods, as well as the exchange rate, evolve over time toward the predictions of the models. However, both the law of one price and purchasing power parity can be rejected for reasons that do not appear in the literature. Patterns of international trade were as predicted by the law of comparative advantage
Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement
A normative conflict arises when there exist multiple plausible norms of behavior. In such cases, norm enforcement can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment. We find that punishment is much more likely to trigger counter-punishment and start a feud when there is a normative conflict, than in a setting in which no conflict exists. While the possibility of a feud sustains cooperation,the cost of feuding fully offsets the efficiency gains from increased cooperation.normative conflict; peer punishment; feuds; counter-punishment; social norms
Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments
Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others’ actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the long run. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats.threats, cheap talk, sanctions, public good, experiment
Nonspeculative bubbles in experimental asset markets: Lack of common knowledge of rationality vs. actual irrationality
We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the
formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. In a setting in which
speculation is not possible, bubbles and crashes are observed. The results suggest that the
departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of
rationality leading to speculation, but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of
irrationality. Much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation, in markets
where speculation is possible, is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for
participants in the experiment
Production, Trade, Prices, Exchange Rates and Equilibration in Large Experimental Economies
We study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more complex than any that have been studied experimentally to date. Complexity is derived from the fact that the economies are international in economic structure with multiple input, output, and foreign exchange markets in operation. The economies have twenty-one markets and due to the fact that they have roughly �fifty agents, the economies are characterized by several hundred equations. In spite of the complexity and interdependence of the economy, the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilibrium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market-level variables. Empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described
An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade
This study is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system. The concept of multiple "countries" in which each country has its own technology, preferences and resource endowments, is introduced and operationalized. The questions posed in the study are related to the law of comparative advantage, factor price equalization, terms of trade, efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions. The study builds on previous work in the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena
Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality
Your Money or Your Time? Experimental Evidence on Overbidding in All-Pay Auctions
Competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest. Those who spend the most time become more likely to obtain the prize. We model this competition as an all-pay auction under incomplete information, and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards are in terms of time. In the experiment, subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially prespecified length of time. However, they can bid, in terms of time, to leave early. The auction has an allpay structure so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within her group, she must stay for the additional time that she bid. We correlate behavior in this game with behavior in an isomorphic all-pay auction played with money bids. We also consider how two measures of sophistication, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) score, and performance on a probability calibration task, correlate with behavior. We find strong similarities in overall behavior between the auctions conducted with money and with time. Bidding greater than equilibrium levels is typical, and as a consequence, average earnings are negative in both auctions. Thus, the result that there is overdissipation of rent in all-pay auctions extends to competition in terms of time. Higher CRT score and more accurate probability calibration correlate with better decisions in auctions played for money but not those played for time
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