The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payments Systems: Learning From the Suffolk System

This paper analyzes the operation of the Suffolk System, an interbank note-clearing network operating throughout New England from the 1820s through the 1850s. Banks made markets in each other's notes at par, which allowed New England to avoid discounting of bank notes in trade. Privately enforced regu- lations prevented free riding in the form of excessive risk taking. Observers of the Suffolk System have been divided. Some emphasized the stability and effi these arrangements. Others argued that the arrangements were motivated by rent-seeking on the part of Boston banks, and were primarily coervice and exploitative. In the neighboring Mid-Atlantic states, regulations limited the potential for developing a regional clearing system centered in New York City on the model of the Suffolk System. This difference makes it possible to compare the performance of banks across regulatory regimes to judge the relative merits of the sanguine and jaundiced views of the Suffolk System. Evidence supports the sanguine view. New England's banks were able to issue more notes and these notes traded at uniform and low discount rates compared to those of other banks. An examination of the balance sheets and stock returns of Boston and New York City banks indicates that the stock market perceived that bank lending produced less risk for bank debt holders in Boston than in New York. The benefits of the system extended outside of Boston. Peripheral New England banks displayed high propensities to issue notes, and wer able to maintain low specie reserves. Boston banks did not show high profit rates or high ratios of market-to-book values of equity; thus there is no evidence that Boston banks extracted rents from their control of the payments system.

Inconsistencies between lifetime and polarizability measurements in Cs

Electric-dipole matrix elements for 6p-nd, n=5, 6, 7 transitions in cesium are calculated using a relativistic all-order method. The resulting matrix elements are used to evaluate 5d lifetimes and 6p polarizabilities. The data are compared with experimental lifetime and polarizability measurements made by different groups. Domination of the 6p scalar polarizabilities by 5d-6p dipole matrix elements facilitates an exacting consistency check of 5d lifetime and 6p polarizability data. Values of 5d-6p matrix elements obtained from experimental 5d lifetime data are found to be inconsistent with those inferred from 6p polarizabilities derived from experimental Stark shift data. Our ab initio calculated 6p polarizabilities agree well with experimental determinations.Comment: 5 pages, submitted to Physical Review

Sceloporus variabilis

Number of Pages: 3Integrative BiologyGeological Science

Performance of Agronomic Crop Varieties in Alaska 1978 –2002

There is no such thing as the perfect variety for Alaska. Some varieties are adapted to a wide range of climatic and geographic locations, while others are more specific in their adaptation. The change in elevation of a few hundred feet or a move of a few miles can have a considerable effect on the performance of any variety. Also, cultural practices such as tillage, fertilizer rates, planting date, seeding rate, pest control, and a multitude of other factors can also influence crop yields. This is especially noticeable in northern environments such as Alaska. For example, date-of-planting studies done by F.J. Wooding (1973) and C.W. Knight (1989) found that any date after the middle of May for planting an agronomic crop can result in delayed maturity, low yields, and low quality grain, even for the best adapted varieties for Alaska

Banker Fees and Acquisition Premia for Targets in Cash Tender Offers: Challenges to the Popular Wisdom on Banker Conflicts

We analyze data on fees paid to investment bankers and acquisition premia paid for targets in cash tender offers. Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of a benign view of the role of investment banks in advising acquisition targets. Fees to investment banks are correlated with attributes of transactions and target firms in ways that make sense if banks are being paid for processing information. The more contingent (and, therefore, risky) the fees, the higher they tend to be, all else held constant. Variation in acquisition premia also can be explained by fundamental deal attributes. Contrary to the jaundiced view of fairness opinions, greater fixity of fees is not associated with higher acquisition premia, and there is no evidence that investment banks are suborned by acquirors with whom they have had a prior banking relationship.