Capital Account Liberalization, Risk Sharing and Asset Prices

In the month that the capital account is liberalized, all publicly traded firms experience a 7 percent stock price revaluation. Firms whose shares become eligible for purchase by foreigners experience and additional revaluation that is directly proportional to their firm specific reduction in aggregate risk -- the covariance of the typical firm's stock return with the local market is on average 30 times larger than its covariance with the world market. The statistical significance of this proportionality persists after controlling for the firm-specific effects of liberalization on expected future profits in this sample of of 411 firms from 11 countries. These findings suggest that capital account liberalization facilitates risk sharing.

Risk Sharing and Asset Prices: Evidence From a Natural Experiment

When countries liberalize their stock markets, firms that become eligible for purchase by foreigners (investible), experience an average stock price revaluation of 10.4 percent. Since the covariance of the median investible firm's stock return with the local market is 30 times larger than its covariance with the world market, liberalization reduces the systematic risk associated with holding investible securities. Consistent with this fact: 1) the average effect of the reduction in systematic risk is 3.4 percentage points, or roughly one third of the total effect; and 2) variation in the firm-specific response is directly proportional to the firm-specific change in systematic risk. The statistical significance of this proportionality persists after controlling for changes in expected future profits and index inclusion criteria such as size and liquidity.

Capital Account Liberalization: Allocative Efficiency or Animal Spirits?

In the year that capital-poor countries open their stock markets to foreign investors, the growth rate of their typical firm's capital stock exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by 4.1 percentage points. In each of the next three years the average growth rate of the capital stock for the 369 firms in the sample exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by 6.1 percentage points. However, there is no evidence that differences in the liberalization-induced changes in the cost of capital or investment opportunities drive the cross-sectional variation in the post-liberalization investment increases.

Risk Sharing and Asset Prices: Evidence From a Natural Experiment

When countries liberalize their stock markets, firms that become eligible for foreign purchase (investible), experience an average stock price revaluation of 15.1 percent. Since the historical covariance of the average investible firm’s stock return with the local market is roughly 200 times larger than its historical covariance with the world market, liberalization reduces the systematic risk associated with holding investible securities. Consistent with this fact: (1) the average effect of the reduction in systematic risk is 6.8 percentage points, or roughly two fifths of the total revaluation; and (2) the firm-specific revaluations are directly proportional to the firm-specific changes in systematic risk

Risk Sharing and Asset Prices: Evidence From a Natural Experiment

When countries liberalize their stock markets, firms that become eligible for foreign purchase (investible), experience an average stock price revaluation of 15.1 percent. Since the historical covariance of the average investible firm’s stock return with the local market is roughly 200 times larger than its historical covariance with the world market, liberalization reduces the systematic risk associated with holding investible securities. Consistent with this fact: (1) the average effect of the reduction in systematic risk is 6.8 percentage points, or roughly two fifths of the total revaluation; and (2) the firm-specific revaluations are directly proportional to the firm-specific changes in systematic risk

Learning From the Doers: Developing Country Lessons for Advanced Economy Growth

From 1980 to 1992, emerging and developing countries grew by 3.4 percent per year. Their annual rate of growth increased to 5.4 percent between 1993 and 2012. No such increase occurred for advanced nations, whose average growth from 1980-2012 was roughly constant (excluding the impact of the 2008-09 Recession). Developing nations turned themselves around by embracing discipline—sustained commitment to a pragmatic and flexible growth strategy. Three illustrations of discipline through the lens of trade, fiscal, and debt reforms in the developing world offer relevant, practical lessons for recovery in advanced economies and continued catch-up growth in developing nations

Two Tales of Adjustment: East Asian Lessons for European Growth

Paths into the Asian Crisis of 1997-98 and the recent global financial crisis were similar, but the roads out could not be more different. Common wisdom has it that on impact Asia endured fiscal austerity imposed by the IMF whereas the IMF recommended stimulus in the case of the advanced nations at the epicenter of the crisis in 2008-09. While the IMF did recommend different policies to begin with, the fiscal adjustment in Asia was far more modest than is commonly known and the switch from stimulus to austerity in Europe was quite abrupt. The difference in fiscal stance helps explain the difference in the post-crisis paths of output and employment in the two regions