The Round Complexity of Quantum Zero-Knowledge

We study the round complexity of zero-knowledge for QMA (the quantum analogue of NP). Assuming the quantum quasi-polynomial hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem, we obtain the following results: - 2-Round statistical witness indistinguishable (WI) arguments for QMA. - 4-Round statistical zero-knowledge arguments for QMA in the plain model, additionally assuming the existence of quantum fully homomorphic encryption. This is the first protocol for constant-round statistical zero-knowledge arguments for QMA. - 2-Round computational (statistical, resp.) zero-knowledge for QMA in the timing model, additionally assuming the existence of post-quantum non-parallelizing functions (time-lock puzzles, resp.). All of these protocols match the best round complexity known for the corresponding protocols for NP with post-quantum security. Along the way, we introduce and construct the notions of sometimes-extractable oblivious transfer and sometimes-simulatable zero-knowledge, which might be of independent interest

Quantum Key Leasing for PKE and FHE with a Classical Lessor

In this work, we consider the problem of secure key leasing, also known as revocable cryptography (Agarwal et. al. Eurocrypt' 23, Ananth et. al. TCC' 23), as a strengthened security notion of its predecessor put forward in Ananth et. al. Eurocrypt' 21. This problem aims to leverage unclonable nature of quantum information to allow a lessor to lease a quantum key with reusability for evaluating a classical functionality. Later, the lessor can request the lessee to provably delete the key and then the lessee will be completely deprived of the capability to evaluate. In this work, we construct a secure key leasing scheme to lease a decryption key of a (classical) public-key, homomorphic encryption scheme from standard lattice assumptions. We achieve strong form of security where: * The entire protocol uses only classical communication between a classical lessor (client) and a quantum lessee (server). * Assuming standard assumptions, our security definition ensures that every computationally bounded quantum adversary could not simultaneously provide a valid classical deletion certificate and yet distinguish ciphertexts. Our security relies on the hardness of learning with errors assumption. Our scheme is the first scheme to be based on a standard assumption and satisfying the two properties above.Comment: Minor revisions on parameters in the construction. Revised proof Theorem 10.6 proof. Added Seciton 5.2.1 to help with proo

Quantum Key Leasing for PKE and FHE with a Classical Lessor

In this work, we consider the problem of secure key leasing, also known as revocable cryptography (Agarwal et. al. Eurocrypt\u27 23, Ananth et. al. TCC\u27 23), as a strengthened security notion of its predecessor put forward in Ananth et. al. Eurocrypt\u27 21. This problem aims to leverage unclonable nature of quantum information to allow a lessor to lease a quantum key with reusability for evaluating a classical functionality. Later, the lessor can request the lessee to provably delete the key and then the lessee will be completely deprived of the capability to evaluate the function. In this work, we construct a secure key leasing scheme to lease a decryption key of a (classical) public-key, homomorphic encryption scheme from standard lattice assumptions. Our encryption scheme is exactly identical to the (primal) version of Gentry-Sahai-Waters homomorphic encryption scheme with a carefully chosen public key matrix. We achieve strong form of security where: * The entire protocol (including key generation and verification of deletion) uses merely classical communication between a classical lessor (client) and a quantum lessee (server). * Assuming standard assumptions, our security definition ensures that every computationally bounded quantum adversary could only simultaneously provide a valid classical deletion certificate and yet distinguish ciphertexts with at most negligible probability. Our security relies on the hardness of learning with errors assumption. Our scheme is the first scheme to be based on a standard assumption and satisfying the two properties mentioned above. The main technical novelty in our work is the design of an FHE scheme that enables us to apply elegant analyses done in the context of classically verifiable proofs of quantumness from LWE (Brakerski et. al.(FOCS\u2718, JACM\u2721) and its parallel amplified version in Radian et. al.(AFT\u2721)) to the setting of secure leasing. This connection leads to a modular construction and arguably simpler proofs than previously known. An important technical component we prove along the way is an amplified quantum search-to-decision reduction: we design an extractor that uses a quantum distinguisher (who has an internal quantum state) for decisional LWE, to extract secrets with success probability amplified to almost one. This technique might be of independent interest

Rate-1 Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Secure function evaluation (SFE) allows Alice to publish an encrypted version of her input m such that Bob (holding a circuit C) can send a single message that reveals C(m) to Alice, and nothing more. Security is required to hold against malicious parties, that may behave arbitrarily. In this work we study the notion of SFE in the quantum setting, where Alice outputs an encrypted quantum state ∣∣????⟩ | ψ ⟩ and learns ????(∣∣????⟩) C ( | ψ ⟩ ) after receiving Bob’s message. We show that, assuming the quantum hardness of the learning with errors problem (LWE), there exists an SFE protocol for quantum computation with communication complexity (|∣∣????⟩|+|????(∣∣????⟩)|)⋅(1+????(1)) which is nearly optimal. This result is obtained by two main technical steps, which might be of independent interest. Specifically, we show (i) a construction of a rate-1 quantum fully-homomorphic encryption and (ii) a generic transformation to achieve malicious circuit privacy in the quantum setting