Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation

We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner-take-all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campaign spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. We use the model to examine why campaign spending in the United States has increased at the same time that politics has become more polarized. We find that the popular explanation ­ better targeting of campaign spending ­ is not a likely explanation. While better targeting does lead to greater spending, it leads to less polarization. Instead we argue that the likely explanation is that voters references have become more volatile. This will both raise campaign spending and increase polarization. At the same time it is consistent with the observation that voters have become less committed to the two parties.Non Voting Paradox, Electoral Plataforms, Turnout

Voting Leaders and Voting Participation

We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium larger elections are characterized by a higher participation rate. Moreover, no matter what the voters' preferences are, parties spend exactly the same amounts for their campain in equilibrium. Platforms converge to the center (median voter) and spending increases as the uncertainty over voters' preferences decreases.Voter's Paradox, Aggregate Uncertainty.

ECONOMIC RISK AND THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FARM BUSINESSES

Using longitudinal panel farm-level data, this study finds that income variability may be materially influenced by farm size. Econometric results suggest that policy analyses and other considerations of the distributional effects of, and response to, income variability for commercial scale family farms may concentrate on farm size and other structural variables.risk, income variability, farm size, financial structure, Farm Management, Industrial Organization,