ICT, Consulting and Innovative Capabilities

This paper analyzes the impact of the decision to contract ICT consulting on firms' innovative incentives. The paper develops a theoretical model and estimates some of its implications for a sample of German firms. In particular, the paper estimates the average treatment effect of the decision to contract ICT consulting on firms' innovative incentives, considering the role of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity in the correlated random coefficient model. The paper shows three main results. First, the theoretical model shows that ICT consulting increases aggregate incentives to innovate. This result is not corroborated by the empirical application. ICT consulting does not affect neither the probability of introducing product or process innovations nor the number of such innovations. The empirical results show that ICT consulting affects negatively the value of the introduced product and processes innovation. Second, the theoretical model suggests that low productivity firms might evidence either lower, unaffected or higher incentives to innovate. The empirical application shows that low productivity firms exhibit higher incentives to innovate. Third, although the theoretical analysis shows that the lower the productivity level the more the incentives to contract ICT consulting, the empirical evidence is inconclusive on this matter. These results suggest that firms optimize their innovations portfolio through ICT consulting. --ICT Consulting,Competition and Innovation

R&D incentives, compatibility and network externalities

This paper analyzes the impact of network externalities on R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant. The analysis shows that the incumbent always invests more than the entrant in the development of higher quality network goods. However, the incumbent exhibits a too low level of investments, while the entrant invests too much in R&D in comparison with the social optimum. In the model entry occurs too often in equilibrium. These inefficiencies are solely due to the presence of network externalities. By choosing compatible network goods, firms do not necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity. --Network externalities,Innovation,Imperfect Competition

Dynamic R&D incentives with network externalities

This paper studies the incentives to undertake uncertain R&D initiatives in a dynamic duopoly network industry. It is shown that network externalities positively affect the incentives to invest in R&D. In the model, competition resembles a preemption race and, therefore, market performance implies an overinvestment in R&D in comparison with the social optimum. Moreover, network externalities have an important impact in the dynamic evolution of the industry. Although in the long-run a single firm dominates the market (i.e. wins the race), short-run competition is very fierce and concentrated on neck-and-neck technological configurations. This short-run competition is fiercer and longer, the higher the level of network externalities. Policy measures that increase technological diffusion (i.e. mandatory licensing), increase the level of competition and/or prolong the short-run competition have an important positive impact on consumer welfare and on firms? R&D incentives. --Network externalities,Innovation,Imperfect Competition,Dynamic Games

Durable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities

We develop a model of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant with network externalities and durable goods. We show that the threat of entry eliminates the commitment problem that an incumbent may face in its R&D decision due to the goods? durability. Moreover, a potential entrant over-invests in R&D and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, equal or lower R&D investments in comparison with the social optimum. In our model, the incumbent?s commitment problem and the efficiency of its R&D level are determined by the extent of the network externalities. --Network externalities,Durable Goods,Innovation,Imperfect Competition