MODIFYING GEORGIA'S NEGLIGENCE LAW: A NEW GOOD SAMARITAN PARADIGM FOR SOME BUSINESS OWNERS

An investigation of the new statutory standards of conduct relating to accidents involving horses and other equids highlights current issues concerning tort liability. After a summary of existing Georgia Good Samaritan statutes and liability exceptions, part II evaluates the provisions on standards of conduct to show how the statute changes existing law. In part III, two legislative proposals are offered to encourage safer equine activities: (1) an amendment of the statutory provisions on warnings, and (2) adopting new provisions requiring helmets for minors. Through these proposed amendments, the statutory dispensation for equine owners and operators could be based on safety prerequisites.equine liability statute, Good Samaritan statutes, horses, tort liability, Agribusiness,

COOPERATIVE ANTITRUST MONOPOLIZATION AND THE THEORY OF CONTESTABLE MARKETS

The judiciary has relied on a firm's market share to evaluate the presence of monopoly power for a Sherman Act monopolization violation. However, an allegation that a firm's market share constitutes monopoly power may be refuted by evidence that there exists a contestable market. Contestable market theory shows that there is no monopoly power where there exists a threat of entry of other firms. This theory thereby offers agricultural cooperatives, which may have a large market share by reasons of the antitrust immunity provided by the Capper-Volstead Act, an argument to overcome allegations of a Sherman Act monopolization violation.Industrial Organization,

FINANCING THE DISPOSAL OF UNWANTED AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDES

Since the mid 1980s, it has been recognized that significant quantities of unwanted pesticides are being retained by agricultural producers in barns and other out buildings throughout the United States. State governments have responded to the hazards posed by these pesticides by implementing programs to collect and dispose of them. This paper reviews issues related to costs and funding of pesticide collection and disposal programs. Primary and secondary information on states' approaches to and experiences with unwanted pesticide removal is presented. Differences in the theoretical impacts of various collection funding methods on reducing unwanted pesticide stocks and allocating disposal costs are discussed.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When do Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?

State anti-nuisance laws, known as right-to-farm laws, burden neighboring property owners with nuisances. The purpose of the laws is to protect existing investments by offering an affirmative defense. Activities that are not a nuisance when commenced cannot become a nuisance due to changes in land uses by neighbors. While most state laws involve a lawful exercise of the state’s police powers, a right-to-farm law may set forth protection against nuisances that is so great that it operates to effect a regulatory taking. Judicial rulings that two Iowa right-to-farm laws went too far in reducing neighbors’ constitutionally protected rights augur an opportunity to rethink right-to-farm laws. Rather than relying upon a marketplace economy to protect businesses, a law based upon an economy of nature may be drafted to protect farmland and other natural resources

Environmental Mechanism Designs in a New Order of Regulatory Capitalism

Complexity of environmental programs is most apparent with information asymmetries, making the design of efficient mechanisms particularly challenging. As developed theoretically in this paper, a new regulatory capitalism paradigm mating voluntary agreements with environmental education can produce outcomes at least as efficient as voluntary agreements alone. Such a design exploits a key difference between voluntary agreements versus educational programs in terms of their impact on agents' incentive compatibilities. Specifically, in a principal-agent model, voluntary agreements are associated with an incentive-compatibility constraint, whereas educational programs are not. The efficient bundle will likely consist of a set of education programs and voluntary agreements. With the new order of regulatory capitalism, it is time to concentrate on removing barriers yielding inefficient mono-mechanism design and start constructing multidimensional incentives to efficiently allocate effort toward environmental and economic goals.Command and control, environmental education, environmental policy, voluntary agreements, Environmental Economics and Policy,

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION PROTECTION: DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR MULTIPLE PRODUCERS OF REGIONAL SPECIALTY CROPS

Specialty crops grown by multiple producers are often viewed by consumers as differentiated products that command a price premium. Since price premiums are dependent upon differentiation of an item from generic counterparts, specialty crops must have distinctive identities that cannot be copied or mimicked by others. Trademarks are normally employed to differentiate and protect products, but the limitation of trademarks to products from a single source means that differentiation of specialty crops grown by multiple producers may involve difficulties in precluding free riders from adopting the same name. Through a case study of Georgia's Vidalia Onions and an examination of producer price data, this article explores the problem of the protection of product differentiation of regional specialty crops grown by multiple producers.Agribusiness,

EXTERNALITIES FROM ROAMING LIVESTOCK: EXPLAINING THE DEMISE OF THE OPEN RANGE

Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto othersÂ’' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers'Â’ neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause.Livestock Production/Industries,

FINANCING THE DISPOSAL OF UNWANTED AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDES

The disposal of accumulated agricultural pesticides is an expensive proposition due to the hazardous nature of these materials. States have inititated unwanted pesticide collection efforts based on several funding options. Through an evaluation of regulations, funding options and comparison of amounts of pesticides collected to expenditures for pesticides, our paper offers some recommendations for future state collection efforts. It may be advantageous to give greater weight to efficiency considerations for the disposal of existing unwanted pesticide stocks, while equity considerations may be emphasized for the disposal of anticipated future stocks.Environmental Economics and Policy,

FMHA'S EFFORTS AGAINST DELINQUENT BORROWERS: PROPERTY INTERESTS AND TRANSACTION COSTS

A recent judicial decision has precluded the Farmers Home Administration from employing nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in some states. Characteristics of FmHA loans and borrowers suggest that a potential "hold up" problem exists whereby borrowers may cause the value of their mortgaged properties to diminish below the outstanding balance of the loan. Empirical results of a survey show that the preclusion of nonjudicial foreclosure increased FmHAÂ’s direct losses from delinquent borrowers.Agricultural Finance,