A Suggestion on Suggestion

Part I of the full article briefly describes the history and current slate of research into children\u27s suggestibility. In this part, we argue that, although psychological researchers disagree considerably over the degree to which he suggestibility of young children may lead to false allegations of sexual abuse, there is an overwhelming consensus that children are suggestible to a degree that, we believe, must be regarded as significant. In presenting this argument, we respond to the contentions of revisionist scholars, particularly those recently expressed by Professor Lyon. We show that there is good reason to believe the use of highly suggestive questions remains very common, and hat these questions present a significant possibility that children will make false allegations even on matters such as sexual abuse. Part II develops a framework, using Bayesian probability theory, for considering the findings described in Part I. We argue that there is merit to the traditional - and constitutionally compelled - view that an inaccurate criminal conviction is a far worse result than a failure to reach an accurate conviction, and that this perspective should inform the design of legal systems. With this in mind, we explain that even relatively slight probabilities of false allegations are potentially significant. Moreover, we show that the very substantial probability that a child who has been abused will fail to reveal the abuse tends, perhaps counterintuitively, to diminish the probative value of an allegation of abuse when it is actually made. In the discussion below, taken from Part III of the longer article, we turn to discussion of the legal implications of our analysis

The Child Quasi-Witness

This Essay provides a solution to the conundrum of statements made by very young children and offered against an accused in a criminal prosecution. Currently prevailing doctrine allows one of three basic outcomes. First, in some cases the child testifies at trial. But this is not always feasible, and when it is, cross-examination is a poor method for determining the truth. Second, evidence of the child\u27s statement may be excluded, which denies the adjudicative process of potentially valuable information. Third, the evidence may be admitted without the child testifying at trial, which leaves the accused with no practical ability to examine the child. We contend that courts should apply a very different framework. Some very young children lack the cognitive and perhaps moral development necessary to be considered witnesses for purposes of the Confrontation Clause; they are unable to understand the potential consequences of their statements and the significance of those statements. Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause should not apply to very young children\u27s statements. But a child who makes such a statement is still the source of evidence, often very probative evidence. Fundamental fairness therefore requires that the accused have the opportunity to examine the child in some manner. Such examination should not be cross-examination at trial. Rather, it should adhere to the model used for nonhuman sources of evidence: the accused should be able to select a qualified forensic interviewer, who will examine the child out of court according to a prescribed protocol. In this Essay, we outline standards that such a protocol might provide. This model allows evidentiary use of the child\u27s statement, gives the accused a better opportunity than does cross-examination to expose weaknesses in the child\u27s account, and minimizes trauma to the child

A Suggestion on Suggestion

The following essay is adapted from The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implication (86.1 Cornell Law Review 33-108 [November 2000]) and appears here with permission of the publisher. The vulnerabilities of young children have far-reaching implications for the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Arguably, these vulnerabilities may affect how an investigator should interview the child; whether her hearsay statements should be admitted; whether expert evidence concerning her vulnerability should be admitted; and whether a criminal conviction based principally on her testimony should be allowed

A Suggestion on Suggestion

The following essay is adapted from The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implication (86.1 Cornell Law Review 33-108 [November 2000]) and appears here with permission of the publisher. The vulnerabilities of young children have far-reaching implications for the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Arguably, these vulnerabilities may affect how an investigator should interview the child; whether her hearsay statements should be admitted; whether expert evidence concerning her vulnerability should be admitted; and whether a criminal conviction based principally on her testimony should be allowed

The impact of experienced versus non-experienced suggestions on children’s recall of repeated events

Three experiments were conducted to test the proposition that children’s suggestibility about an occurrence of a repeated event is heightened when an interviewer suggests false details that were experienced in non-target occurrences of the event as opposed to new details that never occurred. In each experiment, children participated in a repeated event during which specific items varied each time (e.g., the children always got a sticker but the theme of the sticker was different in each occurrence). Separate biasing and memory interviews were then conducted. In Experiment 1, the interviewer merely suggested that the false details might have occurred in the event. In the remaining experiments, the suggested details were clearly linked to the target occurrence with either a contextual or temporal cue. The potential moderating effect of the child’s age (Experiment 1) and the retention interval (Experiments 1 and 2) were also examined. Consistent with the initial hypothesis, suggestions about experienced (non-target) details were more likely to be repeated by the children compared to suggestions about non-experienced details. In Experiments 2 and 3, experienced suggestions were also more likely to inhibit children’s recall of the target occurrence. The relevance and generalisability of these findings to the legal setting are discussed

Normative developmental vs. reverse developmental trends in memory distortion: a framework to investigate the impact of internal and external influences on memory and their relevance to legal decisions

There are two opposing positions regarding the development of memory: the normative developmental position, and the reverse developmental position. The normative position, which has long been the default presupposition, supports the notion that susceptibility to memory distortion, including false memories, decreases with age. In contrast, the concept of “developmental reversals” supports the notion that susceptibility to memory distortion and false memories increases with age. Each perspective finds support from existing theories as well as from research on endogenous and exogenous sources of influence. In a legal context, having an accurate understanding of the developmental course of false memory can contribute on the one hand to mitigating wrongful convictions and, on the other hand, to appreciating the accuracy of children’s statements when warranted. This review aims to integrate the existing literature regarding these seemingly opposite developmental courses and construct a framework outlining the conditions under which we may observe one age trend over the other. This entails an examination of the paradigms that have been invoked to support these competing positions, specifically developmental responses to internal vs. external sources of distortion

Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns

In the fall of 1994, the publication of Herrnstein and Murray's book The Bell Curve sparked a new round of debate about the meaning of intelligence test scores and the nature of intelligence. The debate was characterized by strong assertions as well as by strong feelings. Unfortunately, those assertions often revealed serious misunderstandings of what has (and has not) been demonstrated by scientific research in this field. Although a great deal is now known, the issues remain complex and in many cases still unresolved. Another unfortunate aspect of the debate was that many participants made little effort to distinguish scientific issues from political ones. Research findings were often assessed not so much on their merits or their scientific standing as on their supposed political implications. In such a climate, individuals who wish to make their own judgments find it hard to know what to believe. Reviewing the intelligence debate at its meeting of November 1994, the Board of Scientific Affairs (BSA) of the American Psychological Association (APA) concluded that there was urgent need for an authoritative report on these issues--one that all sides could use as a basis for discussion. Acting by unanimous vote, BSA established a Task Force charged with preparing such a report. Ulri