The Determinants of Takeovers: Recent Evidence from U.S. Thrifts

This paper uses a two-step methodology to examine the relationship between managerial cost inefficiency and the takeover of U.S. thrifts during a period of market liberalization and widespread takeover activity, 1994 to 2000. In the first stage using stochastic cost frontiers, we estimate controllable managerial cost inefficiency scores for all stock firms operating each year in 1994 to 2000. In a second stage, we use these scores to examine correlates of takeovers, focusing on cost inefficiency. For takeovers by banks, we find a significant negative relationship between cost inefficiency and takeover, suggesting an exit of more cost efficient firms from the thrift industry during this period. However, takeovers by thrifts are associated with other characteristics

Managerial Stock Ownership As A Corporate Control Device: When Is Enough, Enough?

It has long been accepted that managerial stock ownership, beyond some range of possible entrenchment, can be an effective means of aligning the interests of professional managers with those of a firm’s outside owners to the benefit of firm performance. In this paper, we offer evidence on the effectiveness of managerial stock ownership as a corporate control device by analyzing the behavior of 81 thrift institutions operating over the six-year period, 1989-1994. Based on the estimation of stochastic cost and profit frontiers, as well as other performance measures, our results suggest that managerial stock ownership provides an effective corporate control device. However, this device is only effective as managerial holdings surpass about 33% of outstanding shares for improvements in cost efficiency and about 40% for profit efficiency

Managerial Stock Ownership As A Corporate Control Device: When Is Enough, Enough?

It has long been accepted that managerial stock ownership, beyond some range of possible entrenchment, can be an effective means of aligning the interests of professional managers with those of a firm’s outside owners to the benefit of firm performance. In this paper, we offer evidence on the effectiveness of managerial stock ownership as a corporate control device by analyzing the behavior of 81 thrift institutions operating over the six-year period, 1989-1994. Based on the estimation of stochastic cost and profit frontiers, as well as other performance measures, our results suggest that managerial stock ownership provides an effective corporate control device. However, this device is only effective as managerial holdings surpass about 33% of outstanding shares for improvements in cost efficiency and about 40% for profit efficiency

Target company cross-border effects in acquisitions into the UK

We analyse the abnormal returns to target shareholders in crossborder and domestic acquisitions of UK companies. The crossborder effect during the bid month is small (0.84%), although crossborder targets gain significantly more than domestic targets during the months surrounding the bid. We find no evidence for the level of abnormal returns in crossborder acquisitions to be associated with market access or exchange rate effects, and only limited support for an international diversification effect. However, the crossborder effect appears to be associated with significant payment effects, and there is no significant residual crossborder effect once various bid characteristics are controlled for

Regulatory Regimes and Takeovers of U.S. Thrifts

This paper examines the effect of regulatory regime changes on the attributes of acquired thrifts for periods of stringency in 1990 to 1993, and deregulation in 1994 to 2000, with the removal of significant impediments for bank takeovers of thrifts. We test a regime change hypothesis that predicts a more effective takeover market in the later regime. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find bank acquirers to engage in diverse motivations for takeovers in the later regime, including revenue turnaround motives, allowing discipline of profit inefficient firms. The results suggest greater takeover discipline in the later regime, but also suggest a complimentary role for regulatory discipline, with acquirers avoiding more cost inefficient and risky thrifts. In contrast in the early regime, regulatory concerns for building up capital dominate acquisition decisions.Regulatory Regimes, Thrifts, Takeovers, Profit and Cost Efficiency

Firm Efficiency and the Regulatory Closure of S&Ls: An Empirical Investigation.

This paper uses a two-step methodology to examine the relationship between firm inefficiency and the regulatory closure of savings and loans (S&Ls). In the first step, using multiproduct, translog stochastic cost frontiers, the authors estimate inefficiency scores separately for mutual and stock S&Ls operating in the Southwest in 1988. They use the inefficiency scores in second step logit models to identify determinants of regulatory closure. For both mutual and stock S&Ls, the authors find a significant positive relationship between firm inefficiency and regulatory closure. They also find a greater probability of closure for S&Ls in economically depressed states. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.

Cost Inefficiency and the Holding of Non-traditional Assets by Solvent Stock Thrifts

In contrast to greater restrictions on thrifts' non-traditional assets under FIRREA, Congress is considering new legislation forcing thrifts to convert to banks. Hence, the efficiency implications of product diversification for thrifts is an important issue. We examine the relation between thrifts' movement into non-traditional assets and the operating inefficiency of adequately capitalized stock thrifts in 1988 and 1994. We estimate inefficiency scores for individual thrifts for each year using a stochastic cost-frontier methodology. In a second step, we regress these scores against measures for movement into non-traditional assets. We find a significant fall in inefficiency with a rise in holdings of both traditional and non-traditional assets. Our results suggest that greater diversification privileges for thrifts should be beneficial to the health of the industry. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.